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PREFACE
While I was preparing my thesis I was asked, "What has your* 
research to do with political science?" The question was an acute one, 
rooted in the knowledge that my thesis is without charts, graphs, 
tables and statistical analyses. Should the thesis, therefore, he 
"relegated" to the category of history— as opposed to political 
science? In responding to the question, I disclose my preference for 
the traditional approach to the study of politics.
Despite the many accomplishments and the potential of the 
behavioralists, their approach to politics is severely limited and there 
are many questions, they freely admit, which they are unable to explore. 
It is where the behavioralists end their research that the tradition­
alists must begin theirs. Whereas the behavioralists are limited by 
their insistence upon exactitude and regularity, the traditionalists 
are limited by their inability to insist upon those desiderata. Poli­
tical science is best served, therefore, by its students who understand 
the prejudices of their favored approach and look to their colleagues 
of different persuasions for their compleieitary wisdom and advice.
A persistent danger exists in the arguments of those who wish 
to define out of the discipline of political science those whose 
methods of research may not be in vogue. Whether he uses mathematics 
or philosophy there ought to be room within the discipline of politics 
for any student or scholar who seeks to understand political man. At
one point in the education of every student should come the knowledge 
that college catalog division of subjects is a matter of academic con­
venience and that the unity of knowledge resists such arbitrary com­
partment alization. In short, then, who is to say whether history is 
the rightful property for study of political scientists or politics is 
the bailiwick of historians?
This thesis is a reflection of my belief that a political 
science devoid of philosophical speculation and historical analysis is 
a bankrupt enterprise. Perhaps the best example of this in inter­
national politics is in the writing of Thucydides who said that the 
events he described in the Peloponnesian War " . . .  have been before 
and shall be ever as long as human nature is the same.""*' Because the 
work of philosophers and historians cannot be reduced to formulas or 
equations is no reason to dismiss their work as only peripheral to 
political science or to fail to honor them by the conferral of the 
title of "political scientist."
* * *
For his patience, encouragement and constant assistance, I must 
thank Professor Alan J. Ward. Both as teacher and as thesis advisor, 
Professor Ward has been willing to help me in every way possible in my 
year at William and Mary. Professor Chonghan Kim and Professor James 
M. Roherty critically read the manuscript and provided a number of 
helpful suggestions. I am grateful also for their availability to me
■^ ■Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Vol. I, the Thomas Hobbes 
Translation, ed. by David Grene (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1959)> P* 20l|. (Bk. Ill, 82; see also, IV, 18 inter alia.)
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and their genuine interest in my thesis throughout the year.
I owe an indirect and inestimable debt of gratitude to Profes­
sor Peter V. Sampo, former associate professor of politics at 
St. Anselm's College, Manchester, New Hampshire, whose love of learning 
first attracted me to the study of politics. I must also acknowledge 
the help and ready encouragement of my wife Rebecca.
Learning is an activity without end. Students of all disci­
plines might well adopt as their motto, as I have, the maxim of the 
French historian Fustel de Coulanges, "Qiiaero"— "I seek to learn." To 
those who have helped me learn to this point I am sincerely grateful.
JHT
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ABSTRACT
The thesis is an historical analysis of the diplomatic and 
military policies of the United Rations and the United States during 
the Korean War. The thesis demonstrates that the mis judgments in 
United Rations1 policy have their origin not in a conspiracy against 
or by the United States, but rather in the failure of UR leaders to 
appreciate the symbiosis between military power and diplomatic purpose. 
The failure to integrate power and purpose was most dramatically mani­
fested in the fluctuating objectives of UR policy and the progressive 
deterioration of UR military might.
The thesis inquires into the nature and causes of the frustra­
tion and irresolution which characterized the two-year period (195>1- 
1953) of the Korean War truce talks. The argument is adduced that, to 
a significant degree, the impasse at the conferences was a product of 
the UR leaders' diplomatic misperceptions of the cultural, political 
and military orientations and objectives of their bargaining adver­
saries.
The thesis concerns itself with the notion that the respective 
bargaining rivals represented divergent— and at first, irreconcilable—  
purposes; that only after prolonged disputes did it become clear to the 
UR leaders What the progress of truce talks between belligerents 
depends for its direction upon the application of military power which 
is coincident with and complementary to simultaneous negotiatory ini­
tiatives. The thesis characterizes the policies under examination as a 
study in negotiatory naivetel
vii
POWER ARK POLITICS IR THE KOKEAH WAR: 
A STULY IR REGOTIATORY RAIVETE^
INTRODUCTION
. . . In a legitimate order, a conference represents a struggle to find 
formulas to achieve agreement; in a revolutionary order, it is a strug­
gle to capture the symbols which move humanity.-
— Henry Kissinger
Although the complexities and controversies of the Korean War 
pale by comparison with those of the Vietnam War, there is a plethora 
of information about the three-year conflict in Korea. In the twenty 
years that have elapsed since the signing of the armistice at Panmunjom, 
scholars and soldiers have produced a wealth of commentary concerning 
the issues that emerged during the war. Among the controversies are 
MacArthur's relief by Truman, the brainwashing- of UN POWTs, the degree 
of success of the UN collective security effort, the alleged use by the 
UN of germ warfare against the North Koreans and a host of other debat­
able topics. A representative divergence of opinion about the success 
of the UN military effort is that between Senator Joseph McCarthy and 
General Matthew Ridgway. The former regarded the effort in Korea as a
p
"tremendous defeat" while the latter thought that in Korea "the crest 
of the Communist wave was broken" by the UN Army.-^
ICited in David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1961+), p. 310.
2Pacts on File, XIII, No. 667 (August 7-13, 19$h), P- 267.
^Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1967)> p. 2i|l.
2
3Almost all the controversies about the Korean War are related
to the core question of whether the United Nations should have pursued
a policy of military victory. Is it true, as Lord Fisher said, that
’’moderation in war is imbecility”^ or, as General MacArthur put it,
b
that "in war there is no substitute for victory” To be sure, the 
indecisiveness of the war (ridiculed by some with the label "Die for 
Tie") was a factor in its increasing unpopularity in the United States; 
"by 195>2 there were even allegations that victory was not forthcoming 
because the State Department was honey-combed with subversives. On 
balance, however, Thomas Schelling seems right in making the observa­
tion that because the Korean War was limited by "dramatic restraints" 
such a.s no use of atomic weaponry and no invasion of Chinese Communist
soil, the war can be considered "evidence that the capacity for vio-
£
lence can be consciously restrained."
This thesis is concerned with the notion that for the United 
Sta,tes^ the conscious restraint of violence represented an anomaly from 
the traditional American approach to the problems of power (military 
force) and politics (diplomacy). In recent previous wars, military 
victories had permitted Americans the comfortable illusion of regarding 
power politics as an oxymoron. In Korea, with the prospect of military
^Cited in Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1967), p. 332.
^The New York Times, April 20, 195>1» P»
^Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale Uni­
versity Press, 1966), p. 31*
^Except where plain distinction is indicated by the text, the 
terms United States and United Nations are used interchangeably through­
out the thesis.
kvictory ruled out, Americans were confronted with the need to under­
stand power as an aspect of diplomacy. Forced by the reality of the 
Korean War truce talks to integrate power and politics, Americans only 
slowly realized the bankruptcy of their former arbitrary compartment- 
alization of power and politics. The division of power and politics 
that had been a comfortable illusion before the war in Korea, became a 
serious liability during it.
The problem explored in this thesis is not whether the Korean 
War should have been limited and localized (which is here understood as 
axiomatic); rather, the problem examined in the following chapters con­
cerns the influence of the limited application of TIN military power 
upon the truce talks. General Mark Clark’s words neatly summarize the 
argument of this study: "I believe . . . that we could have obtained
better truce terms quicker, shortened the war and saved lives, if we
Q
had got tougher faster.’1 The American experience of deprecating power 
politics led many American leaders and their TOT counterparts to a 
series of judgments about the purpose, the principles and the timing of
negotiations that can best be described as naive.
The problems encountered by TOT negotiators during the Korean 
truce talks are of enduring interest. The point should be made in that
connection that of the mistakes made by TOT leaders during the Korean
War, a fair share may have their roots in the very soil of democratic 
institutions themselves. Alexis de Tocqueville observed about a cen­
tury ago that
Q
Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 195U)> P« 3«
5Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities 
which a democracy possesses; and they require, on the con­
trary, the perfect use of almost all those faculties in which 
it is deficient. . . .  A democracy is unable to regulate the 
details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design, 
and to work out its execution in the presence of serious 
obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy, and 
it will not await their consequences with p a t i e n c e .  ^
While the thesis will make the point that, because of their attitude 
toward the experience with power politics, the Communists had the edge 
during the Korean truce talks, no implication is intended that western­
ers should adopt entirely the ruthless approach of Communist bargain­
ers.^ bean Acheson has rightly observed that "The means we choose to 
overcome the obstacles in our path must be consonant with our deepest 
moral sense.Similarly, George Kennan has written that "The great­
est danger that can befall us in coping with . . . Communism is that we
1 p
shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping."
The point of the thesis is that it is imperative for western
diplomats to understand the approach to diplomatic and military (diplo-
military) affairs of their bargaining rivals, buring the Korean truce
13talks TJN strategists were continually offering the Communists the
9Alexis de Tocqueville, bemocracv in America, trans. by Henry 
Reeve (New York: Arlard and Saunders, 1838), pp. 215-216.
■^Walter Hermes has written that "Since the Communist dialectic 
permitted the ends to justify the means, the enemy had no hesitation in 
employing any method calculated to achieve success in the negotiations." 
US Army in the Korean War: Truce Tent and. Fighting Front (Washington,
b.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), pp. 50$-%Q6.
•^Cited in Robert Leckie, Conflict: The History of the Korean
War, 1950-1953 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962), p. 399*
•^cited in Halle, The Cold War as History, p. 266.
13The term Communist, unless otherwise specified in the text,
is used throughout the thesis as a collective reference to the North
Koreans, the Chinese Communists and the Soviets. This collective 
reference, of course, is more appropriate in that connection then 
(1950-1953) than a similar use would be now.
/o
carrot of good will and faithful negotiations instead of admonishing 
them with the stick of applied military power. If the UN leaders had 
understood that the Communists were coming to truce talks to achieve 
purposes vastly different from those of the UN, it is probable that the 
UN. could have adopted a different, far more effective negotiatory tech­
nique. Hans Morgenthau, for instance, has written that among the tasks 
of diplomacy is the need to determine its objectives "in the light of 
the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit of these 
objectives. The thesis attempts to marshal evidence that the United 
Nations based its policy options more on hopes than facts, more on 
promises than realities. In its great concern to have peace, the UN 
undermined its own military and diplomatic cause and contributed to the 
support of its foes.
The Korean truce talks, as William Vatcher has observed, repre­
sented a "battleground between two ideologies— one dedicated to world
revolution, the other to evolution; one seeking to impose its ideals by
lb
force or subversion, the other attempting to protect its ideals." ^
This conflict of ideology is a theme that runs through the history of 
the Korean War. The democratic leader, as opposed to the autocrat, has 
a constant need to explain and defend his programs and policies, to 
justify them to his national constituency. By so doing, however, he 
runs the risk of providing his enemy with an intelligence that might
■^Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for
Power and Peace, 5>th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1972)> p^  
f>19. All references to this book in the thesis are to this edition.
■^William H. Vatcher, Jr., Panmun.jom: The Story of the Korean
Military Armistice Negotiations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.,
195>8)> P« vii.
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otherwise "be -unavailable. Nowhere is this great paradox of democracy 
so clear as in the Korean trace talks. A good portion of the first 
chapter is an examination of the public relations problems encountered 
by the Truman Administration from the time the decision was made to
/
enter the war until the truce talks started a year later. Fred Ikle 
addressed himself to this problem in his book How Nations Negotiate:
In situations where fighting will continue or threatens 
to resume unless agreement is reached, public opinion and 
other domestic forces may exert considerable pressures on 
negotiators to agree. Often, there are important asymmetries 
in the susceptibility to such pressures. American negotia­
tors at Panmunjom and their superiors in Washington felt very 
strongly the yearning back home for an end to the fighting, 
but their Chinese and North Korean opponents— while sensitive 
to the military weakness of their side— remained relatively 
immune to popular sentiment in their countries.1^
The prescience of Morgenthau's "rule" of diplomacy that the government
17must be the leader of public opinion, not its slave, ' is made apparent 
by a study of the Korean War's diplo-military events.
Although a chronology is provided in the thesis (see Appendix
A), mention should be made here of the major diplo-military occurrences
of the war. It is possible to divide the war into seven time frames in
18order to demonstrate the chief events of the war:
(1) The North Korean Invasion (June-September, 19f?0).
(2) UNC Recovery and Invasion of North Korea (September- 
November, 1950).
(3 ) Chinese Communist Entry and NKPA Recovery (November, 1950- 
January, 1951)•
l^Fred C. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper and
Row, I96I+), p. 29. His Chapter 12, "Negotiating Skill: East and
West," (pp. 225-255) highlights a number of differences in approach.
-^Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 5^7*
^®A glossary (abbreviations) and maps follow the concluding 
chapter of the thesis.
8(U) UNC counter-offensive and First Hints of "Peace" (January- 
June, 195l)*
(5) The Beginning of Talks at Kaesong and their Suspension 
(July-August, 1951).
(6) TJNC Autumn Offensive (August-October, 193>l).
(7) Start of Talks at Panmunjom and Subsequent Events (October,
1951-July 27, 1953).
An historical analysis, the thesis is divided into four chap­
ters. The first chapter deals with the diplo-military events from the 
decision to intervene in the war to the decision to negotiate an end to 
the war, a year later. Of particular importance in the first chapter 
is the relationship between military circumstance and political policy.
The second chapter describes the first meetings of the UHC delegates 
with their CCF and EKPA counterparts at Kaesong. This chapter is 
largely concerned with the relationship between the battlefield situa­
tion and its influence, or lack of it, on the negotiatory process. The 
third chapter is concerned with the conference at Panmunjom and with 
events leading to the end of the war. Of chief importance in the third 
chapter are the "little armistice" and Eisenhower's accession to the 
Presidency. The fourth chapter is the conclusion.
To claim for the thesis that it is anything more than a case 
study of how UN leaders understood the relationship between power and 
politics during the Korean War would be too pretentious. The thesis, 
therefore, is not represented as a handbook for negotiators or as a 
manual for soldiers. However, although the literature dealing with the 
Korean War is plentiful, there are relatively few sources concerned 
with diplo-military events and inter-relationships. A thesis concerned 
exclusively with that subject may be able to make a contribution to the 
understanding of this critical aspect of the Korean Conflict.
9Of the secondary sources used in this thesis, three were espe­
cially valuable: Fehrenbach's This Kind of War, Hermes' Truce Tent and
Fighting1 Front, and Rees' Korea: The Limited War. Primary sources for
this thesis have included works by Douglas MacArthur, the first UHC 
Commander-in-Chief; Matthew Ridgway, the second Commander-in-Chief;
Mark Clark, the third UHC Commander-in-Chief; Dean Acheson, Secretary 
of State; J. Lawton Collins, US Army Chief of Staff; C. Turner Joy,
Senior Delegate of the UEC to the truce talks at Kaesong and Panmunjom; 
William Vatcher, a US Army lieutenant who served on the Panmunjom truce 
team for eight months; and Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. A number 
of other sources, primary and secondary, were used, including govern­
ment publications and periodical literature.
The principal source for the thesis is Admiral Joy's How Com­
munists Negotiate. Fred Ikle/fs comments about Joy's book highlight the 
basic premise of this thesis.
The American military officer, when he finds himself in 
negotiations with the opponent, may still fail to see that 
military power must serve the over-all aims of foreign policy 
and that the distinction between military and political objec­
tives is only a question of emphasis between means and ends, 
not a choice between two divergent goals. An illustration is 
provided by Admiral Joy. . . . After one hundred and fifty 
pages of penetrating insight and useful advice, Joy's book 
lapses into the following error: "A military armistice agree­
ment should be no more than an agreement between opposing com­
manders to stop the fighting. It should never be concerned 
with political questions.
The point that Ikle*" makes is that what is political and what is mili­
tary is not always perfectly clear; efforts to segregate the two ele­
ments are capricious and counter-productive. This thesis contends that
•*-9ik;le#, How Nations Negotiate, p. 1^7•
10
20negotiators in wartime require a particularly keen sense of balance 
"between negotiatory initiative and military power. The most naive and 
telling mistake made by the leaders of the United Nations was their 
failure to appreciate the symbiotic relationship between military power 
and diplomatic purpose. Their inability to perceive that wartime 
diplomacy depends for its direction and denouement upon applied mili­
tary power resulted in a derangement of their objectives and a vitia­
tion of their strength.
20The point here is that wartime diplomacy, which is concerned 
with ending wars, is different from peacetime diplomacy, which is con­
cerned with preventing them. One must therefore regard definitions of 
negotiations, unless clearly stipulated, as pertaining to peacetime 
negotiations. Examples of this type may be seen in Arthur Lall, Modern 
International Negotiation: Principles and Practice (New York: Colum­
bia University Press, 1966), p^ 9 ; and Ikle1*, How Nations Negotiate, pp.
3-k.
CHAPTER I
THE UN GOES TO VAR: THE POLICY
FARRAGOES OF LIMITED CONFLICT
The crusading mind knows nothing of persuasion and compromise.
It knows only of victory and defeat.^
— Hans J. Morgenthau
Historical Background
At the Cairo Conference in December, 191+3 > ^he United States, 
Great Britain and China pledged their determination that "in due course" 
Korea would become free and independent. That pledge was reaffirmed by 
the Potsdam Declaration in July, 1945? subscribed to by the Soviet
Union when it declared war against Japan in August, 19U5>- When the 
Japanese surrendered, the nearest American troops to Korea were in 
Okinawa, 600 miles away and in the Philippines, about 1^00 miles away. 
The Soviets and Americans therefore decided that Soviet troops, which 
were already in Korea, would disarm the Japanese above the 38"th paral­
lel, and the Americans, below it.
Although this division of Korea at the 38th parallel had been 
intended by the Americans as a temporary expedient, it soon became evi­
dent that the Soviets regarded it as a permanent division. Subsequent 
US efforts to unite Korea were unsuccessful. In May, 191+8> the United
■^Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 5>30"5>31«
11
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Nations supervised an election in South Korea and on August l5> 19U8, 
the Republic of Korea (ROK) was officially established. Not to be out­
done, the Soviets proclaimed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
on September 9» 19^8, and announced in December that its withdrawal of 
troops from North Korea had been completed.
Despite evidence that the Soviets had been building a powerful 
North Korean Army, the United States completed its withdrawal of occu­
pation forces in June, 19^ -9> leaving only a small military advisory 
team in the ROK. The Soviets did not permit UN observation of their 
troop withdrawal; however, the American withdrawal was verified by a UN
O
commission which filed its favorable report in July, 19^ -9- After the
war had begun, US Representative Walter Judd was to write that among
the mistakes that led to Korea was
. . . the decision by military men in Washington to divide 
Korea along the 38th parallel. . . . /Another error/ was that 
for the first three years after V-J Day we refused to train 
armed forces to defend South Korea, although we knew the Rus­
sians were feverishly developing large forces in North Korea 
and had large and experienced units made up of Koreans in 
both Siberia and Manchuria.3
Although the United States had contributed economic, technical 
and some military assistance to the fledgling government of South 
Korea, there were serious questions being raised in the US about the 
strategic importance of the ROK to the American defense posture. That 
the ROK was not considered especially important to American security 
interests is attested to, in part, by both the words of high military
^U.S., Department of State, United States Policy in the Korean 
Crisis, Par Eastern Series Pubn. No. 3922 (1930), pp. IX-Xll see 
also John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 196%), pp. 8I4-86.
3walter H. Judd, "The Mistakes That Led to Korea," Reader's 
Digest, November, 1950, pp. 5U-55-
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and political figures and the disposition of forces. In the spring of 
1949? for instance, General MacArthur had outlined an American "line of 
defense" in the Far East that omitted the Korean peninsula.^" In Janu­
ary, 1950? the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, made a speech in 
which he too outlined a defense perimeter which ran, he said, " . . .  
along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus . . .  to the 
Philippine Islands." Representative Judd said of Achesonrs speech 
that "The occupants of the Kremlin looked at the map and found that 
Korea . . . was "beyond our line and therefore would not "be defended by 
us. So they moved in. Why should anyone be surprised?"
One major consideration of the post-World War II world was the 
declining strength of the American armed forces. By 1950 there simply
^Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American
Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957)? P- 164*
^Cited in Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Inter­
est (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951)? P* 263. As historian Samuel
Eliot Morison has pointed out in his The Oxford History of the American 
People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965): "This speech was
held up against Acheson . . . as an ’invitation' to the communists to 
overrun South Korea. He was able to prove that his perimeter was 
exactly the same as the one previously defined by General MacArthur. 
Moreover, he repeatedly asked Congress to provide military aid for 
South Korea, even after the House on 19 January defeated the aid bill 
which the state department had requested." (p. IO67). Discussing the 
failure of the Congress to furnish continued support to Korea, Acheson 
said, "The idea that we should scrap all of that /help to Korea/, that 
we should stop half way through the achievement of the establishment of 
this country seems to me to be the most utter defeatism and utter mad­
ness in our interests in Asia." Cited in Morgenthau, In Defense of the 
National Interest, p. 266. For further debate on the matter of defined 
American defense interests, see J. C. Vincent's letter in The New York 
Times, January 30, 1957 (p* 28), and General MacArthur's rejoinder in 
ibid., February 4? 1957 (p* 18).
^Judd, "The Mistakes That Led to Korea," p. 55* In this 
regard, Robert T. Oliver wrote: "To the Kremlin it must have appeared 
that the Republic of Korea was not only hopelessly weak militarily, but 
also had been abandoned diplomatically." "Why War Came in Korea," Cur­
rent History, September, 1950? P* 140.
lb
were not enough troops to fulfill widespread American commitments. In 
this shortage of troops, one writer, Robert Osgood, finds another rea­
son that the Communists felt they could invade South Korea with impun­
ity.
. . .  It did not even take the withdrawal of American troops 
or the statements of MacArthur or Acheson to assure the Com­
munists that they might safely attack South Korea. The severe 
shortage of American ground troops, combined with America's 
repeated stress upon preparing to meet the Russians in a total 
war in Europe, ought to have been enough to convince them that 
the United States would not divert precious troops from major 
strategic areas for the defense of Korea. . . . America's 
military establishment in the years before the Korean War was 
so inadequate that . . . the Chiefs of Staff were concerned 
about obtaining enough men to guard the air strips at Fair­
banks, Alaska.7
John Spanier reached a similar conclusion in saying that Korea was mili­
tarily dispensable within the framework of American security because in 
a global war, its fate would be decided in other theaters of war. In 
fact, Spanier points out, one of the reasons that US troops were with­
drawn from Korea was that in a major confrontation with the Russians,
US troops in Korea would be vulnerable to Soviet ground forces and might
g
be trapped on the Korean peninsula.
These misjudgments in American policy provided the Communists 
with ample evidence that, as Osgood put it,
7osgood, Limited War, p. 161+. Particularly revealing in this 
connection is T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War; Korea-A Study in 
Unpreparedness (New York: Pocket Books, Inc. , T§oU)} pp. 5>-108, passim.
See also David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1961).), especially pp. x-xvi.
o
°Spanier, American Foreign Policy, p. 8 7. The high state of 
readiness of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) was consistently 
underestimated by American political and military leaders. Said General 
Matthew B. Ridgway in The Korean War, p. 114: "What is truly inexcus­
able, I believe, . . . was a failure to assess properly the high level 
of combat effectiveness that the North Korean Peoples Army had attained."
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. . . the American government would not consider it worthwhile 
to defend South Korea; and if they interpreted America's con­
duct of foreign policy in terms of their own standards, they 
could hardly have reached any other conclusion than that the 
United States would acquiesce in a limited move of a satellite 
army into a minor strategic position.9
American strategic thinking, in the five-year period between the end of 
World War II and the start of the Korean War, can be summarized this 
way: if war comes, it will be total; if war comes, it will occur in a
major theater (viz., Europe); even if war occurs in Korea, it will not 
involve vital American interests. The uncertainty and instability of 
this strategic thinking is vividly illustrated by the events of June,
19509 when: war came and it was limited; the war occurred in Korea;
and the war was seen as involving vital American interests. The case 
can be made that in making his decision to intervene in Korea, Presi­
dent Truman was significantly influenced by a desire to salvage what he 
could from policies that the NKPA invasion had shattered.
One should recall when examining the Korean War intervention 
decision that it came close on the heels of the fall of China to the 
Communists. Truman's entire Far East policy was under political attack.
To many people in the United States of 1950 > "the invasion of South 
Korea was as much a product of Administration blundering as it was of 
North Korean aggression. Truman, of course, is said to have kept on 
his desk the famous sign "The Buck Stops Here." With respect to Korea, 
the buck surely did stop with Truman, but not until a number of bureau­
crats had passed it along at top speed in hopes of averting liability 
for the Korean War "fault." In fact, according to US News and World 
Report, Korea, in effect, was
^Osgood, Limited War, p. 165.
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. . .  a second "Pearl Harbor," less than nine years after the 
first. . . .  no real military defense was ready. . . . Rear 
Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, chief of the Central Intel­
ligence Agency, now testifies before Congress that he warned 
the Defense Department on June 9— about two weeks before the 
attack— -that the North Korean Army had ordered civilians 
evacuated . . .  a sure sign of approaching military activity.
He also had reported that a sizable military force was ready 
in North Korea and that Russia had agreed to supply North 
Koreans with a stated number of tanks, planes and other mili­
tary equipment.10
Then was the "fault" with the Defense Department? No, according to US 
News: "Defense officials imply that CIA has been crying ’WolfI' so
often and about so many places that Korea was not considered any more 
crucial than a number of other spots.
Was the Far East Command, which clearly was unprepared, at fault
for the failure to detect and react to the invasion? MacArthur said no:
"The Far East Command, until the President’s great pronouncement to
support the epochal action of the United Nations, had no slightest
responsibility /sic~7 for the defense of . . . Korea. With the Presi-
12dent’s decision, it assumed a completely new and added mission."
Congress, in not responding to Acheson’s requests for aid to 
Korea, may be assessed a portion of the blame; its case is not helped 
by the record of an interview with Senator Tom Connally, then chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who, when asked if Korea 
were still an essential part of the US defense strategy, had replied 
(on May 5, 1950), "No. Of course, any position like that is of some
10"Korean Fumble: Whose Fault?" US News and World Report,
August 1+, 1950, P» 18. See also: "Capital in Dispute on Korean
Attack," The New York Times, June 26, 1950, p. 3? s-nh "War No Surprise, 
Intelligence Says," in ibid., June 27, 1950, p. 3-
^-''Korean Fumble: Whose Fault?" p. 18.
l^ ibid.t p# 18.
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strategic importance. But I don’t think it is very greatly impor­
tant.”^
The confusion caused by the North Korean invasion was a con­
tinuation of muddled, cloudy thinking about whether Korea was, in fact, 
important to American defense posture and, if so, how important it was.
The ill-conceived strategies and public statements concerning Korea 
were reflections of a hesitant and poorly-defined policy. Later, 
during the MacArthur hearings, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson was 
asked, "Was there a U.S. war plan made up for use in case of attack in 
Korea?" Secretary Johnson replied simply, "No, sir."^
On the strength solely of public statements by American leaders 
and available information about the disposition and readiness of US 
armed forces, North Korean authorities appear justified in concluding 
that an invasion of the ROK would not stimulate a high-powered American 
response. At worst, the North Koreans might have anticipated US invec­
tive against them in diplomatic circles.
The Framework of the Intervention Decision 
Few incidents in history lend themselves to unicausal analysis.
That is, with few exceptions, most historical events require analysis 
based upon several probable causes. The decision of US leaders to 
intervene in Korea is not one of the few exceptions. To be sure, one 
of the factors which influenced Truman in his decision to intervene was 
his desire to redeem his Far East policy which, after the fall of China
13ibid.
Johnson Tells About 'K Day,'" US News and World Report,
June 22, 19^1, p. 21.
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and the invasion of the ROK, was liable to being' charged as "soft on 
communism." However, Truman’s desire to redeem his policies is only 
one of a number of compelling reasons that the Administration reacted 
to the Korean crisis with its surprising speed and firmness.^
While few would dispute that the American decision to go to 
the aid of the South Koreans was a highly political decision, calcu­
lated according to international diplomatic and military exigencies, 
one would be remiss in attributing only a political character to the 
Korean intervention decision which was rendered in a moral framework.
It is inappropriate to speculate here on the chemistry or formula (so 
much politics added to so much morality) to which US foreign policy 
must be made to conform; it is equally out of order to survey the 
foreign policies of other nations to arrive at a base for comparison 
of the degrees to which their foreign policies are moral or political.
And there is the recurring problem of definition: what is moral and
what is political? Are they mutually exclusive or do they strike a 
balance at some imperceptible point in the formulation of foreign 
policy?
It seems fair to say that the history of US foreign policy 
reveals a preoccupation with what is considered to be objectively 
right, ethical or moral. Thus it was in keeping with tradition that 
Truman could say of his intervention decision that: "It should be made
15a version which differs markedly from the one documented in 
this thesis concerning the US entry into the war, its prosecution, and 
the peace talks, can be read in I. F. Stone, Tne Hidden History of the 
Korean War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952); Stone's book is
highly polemical and is dismissed by John Spanier as "untenable." See 
Spanier's criticism of the book in his The Truman-MacArthur Contro­
versy and the Korean War (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1965)»
p . 305.
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perfectly clear that the action was -undertaken as a matter of "basic
l6moral principle." If US policy is formulated— or, at worst, ration­
alized— in terms of what is thought to be objectively right, Communist 
foreign policy formulates or rationalizes what is right in terms of 
self-interest. While we must be willing to make allowances for the 
individual actions of some Communist nations, Communist ideologues have 
made no secret of their formula for foreign policy: what advances
their cause is just and what impedes their cause is unjust. The right­
eousness of Communist ends permits, even encourages, means that the
17less ideologically committed would view as unscrupulous. '
In international politics nations preserve or extend their
advantages by employing power. Power can be defined in any of a number
of ways but what underlies nearly all definitions of power is the
notion that power is a tool used to promote certain purposes decided
upon by the leadership of the nation in question. The conception of
power as a political tool is one that plainly is more in harmony with
the Communist understanding of adversary world politics than it is with
the American. John Spanier has expressed the problem this way:
American depreciation of power and reluctance to recognize it 
as a factor in human affairs makes it psychologically neces­
sary to rationalize actions in the international arena in 
terms of ideological objectives and universal moral principles.
American power must be "righteous" power used not for purposes 
of power politics and selfish national advantage but for the 
peace and welfare of all mankind. Inherent in this public
XDHarry S. Truman, "Tire Korean Situation: Its Significance to
the People of the United States," The Department of State Bulletin, 
Vol. 23, No. £78 (July 31, 1950), p. 163.
■^See, for instance, U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Un- 
American Activities, Facts on Communism: The Communist Ideology, by
Gerhart Niemeyer, House Document No. 33^, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., i960, 
especially pp. 133-135•
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image of the United States as a noble and unselfish crusader on 
behalf of moral principles was an extreme danger, however—  
namely, that if the enemy were not properly punished through 
total defeat, the reaction to the war would be one of frustra­
tion and disillusionment.-*-^
Of critical importance, then, to an understanding of war aims 
and objectives is the framework in which they are set. Waging a war 
with limited means for a limited objective, and possibly for an unlim­
ited time, was a new and upsetting experience for Americans. If US 
policy is labeled moral, then that of the enemy must be understood as 
immoral. How does a nation deal with the immorality of another nation?
Set in a moral frame-work, the only logically consistent suggestion is 
that the immoral nation must be punished. In short, as Henry Kissinger 
points out, US moral foundations require a total solution, resulting in 
the proper punishment to the immoral adversary: ". . . we necessarily
had to ascribe the cause of war to the machinations of wicked men. Our 
military actions were thereby transformed into crusades to punish the
f.19aggressor." ^
Extending the argument, one cannot adequately punish the 
immoral nation by accomplishing a very circumscribed, limited objective.
What is called for is victory: victory in the manner of the Spanish-
American War of 1898 and of World War I and World War II. Anything 
less than total victory would accord a measure of triumph to the enemy, 
that is to immorality. As expressed by Robert Strausz-Hupe:
■*-®Spanier, American Foreign Policy, pp. 89-90.
-^Henry a . Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of 
American Foreign Policy, Anchor Books (Garden City, H.Y.: Doubleday
and Co., Inc., 1962), p. 182.
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It is indeed a paradox of our time that democracies, once fully 
mobilized for military conflict, are apt to outdo the dictator­
ships in waging total military war— the war for unconditional 
surrender. This paradox derives from the democracies' instabil­
ity of mood— the oscillation between the aversion against all 
things military and a war psychosis that can be appeased only 
by total victory and the severe punishment of the enemy.^0
What all of this points out, of course, is that the moral frame­
work in which the war was set demanded a total, that is a military, 
solution. How can one bargain or negotiate with evil? How can one 
reach an accord or agreement with him who is immoral? The moral dilem­
ma of the Korean War, one which originated in part with the need to 
brand the adversary’s actions as "immoral," seriously impeded and 
jeopardized the negotiations which later took place.
In assessing the framework in which the intervention decision
was set, we also need to understand the political interpretations of
the North Korean attack that were employed by UN leaders in their
policy formulations. Alexander George presents five interpretations
that help explain why Korea rather suddenly became, as Spanier put it,
21
". . . identified with the survival of the United States itself."
The interpretations of the attack were:
(1) the "Diversionary Move" Interpretation— the attack on 
Korea was a mere diversion; a major attack in a vital area 
might occur anytime.
(2 ) the "Soft-Spot Probing" Interpretation— the attack was a 
probe to see whether the US would permit the erosion of 
its soft spots.
(3) the "Testing" Interpretation— if Korea were allowed to 
fall, then the Soviets could test US resolve elsewhere.
pr\ /
Robert Strausz-Hupe, et al., Protracted Conflict: A Chal­
lenging Study of Communist Strategy, Harper Colophon Hooks (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1963), p. 3 7.
2^-Spanier, American Foreign Policy, p. 87*
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(U) the "Demonstration" Interpretation— Korea was a Communist 
show of force, a propaganda effort.
(5) the "Soviet Far East Strategy" Interpretation— Korea was 
proof of Soviet intentions in the Far East.^2
Regardless of the interpretation considered to he most important in the 
decision to defend Korea, it is of central importance that, according 
to the announced policy of the United States, Korea should have heen 
permitted to fall. However, according to George, there is no material 
available to indicate whether consideration was even given to the pos­
sibility of permitting the fall of Korea while concentrating on pre-
21venting further Communist aggression in other areas.
The Army Chief of Staff at the time, General J. Lawton Collins,
has suggested two chief reasons that, when confronted by the NKPA
attack, the Truman Administration felt compelled to change its policy
and take action to defend Korea:
First of all, I believe our political and military leaders 
were surprised and deeply shocked by the bald actuality of the 
North Korean attack. . . .
We received a second shock when it became quickly evident 
that the ROK Army's capacity to stop the attack had been 
grossly exaggerated.
Collins’ suggestion about the "bald actuality" of the NKPA attack high­
lights what appears to be the single most important reason that Truman 
and his advisers adopted a course of vigorous military action in Korea.
The most visible line of thought concerning the larger political
op
Alexander L. George, "American Policy-Making and the North 
Korean Aggression," World Politics, Vol. VII, No. 2 (January, 1955)j
pp. 211-215.
23jbid., pp. 225-226.
? J
J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons
of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), p. i+1*
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implications of the attack on the ROK was that if this aggression went 
■unchecked, it would destroy the foundations of international security 
and help engender the third world war. Alexander George supports 
this argument.
Our evidence suggests that in the crisis engendered hy the North 
Korean attack, certain leading American policy-makers (President 
Truman and perhaps Secretary Acheson as well) took their bear­
ings to some extent from the testing interpretation, which made 
use of the historical parallel with Hitler.^6
The extreme of that interpretation, found in the writing of 
Walter Judd, contributes to our understanding of the climate of opinion 
of the day:
If we failed to take a stand against this . . . Communist aggres­
sion, then not only Korea but the United Nations would have gone 
just as the League of Nations did. . . . Who in Asia— or in 
Europe, for that matter— could again put any confidence in us 
or in the United Nations? Formosa would go. The Philippines 
would go. Indo-China and the rest of southeast Asia would go.
Then Europe would go because it cannot become self-supporting 
without Asia. We either had to resist this aggression in Korea 
or withdraw to the North American continent.21
This interpretation of events, which might fairly be described 
as the father of the domino theory, is a lead-in to the strong under­
current of moral influence which, as has been pointed out, was a factor 
of major significance in the Korean intervention decision. The moral 
factor, the idea that, as Osgood has written, it was the role of America 
to be ". . . leading the civilized world in preventing a chain of
2^Osgood, Limited War, p. 169.
26George, ’’American Policy-Making and the North Korean Aggres­
sion, ” p. 220.
27Judd, ’’The Mistakes That Led to Korea,’’ p. $6. Although it 
is more notable for its polemics than its scholarship, one book which 
helps re-create some of the fear of imminent Communist success both in 
Asia and in Europe is John T. Flynn, While You Slept (New York: The
Devin-Adair Company, 1931*
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aggression that violated the universal principles of law and order
28championed by America” is manifestly important to both the decision 
to intervene in the war and subsequent efforts to negotiate the war 
to a conclusion.
The Intervention Decision
On Saturday, June 21*, 1950 > President Truman had left Washing­
ton to fly to Independence, Missouri, for a restful weekend. His rest 
was interrupted by Secretary of State Acheson whose phone call informed 
Truman that Korea was under attack. Having learned the next day that 
the situation in Korea was deteriorating, Truman decided to return to 
Washington immediately. His thoughts during the return flight are 
recorded in his Memoirs.
I had time to think aboard the plane. In my generation, 
this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked 
the weak. I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria,
Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time the democracies 
failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going 
ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini 
and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen and twenty years 
earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to 
fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations 
closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted 
to force their way into the Hepublic of Korea without opposi­
tion from the free world, no small nation would have the 
courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist 
neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would 
mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought 
on the second world war. It was also clear to me that the 
foundations and the principles of the United Nations were at 
stake unless this unprovoked attack on Korea could be stopped. '
On the afternoon of the 25th, Trygve Lie of the United Nations 
placed before the Security Council a report from its own commission in
28Osgood, Limited War, p. 166.
^Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Yol. II: Years of Trial and Hope
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1956)7' PP. 332-333.
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Korea which indicated that the North Koreans had launched an all-out 
attack on South K o r e a . L i e  indicated that the UN had a clear duty to 
take steps to restore peace. In a meeting1 of the Security Council, the 
United States proposed a resolution which declared that North Korea had 
committed a breach of the peace, called for the immediate cessation of 
hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38^  paral­
lel, and requested all UN members to assist in the execution of the 
resolution and to refrain from assisting the North Koreans. There was, 
however, no mention in this resolution of armed help for South Korea.
on
It was passed by the Security Council, 9-0-1 (Yugoslavia abstained.)^
The President had requested that his key advisers meet with him
32at the Blair House that Sunday evening. Because Truman and his 
advisers were unaware of how serious the situation in Korea really was, 
little of major importance was transacted in this first meeting.
Throughout the period of the decision crisis there was an "information
3^Lie, a Norwegian, was the first Secretary-General of the UN. 
It is interesting to note, in connection with the UN commission’s 
findings, this report from Tass. "Tass reported today that South 
Korean troops made an unexpected attack on North Korea early this 
morning /jxme 2j£7", but were driven back by North Korean police and 
armed forces." In The New York Times, June 26, 1950» P» 3»
^Significantly, the Soviet Representative to the UN, Jacob 
Malik, had boycotted the UN since January, 1950, as a protest against 
its refusal to admit into membership the Chinese Communists. An 
interpretation of Malik's continued absence is discussed later.
3^At the time, the White House was being remodeled. For a 
detailed, yet highly readable, study of the intervention decision, see 
Glenn Paige, The Korean Decision: June 2li-30, 1950 (New York: Free
Press, 1968). Dean Acheson’s Present at the Creation: My Years in the
State Department (New York: Signet, 1970) is indispensable. In this
thesis, all references to this book are taken from the Signet edition. 
Of particular value also is an article by Beverly Smith, "Why We Went 
to War in Korea," Saturday Evening Post, November 10, 1951» PP» 22-23, 
et seq. Less valuable but still helpful is Albert L. Warner, "How the 
Korea Decision Was Made," Harper’s Magazine, June, 1951, PP« 99-106.
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lag" which hindered the decision-making. An example of this problem of 
information lag is found in The New York Times of June 25 where one 
could read that " . . .  United States military advisers said the inva­
sion was virtually stopped by this afternoon." (p. 2l). Although the 
invasion did slow down some, its progress went virtually unchecked for 
several weeks. Faulty reports from the Korean front created a grossly 
inaccurate picture, entirely too optimistic. This kind of optimism, as 
we will see, troubled the United States throughout the Korean War.
At a second Blair House meeting on Monday (June 26), Secretary 
Acheson advanced a critical suggestion: the use of the US Navy and
Air Force to help the embattled South Koreans. Acheson also favored 
the idea of bringing before the Security Council a resolution calling 
upon UN members to provide military assistance to the ROK.33 Contra­
dicting the misleading optimistic reports, General MacArthur managed
to get word to Truman that the utter collapse of the South Korean
J
forces was imminent. This datum and the strong advice of his staff 
prompted the President's June 26 decision which authorized MacArthur to 
employ " . . .  his navy and air force to attack all North Korean mili­
tary targets south of the 38th parallel, with the object of clearing
35South Korea of Communist military forces."
Truman's conferees were unanimous on the decision to employ air
and naval forces to help the South Koreans. There was no appreciation
of the fact that the ROK Army had been virtually shattered and although
33Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 531*
3^-Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy, p. 36.
3^Carl Berger, The Korea Knot: A Military-Political History
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), p. 108.
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the use of US ground forces had "been discussed, the hope was that air 
and naval units would he sufficient to ohviate the need for infantry­
men. There was also some discussion of what the Russians might do; the 
prevailing belief was that the Russians would not employ their own
forces in Korea. There was very little consideration of what the
16Chinese Communists might do.
To he sure, the decision to commit US air and naval forces was
a major one. It is necessary to underscore the fact that the decision
was made hy the President and his advisers from the Departments of
State and Defense. There were no Congressional leaders at either of
the Blair House meetings. In effect, Truman, in deciding to commit US
17forces to battle, was confronting Congress with a fait accompli;-" 
moreover, because the UN had not yet approved the commitment of "allied" 
military power, it too was confronted with the problem of judging and 
approving actions that had already been initiated.
The President decided to inform Congressional leaders of his 
decision to commit air and naval forces to Korean combat before the 
news was officially released to the public. On the morning of Tuesday,
June 27» fourteen Congressional leaders were summoned to the White 
House to hear his decision. "No one," Beverly Smith observed, "ques­
tioned the propriety of the decisions; the general attitude was one of
O
warm and friendly support."-^ When news of the President's decision to
3^Warner, "How the Korea Decision Was Made," p. 103- 
17-"That this is not at all uncommon in US history is amply 
demonstrated in "Use of Land and Naval Forces of the United States for 
Protection Purposes," The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23, No.
£78 (July 31, 1950), PP« 177-178. A list of 85 such uses is cataloged 
there.
3^Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," p. 82.
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commit air and naval forces to the help of the ROK was heard in the
39House of Representatives, the members rose to their feet and cheered.
That afternoon, the United Nations was confronted with Truman’s 
decision. The resolution which the Security Council was to consider 
was that members of the United Nations ’’furnish such assistance to the 
Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to 
restore the international peace and security in the area.” The resolu­
tion was passed 7-1-2. As David Rees observed, "For the first time in 
history an international body had voted force to meet force.
The Soviets again boycotted this meeting. Beverly Smith sug­
gests the possibility that the continued boycott was permitted by the 
Soviets in order to allow the US to intervene in Korea. After all, the 
Soviets knew the power of the NKPA, which had been trained by Soviet 
officers; the United States did not have any clear idea, as releases 
from the Korean front point out, of the high state of readiness of the 
NKPA. The theory argues that for the US to have its forces tied down, 
or better yet to suffer a defeat was an appealing idea to Soviet plan­
ners.^ There is, of course, no way to be certain that this policy or
a similar one was not followed by the Soviets; however, available
New York Times, June 28, 1950, p. 1. See also "Act of 
Aggression in Korea," The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23, No.
575 (July 10, 1950), pp. 1|3-U6; and. Warner, "How the Korea Decision 
Was Made," p. IOI4.
^Rees, Korea: The Limited War, p. 2l(.. Britain, France,
Nationalist China, Cuba, Ecuador and Norway voted for the US resolu­
tion; Yugoslavia voted against it and India and Egypt abstained.
^-Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," p. 8 6. Harry F. Kern’s
theory is nearly identical. See his "An Opinion: Maybe Moscow Wasn’t
Surprised," Newsweek. July 2]+, 1950, p. llj. —  ("Had the Russians plan­
ned it all this way in order to entice the U.S. Army into Korea?")
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evidence suggests that this theory, while tantalizing, is rather too 
conspiratorial to be true.^
The advantage of hindsight now prompts the observer to the con­
clusion that Truman would have fared better had he secured formal Con­
gressional and United Nations’ approval before he committed US forces 
to battle in Korea. Although his quick actions were warranted and jus­
tified, Truman was later accused of stampeding the Congress and the 
)
United Nations.
Writing on Wednesday, June 28, Hanson Baldwin made the observa­
tion that US ground troops would probably be needed in Korea because of 
the inability of the ROKA to stem the tide of the North Koreans.
Despite this type of ominous prediction, June 28 was a quiet day except 
for Robert Taft's speech in which, in essence, he said the President 
had done the right thing in the wrong way. However, while criticizing 
Truman's snub of the Congress, Taft said he supported the use of US 
forces in Korea. ^
A key to the series of decisions made throughout the week 
during which the United States became involved in Korea is the character
^The "evidence" refers to subsequent events: it simply seems
unrealistic in view of Soviet military and diplomatic actions through­
out the Korean War to argue that they contrived a scheme to embroil the 
US in Korea. In any case, the theory is intriguing and deserves men­
tion.
^The stampeding charge is one of I. P. Stone’s points against 
Truman in his Hidden History of the Korean War. Cf. with Smith, "Why 
We Went to War in Korea," p. 78, ff.
*^ The New York Times, June 29, 1950, p.
^Robert A. Taft, "The Korean Crisis," Vital Speeches, July 15»
1950, p. 6li|, 617. See also Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 53U-
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of President Truman.^* He was guided throughout, he said, by one 
determination:
Every decision I made in connection with the Korean conflict 
had this one aim in mind: to prevent a third world war and
the terrible destruction it would "bring to the civilized 
world. ^+7
The great significance of Truman's understandable desire to avert a 
major war became increasingly important with the unfolding of Korean 
combat events.
At a press conference on June 29, Truman was asked if the US
military intervention in Korea could be described as a police action.
] R
The President responded, "Yes, that is exactly what it amounts to,"
It was at this same press conference that Truman called the North 
Koreans bandits^ which is not unlike terming them immoral. If the 
NKPA was merely a horde of bandits and the UN Army a police force, what 
were the prospects for negotiating an end to the conflict? To be sure, 
the image of policemen discussing and debating across a conference 
table with bandits would not be a popular one. Policemen are not 
regarded as international mediators any more than are soldiers. While 
Truman could not have foreseen the consequences of his labeling of the
i /
n The late President had the habit, and on balance it was a 
good one, of making a decision to the best of his ability and in light 
of all the information available to him and then not fretting about it 
for years on end. See Thomas A. Bailey, Presidential Greatness (New 
York: Apple ton-Century, 1966), p. 161+.
^Truman, Memoirs, p. 3U5*
Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," p. 86; and The New York 
Times, June 30, 1950, P- !• Said Smith, "On that Thursday the descrip­
tion seemed appropriate. It became absurd when whole armies fought 
savagely up and down the peninsula."
^ Facts on File, X, No. 50l+ (June 23-29, 1950), p. 201+.
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North Koreans as bandits, it says something that, as Beverly Smith has
written, he never bothered to disavow or amend that label.^
It had become fairly obvious by late Thursday that the ROK
could be saved only by ground forces. At a meeting with his advisers
that evening, Truman affirmed his decision to commit US ground troops
to Korea. One of the things that convinced Truman he could commit
American forces without involving a Russian response was their reply to
a US request that the Soviets use their good offices to bring an end
to the fighting in Korea. Although the Soviets refused to assist in
this regard, certain phrases in their reply gave Acheson and his staff
61an indication that they would not intervene in Korea. Having decided
to use US ground forces, Truman had completed the series of judgments
that led to US involvement in Korea. He later wrote that his decision
to intervene in Korea
. . . was the toughest decision I had to make as President.
What we faced in Korea was the ominous threat of a third world 
war. I prayed that there might be some way other than swift 
military action to meet this Communist aggression, for I knew 
the awful sacrifices in life and suffering it would take to 
resist it. But there was only one choice facing us and the 
free world— resistance or capitulation to Communist imperial­
ist military aggression. . . . This was the same kind of 
challenge Hitler had flaunted in the face of the rest of the
world.52
A Friday morning phone call to the President confirmed the need 
for American ground forces in Korea. Truman authorized one combat 
regiment to be sent, approved a naval blockade of North Korea and pro­
mised a later decision on additional troops which, of course, he made
^Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," p. 86.
^ ibid., p. 88.
^Truman, Memoirs, p. I+63.
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in favor of commitment. By 11 A.M. on Friday, June 30> Truman had once 
again assembled the leaders of Congress to communicate to them his 
decision. Their reaction was predictably favorable. J Truman, as we 
have seen, was most preoccupied with preventing a major war. At the 
same time, he knew that the path of appeasement was only an invitation 
to the aggressor to continue his practice. ^ Truman was thus emplaced 
between the Scylla of having to exert military power and the Charybdis 
of limiting it; determined to avert both policies of appeasement and 
Armageddon, Truman chose the path of limited war.
The Influence of the Intervention Decision 
on the War and the negotiations
Truman's desire to check the chain of aggression that he feared 
would accompany or result from US inaction in Korea was complemented 
by his conformity to the American habit of dressing the wolf of self- 
interest, of power politics, in the sheep's clothing of a moral crusade.
It is politically expedient, of course, for almost any national leader 
to attach exalted moral purpose to his international dealings; not for 
nothing do national leaders appeal to higher, nobler standards than 
those of self-interest to sanction their policies. The problem with 
the US involvement in Korea is not that this practice was followed, but 
that it was adhered to so strictly that it obstructed the underlying
^Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," p. 88. Shortly after 
the intervention, Gallup found that of those he interviewed 8l% favored 
the intervention, 13% were opposed and 6% had no opinion. Cited in 
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (hew 
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), p. 821n.
-^Harry S. Truman, "Aims and Objectives in Resisting Aggression 
in Korea," The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23» No. 584 (Septem­
ber 11, 1950), p. 407*
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political purposes for which the war was fought and for which, later, 
the negotiations were conducted. The point is made succinctly by 
Robert Osgood:
UN sanction gave American intervention the color of a cru­
sade. As leaders of the UN forces, Americans could envision 
themselves as missionaries for the principle of collective 
security. In this role they would be above power politics.
As upholders of the integrity of the United Nations they would 
be fighting for the peace and welfare of all mankind, not for 
their purely selfish national advantage. . . . The trouble 
with our action in Korea was not that we intervened in the 
war— which was necessary from the standpoint of containment—  
or that we intervened under the aegis of the United Nations—  
which probably facilitated more than it hampered the achieve­
ment of American objectives— but, rather, that our eagerness 
to represent American intervention as an altruistic act of 
pure collective security tended to obscure the underlying 
basis of Realpolitilc without which intervention, regardless 
of UN sanction, would have been unjustified.^
Whether the US used a moral shield or a policeman’s badge, 
whether the Korean War was regarded as a crusade or a police action, 
the framework tended to frustrate limited military action and to 
thwart the concessions of give-and-take negotiation. In either case, 
crusade or police action (and of course the two are clearly related), 
the imagery simply is not consonant with the purpose: if the enemy is
evil, he must be rooted out and destroyed, not simply pushed back to a 
convenient line and allowed to escape. And if the enemy is a criminal, 
the law officers cannot be expected to bargain with their adversaries 
about the justice of the law they are appointed to enforce.
Although stamping the UN military mission in Korea with the 
imprimatur of righteousness was strikingly incongruous in a limited war 
in which final, telling blows were forbidden by the ground rules, this 
is the manner in which US-UN policy was identified. Dean Acheson, for
^Osgood, Limited War, pp. I66-I67.
instance, thought that the attack on Korea
. . . was a challenge to the whole system of collective secur­
ity, not only in the Par East, hut everywhere in the world. . . . 
This was a test which would decide whether our collective 
security system would survive or crumble. . . . The decision 
to meet force with force was essential. It was the unanimous 
view of the political and military advisers of the President 
that this was the right thing to do. This decision had the 
full support of the American people because ft accorded with 
the principles by which Americans live.
hid it accord with American principles, then, to wage a carefully
orchestrated war, one without conclusive results? hid it accord with
American principles to bargain with an enemy for two years, again with
out conclusive results? Before identifying any political or military
endeavor with "American principles," one must be sure about what those
principles are.
While the popularity of the war eroded as it dragged on,^
there is little doubt that the decision to intervene was warmly wel- 
98corned.^  That there were inherent contradictions in the rhetoric and 
the policy associated with the intervention decision came to light, 
unfortunately, only later. The ill-chosen rhetoric was not consistent 
with the objective either of limiting the conflict or, later, of
^ /pesun. AchesonT”, "World Documents: The Acheson Testimony,"
Current History, August, 195>1, p. 98. Emphasis supplied.
^See John E. Mueller, "Trends in Popular Support for the Wars 
in Korea and Vietnam," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXV 
No. 2 (June, 1971), pp. 35'8-373.
^®This is not to say that there was not, even at the outset of 
the war, some dissent. George Kennan, for instance, was later to 
write: "I never approved of the involvement of the United Nations in
the Korean affair or understood the rationale for it." Cited in Glenn 
Paige, 1930: Truman's Decision (New York: Chelsea House Publishers,
1970), p. 69.
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settling it diplomatically. J There are instances as well where the 
rhetoric may "be understood as the mid-wife of the policy. Were all the 
problems of the Korean entry decision reduced to a single sentence, it 
would be this: from the outset, there was a failure by the Administra­
tion to understand the war effort as a limited application of military
60power to achieve a general political objective known to the public.
It is relatively easy to enumerate the faults of the US'deci­
sion to intervene: the decision was made by a coterie whose leader,
^For Truman's message to Congress about the war, see Truman, 
"The Korean Situation," The Department of State Bulletin, pp. I63-I69.
^ A  number of problems attend this general sentence. It appears 
that two types of "objective" are required. The first is a precise and 
certain objective given as a mission to the military command; normally, 
this objective will refer to reaching a certain geographic point and 
securing the area around and behind it, while inflicting a maximum of 
damage upon the armed forces of the enemy. To accomplish its mission, 
the military must be sure of what it is its forces are to do. While 
military operations must be based upon certitude of objective, quite 
the opposite is true about diplomatic objectives, at least insofar as 
the public and rival diplomats are permitted to know. The democratic 
public, of course, must have knowledge of the objective for which its 
military is fighting: however, the objective defined for the public
and for foreign diplomats must be vague and purposely sketchy. The 
reasons are clear: if the public is informed of the exact objective
and it is never reached, the conclusion to be drawn is that the war is 
a failure; should the objective be exceeded, on the other hand, the 
administration in power is liable to charges of aggression by its own 
definition. Vague objectives also provide a groundwork for bargaining 
whereas stiff objectives sacrifice the flexibility and possibly the 
timing of negotiations to the initiative and pleasure of the enemy.
An example of these points would be the following: in Korea the mili­
tary might have been ordered to proceed to a set point and secure a 
main line of resistance, defined by the government according to the 
political and military exigencies of the time; public and international 
policy would then have been published as, say, an effort to secure the 
territorial integrity of the ROK. Depending upon the progress of 
diplomatic and military initiatives, the objective could have been 
brought increasingly into focus. What happened in Korea, as we will 
see, was markedly different from this prescription: the policy decided
upon fluctuated with the fortunes of battle. American policy was con­
fusing to the American public, the American military, and to the enemy. 
Of course, these obscure and vacillating policies impeded both mili­
tary and diplomatic settlements to the war.
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the President, announced his decision to key Congressional leaders 
after the decisions had "been made; his decisions were couched in rheto­
ric plainly inconsistent with the purposes and the limited extent of 
the war; the objectives of the war, as will become obvious, were con­
fused and confusing. The Korean War, from the intervention decision 
through the negotiations, required a diplomatic artfulness, a finesse, 
which UN leaders were unable to produce. We turn now to the military 
progress of the war which points up one of the major problems the 
Administration had in waging both the war and peace talks: what was
the goal, the objective, of the war?
Pusan to Inchon 
The invasion of South Korea, which began on June 25>, had
reached and captured Seoul by the 28th. By July 20, despite some
heroic resistance, the United Nations Army^ had abandoned Taejon. By
August 1, 19^0, the military situation in Korea was perilous for the 
UNC. Despite the serious military situation, there was a crass opti­
mism about UN involvement in Korea. For instance, just two weeks 
before the Pusan Perimeter was established, one could read in US News
the opinion of one correspondent that it might take as long as three
62or four months to push the Communists back to the 38th parallel. One
of the major problems, as General S. L. A. Marshall has said, was that
On July 7, 19^0, the United Nations created the United 
Nations Command (UNC), under a commander appointed by the United 
States. In this thesis, except where the text indicates a clear dis­
tinction between the two, UN and US Army and UN and US policy will be 
used interchangeably.
^"Victory in Korea in 3 Months?” (Telephone interview with 
correspondent Joseph Fromm) US News and World Report, July llj., 195>0»
P. 15.
37
operations in Korea ". . . were begun with an air of excessive expecta­
tion "based, upon estimates which were inspired by wishful optimism.
Despite the arrival of American troops, commanders questioned 
how much help these soldiers, either fresh from training in the US or 
from occupation duty in Japan, would prove to be. The UK Army had been 
waging the classic retrograde movement, trading space for time and now, 
the optimism of the amateurs notwithstanding, it half-collapsed into 
the famed Pusan Perimeter. For a time it appeared as though the North 
Koreans would push the UK Army into the sea.
The Eighth US Army Commander, Lieutenant General Walton Walker, 
may not have been the perfect man to conduct the Pusan perimeter 
defense, but he seemed to come close to it. By all accounts, Walker 
seemed able to give the appearance of being almost everywhere at once.
"Johnny” Walter neatly summarized both his own determination and the 
desperation of the situation in his order: "There will be no more
retreating, withdrawal, or readjustment of the lines, or anything else 
you want to call it."^
Established in early August, the Pusan perimeter represented
the last line of defense for the UNC. Some of the heaviest fighting
of the war was done in these early days as the NKPA tried to push the
UNC off the Korean peninsula into the sea. From about August 27 through
69mid-September, the UK Army was literally fighting for its life.
^S. L. A. Marshall, "Our Mistakes in Korea," The Atlantic, 
September, 1953* P* 4^-6.
6^Cited in Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, p. 162.
69^An excellent military history of the campaigns mentioned in 
this chapter is Roy E. Appleman, US Army in the Korean War: South to
the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, B.C.: Office of the Chief
of Military History, 1961). This heavy fighting occurred in the first 
UNC campaign: the fight to hold the Naktong River line.
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During these first days of the war the truth of General Ridgway's 
statement that "We were . . . in a state of shameful unreadiness when 
the Korean War broke out . . . ’’ was brought home to thousands of 
soldiers.
Although the clash of two different types of "military cul­
tures" in Korea is itself a fascinating story, we cannot be too con­
cerned here with the purely military side of the war. Most soldiers 
learn early that they have to fight not just the enemy, but the weather 
and the terrain as well. In Korea, there were new circumstances of 
weather and terrain to which the TIN soldier had to become accustomed.
North and South Korea together have only about 8^,000 square miles 
(Utah is about the same in area.) Eastern Korea is very mountainous, 
while much of western Korea is valley with, as military men would say, 
good avenues of approach for tanks and infantry. The NKPA, of course, 
had adjusted its tactics to the terrain of its homeland whereas much of 
the UNO’s initial problem was to familiarize itself with a new terrain
and learn how best to modify its tactics and superior firepower to
exploit the terrain.
LTG Walker’s tenacity (of the "Stand and Die" variety), the 
massive inpouring of troops and equipment, the increasing familiariza­
tion with the enemy, the terrain and the weather gained by UNC staff
officers— all contributed to the development of an idea in the mind of
General MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief of the UNO. There was no 
question that the North Koreans had over-extended themselves: they
were pushing for final victory at Pusan. Their rear areas were weakly
^%Iatthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridg-
way (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956)> P » 191-
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guarded and their lines of supply and communications were most vulner­
able near Seoul.
MacArthur had formulated a plan that called for an amphibious 
invasion at Inchon, on the west coast of Korea. Inchon was, at best, 
an unlikely place for such an effort. The tides prohibited use of the 
beaches except for about six hours a day, the approach was partly 
blocked by Wolmi Island, port facilities were poor and, significantly,
Army manuals allow for about six months planning time for an operation 
of the type planned by MacArthur. Nevertheless, MacArthur told his 
staff on August 12 that he wanted the planning completed in one month. ^  
Paradoxically, MacArthur believed the Inchon landing would
succeed principally because the odds against its success, he thought,
68were $,000 to 1. Inchon would be a success for the classic military 
reason that no one would expect it. Had it not been the renowned mili­
tary commander MacArthur arguing the case, the plans to invade Inchon 
might have been scrapped as the work of a madman. The nearly insur­
mountable technical obstacles were problem enough and, as David Rees 
points out, Inchon (or, as it was called, "Operation Chromite") became 
known as "Operation Common-Knowledge." Communist spies had the details
at least a week before the invasion but, movie-style, were unable to
6qget word to Pyongyang (capital of North Korea). y At a final strategy 
meeting, MacArthur swayed his peers and won permission to go ahead with
67"The Korean War," Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1970> Vol. 13»
p. I+69.
68Rees, Korea; The Limited War, p. 82; and Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, p. 980.
^Rees, Korea: The Limited War, p. 96.
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the £,000 "to 1 gamble. With his characteristic eloquence, MacArthur
told those at the meeting:
If my estimate is inaccurate and should I run into a defense 
with which I cannot cope, I will be there personally and will 
withdraw our forces before they are committed to a bloody 
setback. The only loss then will be my professional reputa­
tion. But Inchon will not fail. Inchon will succeed. And 
it will save 100,000 lives.70
The Inchon landings constitute one of the greatest military 
operations in history. To be sure, the key to both this victory and 
the string of subsequent defeats which followed on the heels of Inchon, 
was the character of MacArthur himself. David Rees offers this sum-
Inchon . . . could not have happened under any other com­
mander but MacArthur. It sprang from his overpowering per­
sonality and his self-confidence, and his plan was supported 
by no one else for it looked back to an age of warfare unen­
cumbered by specialist objections and peripatetic Joint 
Chiefs. It remains an astonishing achievement precisely 
because it was a triumph not of military logic and science, 
but of imagination and intuition. 7^ -
This ’’impossible victory” was achieved on September l£, 1950, and was
followed three days later by a break-out from the Pusan perimeter. By
September 28, Seoul was cleared and the momentum of the M P A  checked.
In a matter of days, it was clear that the M P A  was not only incapable
of resuming the offensive, but stood on the brink of military disaster,
a stunned and crippled force. That MacArthur's strategem had literally
70Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (hew York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 196U), p. 350* Dean Acheson reports how MacArthur brushed 
aside objections to his plan with a brilliant defense, ending his argu­
ment in hushed tones, "I can almost hear the ticking of the second hand 
of destiny. . . .  We shall land at Inchon and I shall crush them." 
Present at the Creation, p. £80. Acheson's source is Rees, Korea: The
Limited War, p. 83.
7^063, Korea: The Limited War, p. 9 6.
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snatched victory from the jaws of defeat reintroduced the problem of 
the objective: what would the UN Army do with its victory?
After Inchon: A Reversal of Objectives
As Montgomery of Alamein once observed,
The responsibility of statesmen and politicians is very 
great. The higher direction of war is in their hands and they 
must see to it that they give clear political directives to 
the service chiefs.7^
This opinion is vindicated by the imbroglio which occurred after Mac- 
Arthur’s stunning success at Inchon. The North Korean Army, caught 
between MacArthur*s surging forces and the break-out drive from the 
Pusan perimeter, was virtually shattered. "Victory" was clearly in 
sight; but victory, of course, is a relative term: one achieves vic­
tory according to pre-defined conditions which are either met or missed. 
MacArthur*s mission of clearing the enemy from the Republic of Korea 
was now nearly accomplished, but was that achievement sufficient to 
merit the label of victory? A number of leaders including, apparently, 
MacArthur, thought not.
The all-important objective that must be clearly defined to 
military leaders for them to devise functional operations plans had 
been hazy at best in the first months of the Korean War. Although Mac­
Arthur had been permitted to conduct limited operations above the 38th 
parallel, his superiors, chief among them the President, were cautious 
about extending the scope of major operations beyond that line. Paring 
the week of the entry decision, (on June 29) Truman was convinced that 
the sole purpose of UN involvement in Korea was to restore the border.
" ^ M o n t g o m e r y  Gf Alamein, A History of Warfare (Cleveland:
World Publishing Company, 1968), p. 552.
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Secretary /of the Arm// Pace expressed the "belief that we 
should "be very careful in authorizing operations above the 38th 
parallel and that we should clearly limit such operations. I 
agreed, pointing out that operations above the 38 th parallel 
should be designed only to destroy military supplies, for I 
wanted it clearly understood that our operations in Korea were 
designed to restore peace there and to restore the border.73
The UN resolution under which the UNC was conducting its operations
had spelled out (on June 27) that member nations were "to furnish such
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the
armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the
area."
As the weeks of conflict passed, it was becoming increasingly 
evident that the UNC was on the verge of destroying the UKPA. The 
goals once so clear to both Truman and to the TOT became less well- 
defined. By the time of Inchon, the original goal of repelling the 
aggression had, in fact, been changed to the unification of Korea by 
force. What was to become for the UN and the US a reversal of policy 
was, from the outset, the goal of ROK President Syngman Rhee. When
Truman marked the second anniversary of the ROK (August 13>) by sending
Rhee a message on August lip that "the aggressor will be expelled,"
Rhee replied, "We shall complete unification of North and South . .
for all time."^
The first hint that UN-US policy might change came from US
Truman, Memoirs, p. 3^ -1 • Truman was unequivocal about US 
aims in the first weeks, "I wanted to take every step necessary to push 
the North Koreans back behind the 38th parallel." Cited in Spanier,
The Truman-MacArthur Controversy, p . 33•
7%acts on File, X, No. £ll (August 11-17, 19^0), p. 2^8.
"Where is the 38th parallel?" Rhee once asked. "It is non-existent. I 
am going all the way to the Yalu, and the United Nations can't stop me." 
Cited in Halle, The Cold War As History, p. 219.
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Ambassador to the United Nations Warren R. Austin who declared on 
August 17, 1950> that the UN should not let Korea remain "half slave, 
half free." Although at the time Truman's policy was still that the 
invaders would be driven back only to the 38th parallel, Austin said 
that the General Assembly decisions of 1947-1949 that Korea be united 
under a freely elected government should be upheld. Austin did, how­
ever, stop short of advocating that UN armies overrun North Korea after
75repelling the aggression.'^
When Representative John C. Davies (D-N.Y.) called on Truman
on August 23, he asked the President about the UN goal in Korea. Of
Truman's answer all Davies could later say was that the President had
not yet "decided in his own mind" whether UN forces should stop at the
7638th parallel once they gained momentum. 1 At a news conference on
September 21 Truman announced that the decision about whether UN troops
would pursue the North Koreans beyond the 38th parallel was not his to
77make. Rather, he said, the US would abide by the decision of the UN.
A week later (September 28), the President implied that the decision 
was being worked out through the UN; however, the view prevailed at 
the State Department that the Security Council resolution of June 27 
("to repel the armed attack . . .") gave MacArthur authority to cross
^Facts on Pile, X, No. (August 11-17, 1950), P« 258; and,
The New York Times, August 18, 1950, P* 1-
7^Facts on File, X, No. 512 (August l8-24> 1950)» p. 266.
77jbid.t X, No. 516 (September 15-21, 1950), p. 297*
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the parallel. In view of the conditions under which that resolution
was passed in late June, that prevailing State Department opinion
(coming in the wake of Inchon) is debatable, at best.
UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie in a Chicago speech delivered
on September 8 had put the matter squarely: "It will not be enough,"
he said, for UN forces to drive the North Koreans back to the 38th
parallel; he declared that the UN must see to it that Korea be "unified
and independent" and that all Koreans be "able freely to select a
79government of their own choosing."'y
On September If?, the day of the Inchon landings, MacArthur was 
authorized by Truman to extend his operations north of the 38lh paral­
lel and to plan the occupation of North Korea. No ground operations 
were to be conducted north of the parallel, however, if there was
78ibld., X, No. 317 (September 22-28, 1950), p. 305- An impor­
tant theme of the Korean War involvement is the extent to which the 
United States surrendered its diplomatic options to the UN. To be sure, 
the United States had to give up a degree of its own latitude in order 
to achieve UN approval of US actions in Korea; however, in light of 
Truman's statements about the willingness of the US to follow the UN 
lead on such vital questions as crossing the parallel (although Truman, 
as we will see above, was not at all reluctant to cross after the 
Inchon victory), one might legitimately argue that the US gave away too 
much of its diplomatic option. An example of this sacrifice of US 
freedom of diplomatic movement occurred on January 13, 1951? when the 
General Assembly adopted a peace plan that, among other things, called 
for the seating of the Chinese Communists in the UN. This, and other 
points about the plan, completely contravened US policy at the time; 
however, the US, not wishing to lose UN support, had to vote for the 
peace plan which Robert A. Taft called, perhaps not unjustly, " . . .  
the most complete surrender to which the US has ever agreed." (Facts 
on File, XI, No. 533? January 12-18, 1951? P* 1^)* Although the plan 
passed the UN, it was rejected out of hand by the Red Chinese, much to 
the relief and delight of Acheson and others. Acheson’s follow-up 
helped bring about the February 1, 1951? branding of the Communist 
Chinese as aggressors, of which more later in the text. The background 
of this "peace plan" that the US did not approve but nonetheless had to 
vote for is explained in Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 661-662, 
and in Leckie, Conflict, pp. 253-255*
7^Facts on File, X, No. 515 (September 8-II4., 1950), P* 290.
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Russian or Chinese military intervention. As Louis Halle has remarked
about this curious authorization:
The confusion implicit in this order, which forbade certain 
operations in a contingency that would be realized only after 
they had been undertaken, represents the efforts of the men 
in Washington to control the events that, in fact, controlled 
them. 80
Certainly, MacArthurfs victory at Inchon had obviated any chance 
for the North Koreans to control the ROK by applied military power.
The NKPA was a stunned and reeling army. The instinct of the army com­
mander, when his opponent is "on the ropes," is to close in swiftly for 
the final assault. MacArthur, understandably, wanted to finish the job 
of destroying the NKPA. The problem was that if the NKPA were allowed 
to retreat into its homeland across the 38th parallel with impunity, it 
could nurse its wounds, recover its strength and, in theory at least, 
again present a formidable threat to the security of the ROK. Now, 
thought MacArthur and others, was the time to avert that threat by 
smashing the North Koreans while they were still badly wounded.
In fact, on September 27, 1950, MacArthur was ordered by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff "to destroy the North Korean armed forces." His 
operations north of the parallel were to proceed only if there had been 
no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, 
no announcement by them of an intended entry and no threat by them to 
counter UNO operations in North Korea. As an additional "safeguard,"
only ROKA forces were to be used in North Korean provinces bordering
8lon China or the USSR. Two days later, President Truman personally
80Halle, The Cold War As History, pp. 220-221.
0 ~ j
"The Korean War," Encyclopedia Brittanica, p. 1+70? Halle,
The Cold War As History, pp. 221-222.
1+6
82cabled MacArthur authority to advance into North Korea and Secretary 
of Defense Marshall sent MacArthur word that "we want you to feel 
unhampered strategically and tactically to proceed north of the 38th 
parallel. Although MacArthur held back his US units from crossing
the parallel immediately in order to establish viable logistical 
chains, ROKA units crossed the parallel on October 1.
Victory was in sight; not simply the success of repelling 
aggression, but the final and clear victory to which American armies 
had become accustomed. In the fall of 195>0 a number of leaders looked 
upon the conflict in Korea as a favorable opportunity to reverse the 
disconcerting post-war series of events. After the war, much of east­
ern Europe had fallen to the Communists and by 19U9 China had fallen.
On the horizon was the high-water mark of the McCarthy era. Could the 
Truman administration turn its back on the opportunity to reclaim from 
Communism the l\9>000 square miles of North Korea? The unification of 
Korea had been an objective of the US since 19^3 and. of the UN since 
19b7 • Here was the chance to achieve that goal, to punish the North 
Koreans, to enhance American and UN prestige and to satisfy "the psy­
chic need for a clear-cut, absolute solution for Korea in the pre-cold
pi
war tradition of American political thought." ^
In the United States elections were to be held in November.
One Senator, as early as late September, had published his opinion that
82nijThe Korean War," Encyclopedia Brittanica, p. 1|70«
^Halle, The Cold War As History, p. 222. Halle observes that 
Marshall's sentence authorized MacArthur "to interpret his instructions 
so widely as to nullify them." (p. 222).
^Rees, Korea: The Limited War, p. 100.
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failure to cross the parallel would constitute appeasement of Russia.8-^
Similarly, General MacArthur had made it clear that if the chance to
have total victory were denied him, he would regard it not simply as
appeasement, "but as a defeat for the West, and a scuttling of United
86Nations objectives. As Louis Halle has pointed out, the critical 
decision whether to pursue the NKPA across the 38th parallel— and thus 
for the UNC to begin an offensive phase in the war— came at a time when 
the American people were becoming convinced that Communist infiltrators 
had virtually taken over the formulation of US foreign policy. If 
Truman had forbidden MacArthur to administer the coup de grace to the 
NKPA, his action would have appeared to substantiate the conspirator
o7
theory and would have been regarded as the great betrayal.
To deny the UN Army the opportunity to pursue the NKPA deep
into North Korea would have required enormous political courage. The
leaders were caught up with the spirit of impending military victory
and the counsels of diplomatic prudence were now of little importance.
Louis Halle provides this analysis:
. . . The influence of the reasonable, the prudent, the sensi­
tive, and the moderate men was now in sharp decline. Control 
of events had been lost. Either one went along with them or 
one was spilled off into the roadway of history, to be left 
behind.88
Whereas Halle notes that events were controlling men, not men the 
events, David McLellan sees the confusion of moral and political
8^ibid., p . 100.
^David S. McLellan, "Dean Acheson and the Korean War," Politi­
cal Science Quarterly, Vol. 83* No. 1 (March, 1968), p. 30-
^Halle, The Cold War As History, pp. 219-220.
88ibid., p. 220.
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purpose which plagued UN efforts throughout the war:
The advance to the Yalu is a prime example of an American pro­
pensity to take the righteousness of its actions for granted 
and to ignore the objective reality which its behavior repre­
sents to others. 9
The decision had to be made: should the UN conduct major
operations north of the 38th parallel and, if so, why? Was the object
simply to be the destruction of the NKPA whereupon the UN Army was to
be withdrawn, its officers content in the knowledge that it would be
years before the North could again threaten the South? Was the goal to
insure that elections be held in the North? Or should the UNO unify
Korea by force?
On September 20, Acheson made it clear, according to David Rees,
that he had abandoned his former views (expressed in June) that the
goal of the UN armies was simply to restore the status of the ROK prior
90to the NKPA invasion, and embraced the goal of unification. Although
the State Department thought that the resolution of June 27 would cover
91this new objective, Truman felt a new resolution was in order. The
opportunity to expand on the original purposes of the US-UN commitment
92to South Korea was irresistible, and on October 7> 1970, the UN 
General Assembly approved a UNC advance into North Korea. That same
^McLellan, ’’Dean Acheson and the Korean War," p. 39. McLellan 
makes the point that the failure of US policy in this instance ". . . 
appears to lie in the comparative insouciance with which the conduct of 
policy in the concluding phase of the war _/November, 195>1~J was left to 
the determination of the military campaign." (pp. 37-38)•
^Rees, Korea: The Limited War, pp. 100-101.
9-^ ibid. , p. 101.
9^As McLellan has observed, it ". . . was not in Acheson's 
nature to pass up an opportunity to enhance the strength and stability 
of the non-Communist world." "Dean Acheson and the Korean War," p. 17.
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day the Eighth US Army crossed the parallel and by October 20, Pyong­
yang had fallen to the UN Army.
While the October 7 Resolution did not mention forceful unifi­
cation, it did recommend that "all appropriate steps be taken to ensure 
conditions of stability in Korea." And, of course, holding elections 
with the goal of unifying Korea peacefully was, in effect, the same 
thing as unifying Korea by force of arms. In either case, North Korea 
would have ceased to exist.
According to Acheson, MacArthur gave the October 7 Resolution a 
meaning never intended:
General MacArthur at once stripped from the resolution of 
October 7 its husk of ambivalence and gave it an interpretation 
that the enacting majority in the General Assembly would not 
have accepted. Nowhere did the resolution declare that the 
Eighth Army would impose a unified and democratic government 
on all Korea. Its task was to "ensure conditions of stability 
throughout Korea."9b
As we have seen, however, stability and peaceful elections proposed by
Acheson would have had in essence the same effect as the surrender of
9^the North Koreans for which MacArthur was calling.
Truman, who had met with MacArthur at Wake Island on October 
1^, had been assured that the chances of a Communist Chinese entrance
93Although the resolution was concerned with "ensuring stabil- 
ity," The New York Times, as if to underscore the intention of the 
resolution, featured this headline on page 1 of its October 8, 1950, 
edition: "U.N. Body, iff to 5> Votes to Unify and Rebuild Korea."
Technically, US troops crossed the parallel before that move was sanc­
tioned by the UN; see ibid., p. 1. The ROKA had been conducting opera­
tions in North Korea since October 1.
9^Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 5>89.
9^This point is made by Spanier in The Truman-MacArthur Contro­
versy, pp. 90-91, and in Rees, Korea: The Limited War, pp. 101-103.
MacArthur’s demand of the NKPA was for them to "forthwith lay down your 
arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision as I may 
direct." Cited in Rees, p. 10J+.
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into the war were slight. MacArthur1 s opinion, as pointed out "by John
Spanier, was rendered on the 15th, some fifteen days after South Korean
9 6troops had already crossed the parallel. By the end of October, Life
could report that "The end of the war loomed as plain as the mustache
on Stalin's face. . . . Now MacArthur could say confidently, 'The war
97is definitely coming to an end shortly.'"^1
The entry of the Chinese into the war was precipitated by a num­
ber of factors but among them, certainly, was the fear that North Korea 
was about to be destroyed either by UN military or diplomatic action.
The most succinct analysis is Spanier1s:
In fact, the advance into North Korea reflected a political 
decision by the United States government to achieve a militar­
ily unified Korea. In the context of the events of late Septem­
ber and early October such a decision should occasion no sur­
prise. It was the logical outcome of the military victory 
achieved by I4acArthur at Inchon and the demand for unconditional 
surrender issued shortly thereafter. Secretary Acheson coiild 
hardly have accepted compliance with this demand. On June 13>
1950, only two weeks before the outbreak of the Korean War, he 
had himself declared that the "one difference which is just 
about impossible to negotiate is someone's desire to eliminate 
your existence altogether." In short, the call for North
9 ^ S p a n i e r ,  The Truman-MacArthur Controversy. Spanier continues: 
"The President had approved of the extension of military operations 
north of the parallel on September 11, and the Joint Chiefs had sent 
MacArthur a directive to this effect on September 1%— that is one month 
before the Wake Island Conference. Eleven days later, the Joint Chiefs 
had informed MacArthur that his 'military objective is the destruction 
of the North Korean armed forces. In attaining this objective you are 
authorized to conduct military operations north of the 38fh parallel.'
/_See footnote 81./ MacArthur had, therefore, tendered his opinion 
after the Administration had already decided that it was safe to march 
up to the Yalu River." (p. 95)-
97"Hard-Hitting U.N. Forces Wind Up War," Life, October 30>
1950, p. 21.
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Korea's unconditional surrender ensured the continuation of 
hostilities.98
One cannot doubt that MacArthur wanted to achieve a clear-cut victory; 
the question that perhaps only the Communist Chinese may have the ans­
wer to is whether they would have been more favorably disposed to the 
unification of Korea by the peaceful, electoral means (after the UN 
Army had sufficiently secured the North) proposed by Acheson and made 
into policy by the October 7 Resolution. The conclusion reached here 
is. that military unification imposed by the UN Army or unification by 
election supervised by UN committees were simply two sides of the same 
coin, equally repugnant to the Chinese Communists.
At about mid-October, the UN Army would have been well-advised
to halt its progress, consolidate and fortify its positions, and
announce that no further military operations would be conducted. An
offer to negotiate might have been extended to the North Koreans; at
the time the UN would have had thousands of square miles of North Korea
with which to bargain and well-entrenched defense positions from which 
99to bargain.  ^ Had the North Koreans declined the negotiating invita­
tion, the UN could have continued its works of fortification and 
exploited their own peace feelers while scoring their enemy on their 
lack of desire to talk peace.
98<3panier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy, p. 91* David 
McLellan has concluded that Acheson went along with the decision to 
drive into North Korea for bwo main reasons: the carrot— the chance
to improve the stability of the free world /see footnote 92J— and the 
stick— the political price he would have had to pay for resisting the 
opportunity for total UN victory. Additionally, McLellan argues that 
Acheson misunderstood the threat to Chinese national interest that they 
would perceive in a UN drive to the Yalu. "Lean Acheson and the Korean 
War," p. 17 et passim.
9^j4acArthur discusses such a possibility in his Reminiscences, 
p. 35?7ff• in reading his suggestions one should recall, however, that 
they are made by him with the benefit of hindsight.
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In any case, this was not to he. On November 21+, MacArthur 
launched his "end-the-war-by-Christmas" drive. Three days earlier, 
elements of the US Seventh Division had reached the Yalu River; how­
ever, the task of destroying the final remnants of the NKPA was not 
yet accomplished. MacArthur's final drive was to achieve that pur­
pose. Although it was known as early as November 1 that there were 
Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) in Korea, MacArthur had split his com­
mand and advanced on a wide front, with no reserve. On November 26, 
the CCF attacked in force; what followed was a series of disasters for 
the UN armies. Their setbacks and retreat was described by Time, very 
probably correctly, as ". . . the worst defeat the U.S. had ever suf­
fered. The hopes and expectations that the war was over dis­
appeared among new concerns about how to save the UN Army from threat­
ening disaster.
After the entry of the CCF, any chance for unification of
Korea, or for negotiations, or for peace, had to be abandoned, at least
for the moment. Suddenly, it was August all over again and the UN Army
was once again facing defeat. This came, ironically, after the f>,000
102to 1 victory at Inchon.
100ttj)efea-k9 it Time, December 11, 1950, P- 17*
^OIa particularly valuable source for information on the entry 
of the CCF is Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision
to Enter the Korean War (New York: The Macmillan Company, i960).
S. L. A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet (New York: Time, Inc.,
1953) describes the defeat of the Eighth Army by the CCF in November,
1950, in the battle of the Chongchon River.
^02pac]ia;rg Ruetten has written that "The ill-fated offensive 
of November 21+, 1950, suggests that the President could very well have 
considered relief of the General for military reasons alone." "General 
Douglas MacArthur's 'Reconnaissance in Force1: The Rationalization of
a Defeat in Korea," Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 3 6, No. 1 (February,
1967) , p . 9 3.
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Start of the Stalemate
The TOT Army was able to avert disaster and was even able by 
January 25, 1951» 1° resume an offensive. Although ground was hard to 
gain and the progress of the TOT Army was slow, the TOTC had reached the 
outskirts of Seoul by the end of February; by March 31, the TOTC had 
restored itself to the position it had held some three months earlier. 
General MacArthur, intensely dissatisfied with the restraints imposed 
upon him and unable to show sympathy for the positions of the Presi­
dent, was relieved by Truman on April 11, 1951* His successor as Com­
mander of the TOTC (CIITCTOJC) was General Ridgway. Ridgway, who had 
taken command of the Eighth US Army when General Walter was killed in 
a December jeep accident, was replaced at that post by LTG James A.
Van Fleet.
On February 1, 1951, the United Nations branded the Chinese as
aggressors and at the same time determined to end the war by peaceful
means. In indicating its willingness to accept the 38th parallel as a
stopping point for the UN Army, the UN utterly reversed its policy
103
prior to that time.
A Communist spring offensive was fairly successful in gaining 
ground but terribly exorbitant in the price in lives the CCF had to 
pay. The TOT counter-offensive in May and June placed the UNC in a good 
position, along the 38th parallel, but Ridgway and Van Fleet were
1Q8The New York Times, February 2, 1951, P* 3- Facts on File,
XI, No. 93^ (February 2-8, 1951) reported that "word was going around 
Washington that the U.S. might be willing to re-draw the line in Korea 
at the 38th Parallel. The State Dept, left this question open by saying 
in a statement Feb. 2 /"~3_7 it did not want to indulge in 'speculation 
about the 38th Parallel at this time.'" (p. l+l). See also footnote ll+ 
in the Conclusion.
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ordered not to launch a major invasion of North Korea. On the success
of this UN drive turns a good portion of the argument later advanced by
Van Fleet and others that in the summer of 1951 exhausted and beaten
CCF and NKPA forces had only one device with which to save themselves
from yet another trip to the Yalu, truce talks.
In Washington, just prior to MacArthur's relief, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff had decided that the Korean War could not be settled
satisfactorily by military action alone. As then Army Chief of
Staff General Collins said,
Though the JCS said so only by inference, there was no 
question but that a military stalemate had been reached 
between the U.N. Command the the Chinese and North Korean 
forces.105
This conviction of the JCS was transmitted to the National Security
Council, which formulated its policy in May, 1951:
The National Security Council's policy of May 17, 1951, 
determined the course of the U.N. Command's combat opera­
tions for the two long years that were to elapse between 
its approval and the signing of the armistice on July 27?
1953.
During this period the main purpose of the United 
Nations operation was to keep pressure on the enemy and 
to inflict maximal casualties on the Chinese and North 
Koreans in order to force an agreement that would end the 
fighting.10^
As the United States and United Nations gravitated toward con­
cluding the war by negotiation as opposed to military action, the 
desire to negotiate again called into question the problem of the 38'fch
lO^Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 30l+.
1Q5jbid., p. 30l+.
106jbid., pp. 305-306. Had this policy been vigorously pursued 
throughout the period of negotiations, this thesis argues, the UN would 
have achieved a negotiated truce more quickly and on more propitious 
terms.
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parallel. The UN’s '’willingness" to settle the war on the 38th paral­
lel was now transformed into official policy, evidenced "by the pro­
nouncements of its leaders:
In March, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway . . . said the war’s end at 
the 38th parallel would be "a tremendous victory." In June, 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson said a cease-fire at the paral­
lel would mean "successful conclusion" of the war. Their 
statements laid the groundwork for a settlement short of full 
military victory. -^7
After statements that the UN goal must be the extirpation of
the NKPA to insure the safety of the ROK, after statements that only
a drive to the Yalu, through the very heart of North Korea, could
punish the aggressors sufficiently, and after a diplomatic and military
drive to unify Korea either by force of arms or ballot, there now
occurred this change in policy which Time labeled "surprising":
"What is the U.S. willing to settle for in Korea? Testifying 
before the MacArthur investigating committee, Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson gave a surprising answer: the U.S. will be
content to stop the fighting at the 38 th parallel. It will be 
willing to leave North Korea in Communist hands, so long as 
there are "reliable assurances” that the Communists will not 
renew their aggression. A "unified free and democratic Korea" 
is not one of the U.S. war aims. . . .  To get a cease-fire 
agreement from the Communists, the Administration was resigned 
to the minimum goal— the restoration of the status quo ante.10°
107"Why U.S. Decided to Halt in Korea," US News and World 
Report, July 20, 1951? P« 18. Ridgway's March 12, 1951? statement is 
also mentioned in Facts on Pile, XI, No. 5^1 (March 9-15? 1951)> P» 8l.
108npeace Terms," Time, June 11, 1951? P» 21. See also T. R. 
Fehrenbach, The Fight for Korea: From the War of 1950 to the Pueblo
Incident (New York:Grossed and Dunlap, 1969), pT 96 for an analysis 
of the Acheson statement. See also The New York Times, June I4., 1951? 
p. 1; and ibid., June 8, 1951i "He stated that an armistice in Korea 
at the Thirty-eighth Parallel . . . would wholly keep faith with the 
pledges made by the United Nations. 'Neither the United Nations nor 
the United States,1 he said, ’has ever undertaken the obligation to 
unify Korea by force.’ He had already made it plain, however, that a 
unified Korea, to be achieved by the means of peace, was and remained 
the ultimate objective." (p. 16). On June 26, Acheson said that Ameri­
can troops had gone into Korea to stop aggression and to restore peace,
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Although President Truman indicates in his Memoirs that the 
agreement to halt UN military progress at the 38th parallel represented 
no change (p. U56) > available evidence simply does not substantiate 
that claim. Major changes traced here demonstrate that the US moved 
from announcing that Korea was relatively unimportant strategically to 
the commitment of thousands of troops when challenged there; from the 
objective of clearing the ROK of aggressor troops to unifying Korea by 
military power; from deciding that the 38th parallel was not acceptable 
as a stopping point to announcing that a halt there would be a great 
victory. The only thread that runs throughout the rhetoric to keep it 
together is the notion of unification; now, twenty years after the 
signing of the armistice at Panmunjom, Korea still is not unified. In 
any case, it was determined that the war be brought to an end by nego­
tiation. Said Truman,
Regarding Korea, we distinguished between the political aim—  
a unified, independent, democratic Korea— and the military aim 
of repelling the aggression and terminating the hostilities 
under an armistice agreement. With the fighting ended, the 
purpose would be to establish the authority of the Republic of 
Korea over all Korea. 18*9
not to unify Korea. The US military objective would be satisfied, he 
said, if the Communists withdrew behind the 38th parallel and that uni­
fication could be the subject of subsequent political negotiations. 
Reported in Pacts on File, XI, No. 556 (June 22-28, 1951)> P« 202. 
Acheson1s positions of June, 1950 > and June, 1951» are virtually iden­
tical; the problem, of course, is that he adopted another position 
entirely in the fall of 1950 when he became convinced that the UN had 
the ability to unify Korea with elections made possible by a secure 
military environment. After the Chinese intervened and secure military 
conditions could no longer be maintained, he returned to his former 
stand. The day after Acheson's June 27 affirmation that the 38th paral­
lel would be acceptable to the US, Pyongyang radio dropped its "drive- 
the-enemy-into-the-seaM slogan and adopted a new one: "Drive the enemy
to the 38th parallel." (ibid., p. 202). ROK President Syngman Rhee 
appears never to have wavered about rejecting any truce talks without 
unification (ibid., p. 202) of which more later.
•1'8|9p'ruinan> Memoirs, p. 1+56.
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The question whether the US could legally negotiate an armis­
tice was resolved by UN Secretary General Lie who obtained an affirma­
tive ruling from the UN legal c o u n s e l . T h e  stage was set for nego­
tiations: all that was needed was a reciprocal gesture on the part of
the Communists. In late June, 1951 > that gesture was given and truce 
talks began shortly thereafter. With the commencement of the talks, 
the UN once again switched positions on the issue of the 38th parallel.
This is discussed in Chapter II, "The Kaesong Negotiations."
Chapter Summary
The decision to intervene in the Korean War represented a 
change of major proportion in American policy. Although the nation was 
at the time unprepared militarily, the United States leaders, confronted 
with a crisis they had not anticipated, decided that South Korea could 
not be abandoned to the Communists of North Korea. The war was alter­
nately regarded as a police action meant to punish the NKPA bandits 
(imagery unconducive to negotiation) or as a crusade (imagery uncondu- 
cive to waging a limited war).
In the first year of the war there arose a number of problems 
concerning US (UN) policy that point out the failure of the Administra­
tion to understand two fundamentals: (l) that the military’s objective
must always be exact and (2) that the objectives announced nationally 
and internationally must deliberately be ill-defined, while still some­
what restricted, to avoid sacrificing diplomatic initiative to the
HOCollins, War in Peacetime, pp. 327-328. See also Leland M. 
Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations, pp.
I83-I8J7. This is a valuable source for information on the problems 
attending US actions under the auspices of an international body.
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potential bargaining rival. Throughout at least the first year of the 
conflict, the US permitted its policy to be the consequent of the 
military situation whereas the reverse is the proper object of states­
manship .
This dilemma is thrown into sharp relief by the Inchon victory 
which provided the US with a most advantageous bargaining position. 
Unfortunately, however, what might have been an extraordinary bargaining 
posture was eroded by naive diplomatic administration: the UN was
unable to translate military triumph into diplomatic advantage, per­
mitted yet another public (and. priva/be) policy change, and authorized 
a military solution to the war which, as events proved, was no solution 
at all.
This chain of events is best described by Henry Kissinger:
The fluctuation of our objectives demonstrated that it is 
impossible to conduct limited wars on the basis of purely mili­
tary considerations. After Inchon, at a moment of maximum 
strength, we proved unable to create a political framework for 
settling the Korean War, and we thereby provided the enemy with 
an incentive, if any was needed, to seek to restore the mili­
tary balance as a prerequisite to any negotiation. It is not 
clear that a generous and comprehensive offer, for example, to 
stop at the narrow neck of the peninsula and to demilitarize 
the rest of North Korea under United Nations supervision, would 
have been accepted; for purposes of this argument, it is suffi­
cient to note that it was never m a d e . m
After the military setbacks imposed by the intervention of the 
CCF, the UN regained the momentum and, after still more see-saw warfare 
throughout the spring of 1951 > the UNC commanded its former position 
along the 38th parallel. The UN Army, under Ridgway, even now against 
the combined powers of the CCF and the NKPA, was in a superior position
■^■^Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1957)? P« 50.
and was ready, once again, to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea. 
At this juncture, it received orders to halt, take up positions and 
await the start of talks at Kaesong.
In the spring of 1951 > of course, there had been still another 
policy change: the 38th parallel, it was publicly announced, would be
satisfactory as a halting line. At Kaesong, however, the Communists 
were not alone in their surprise in learning that the 38th parallel was 
not, after all, suitable as a stopping point. The issue is taken up in 
the next chapter.
CHAPTER II
THE KAESONG NEGOTIATIONS
Pericles’ warning*: I fear our own mistakes far more than the
strategy of our enemies. 1
OThe Military Situation
By the summer of 1951» most American leaders believed, as
General Omar Bradley once phrased it, that an all-out conflict in Korea
"would involve us in the wrong* war, at the wrong place, at the wrong
2
time and with the wrong enemy." The UNC was, therefore, required to 
localize the war. The prospect of a war without victory posed new and 
difficult questions to US military leaders who had been taught all 
along that the object of war is victory.
The public utterances of leading UN and US political figures 
had, howevex*, made it clear that "the barometric changes in plans as 
battle skies clouded or cleared /had finally/ reached an equilibrium."^ 
The course of action chosen now was one of negotiation. So long as the 
Korean War is a subject of interest, scholars and soldiers will dispute
^Cited in Kenneth W. Thompson, The Moral Issue in Statecraft 
(Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), p. 115.
p
Yatcher, Panmunjom, p. 16.
^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 52.
^ibid., p. 5 2.
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the wisdom of the decision to negotiate in the summer of 1951* As dis­
cussed in the first chapter, a Communist spring offensive had been 
fairly successful in gaining ground, but the price in casualties had 
been exorbitantly expensive. In its counter-offensive, the TJNC was 
able both to recoup its lost ground and build momentum; by May, the UN 
Army stood poised along the 38th parallel once again awaiting orders to 
pursue the enemy into the hills of North Korea.
The success of the UNC counter-offensive engenders some of the 
most difficult theoretical considerations of the entire Korean War nego­
tiations. Two separate problems, for instance, accompanied the mili­
tary success. The first was concerned with whether the UN should 
exploit the situation by driving into North Korea, winning the war and 
unifying the country. To the Truman Administration, as we have seen, 
debate over this question was superfluous; they had already supplied an 
answer with the limited war policy.
The second problem dealt with the disparate views about whether 
the CCF was, in fact, defeated by late June, 1951* Within the confines 
of the limited war superstructure, those convinced that Communist 
armies had been shattered had to regard negotiation as the outcome of a 
successfully prosecuted war (final victory, of course, had been ruled 
politically unacceptable). Those who, on the other hand, regarded the 
CCF and NKPA as still formidable, albeit stunned, opponents, understood 
negotiation in a different light. To them negotiations would not be 
the culmination of the war, but its complement; not the denouement of 
war, but its derivative. Thus, with the onset of negotiations, the 
former would consider further military operations as unnecessary, even 
counter-productive; the latter would still view them as critical.
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If the Communist forces had "been effectively "defeated," their 
leaders may have seen in protracted negotiations an opportunity for 
undoing their "defeat" hy degrees. Similarly, if the Communist forces 
at the time were only stunned, negotiations, with a concomitant and 
predictable diminution of military operations, would still afford them 
a marked advantage. It was clearly to the benefit of the Communists to 
give indications that they wanted peace, thus fortifying the arguments 
of those UN leaders who saw continued military operations as redundant 
in the face of the ostensibly imminent peace. By carefully balancing 
their propaganda, the Communists could, at the same time, avert the 
admission and stigma of defeat.
The most outspoken advocate of driving into North Korea and 
winning a clear military victory was General MacArthur. With his 
relief from command in April, 19!?1 > no active duty senior officers were 
prepared to express publicly their contempt for Truman’s limited war 
policy. Although General Yan Fleet later argued that the TJN should 
have made victory its object, he and those who agreed with him knew at 
the time that Truman's policy of negotiating an end to the conflict 
could not be changed or reversed until the November, 1952, elections, 
if even then. Although a number of people might have preferred a 
quick, convenient solution to the war, most were prepared to adjust 
their preferences to accord with the policy pronouncements of the Admin­
istration.^
^A recent article is interesting and instructive on this theme.
See: Andre Modigliani, "Hawks and Doves, Isolationism and Political
Distrust: An Analysis of Public Opinion on Military Policy," The
American Political Science Review, Yol. 66, No. 3 (September, 1972), 
pp. 960-978.
With the decision made that the war would end by negotiation, 
speculation was divided into the two camps we have mentioned. One camp 
felt that the talks at Kaesong were simply a manifestation of the 
impending end of the war; their unguarded optimism ironically contri­
buted to precisely the opposite effect. The other camp, whose members 
are hardest to identify, was far less optimistic and far more suspi­
cious of ulterior Communist motives. Although General Ridgway most 
nearly approaches this type, his temporary willingness to forego mili­
tary operations at the start of the talks precludes his convenient 
assignment to this category.
While there is little debate that the Communist forces were 
badly hurt and that the momentum, at least at that time, was with a 
reinvigorated UN Army, there is dispute about whether another great 
drive into North Korea would have resulted in final victory. Each 
side, those who argue that a vigorous offensive would have ended the 
war with a -unified Korea and those who contend that such an offensive 
might have increased the stakes in Korea even to the point of an 
entrance by the Soviet Union, has its champions. The moderate view­
point that victory, albeit a Pyrrhic one, could have been won, is held 
by General Ridgway:
If we had been ordered to fight our way to the Yalu, we 
could have done it- if our government had been willing to 
pay the price in dead and wounded that action would have 
cost. Prom the purely military standpoint the effort, to 
my mind, would not have been worth the cost.
On the other hand, a number of others, including General James 
A. Van Fleet, then Commander of the US Eighth Army and Ridgway's
^Ridgway, Soldier, p. 219.
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immediate subordinate, have argued that the decision to negotiate pre­
vented a virtually assured UN military victory. Van Fleet thought that 
after the UN Army had met the Communist spring offensive and repelled 
it, the next six weeks "were among the greatest in the history of the 
U.S. Army.”
We met the attack and routed the enemy. We had him beaten 
and could have destroyed his armies. . . . Then our government's 
high policy intervened, and we were ordered not to advance any 
farther. . . .  We have made many mistakes in Korea, but the 
greatest mistake is this: we have consistently underestimated
the Koreans and overestimated the Chinese Reds.7
Although it appears extreme to say that the CCF and the NKPA
g
were "beaten," evidence is strong that their armies were, at that 
time, in serious difficulty. However, those who would have pressed for 
a military victory in summer, 1951 ? discount the fact that as the CCF 
fell back into North Korea, they would have been retreating into their 
strength. That is, the nearer China that the CCF retreated, the closer
^James A. Van Fleet, "The Truth About Korea From a Man Now Free 
to Speak," Life, May 11, 1953* P* 127. (The second part of this two- 
part series is: "How We Can Win With What We Have," May 18, 1953? PP*
157-158+.) In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Van Fleet said essentially the same as cited above; see The New York 
Times, March 23, 1953? P* 1* Among those who shared Van Fleet's view­
point is William C. Bullitt: " . . .  Lack of a will to win was the 
chief obstacle to victory under the Truman Administration. We could 
have crushed the Communist armies in the summer of 1951. . . . "  "We 
Can Win the War in Korea," Reader's Ligest, March, 1953? P* 31*
o
Ridgway, for instance, reported to the UN Security Council on 
June 28 that the Communists had 77 divisions in Korea and could launch 
a new offensive, despite recent "severe losses," within "a minimum of 
several weeks." Facts on File, XI, No. 557 (June 29-July 5? 1951)? P* 
210. Interestingly, Ridgway also disputes Van Fleet's analysis of the 
extent of deterioration of the Communist armies: "In the light of
later statements by Van Fleet to the effect that I had prevented him 
from driving on to total victory, it is interesting to recall that his 
views then were that he did not favor an advance by the Eighth Army." 
See Ridgway's The Korean War, p. l8l. Ridgway’s version is supported 
then Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins. See his War in 
Peacetime, pp. 306-307*
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would have been large reserves of troops and equipment and the more 
reason the CCF and NKPA would have had to rally and fight more deter­
minedly. Evidence is not only strong, but overwhelming, that the Com­
munists thought the time ideal to talk and relieve military pressure on
their battered armies; however, the contention that military victory
9
was the UNC’s for the asking is unsupport able.
The pressure for a conclusion to the conflict in Korea by peace­
ful means had been building since the February 1, 1951» UN resolution 
which called for exactly that. In the United States on May 17, Senator 
Edwin C. Johnston introduced a resolution asking the UN to urge the 
belligerents in Korea to declare a cease-fire along the 38'fcN parallel 
by June 25, the first anniversary of the war. Johnston also thought 
that foreign forces should be withdrawn and that prisoners of war 
should be exchanged. The wide publicity of the Johnston resolution 
throughout the Soviet Union was interpreted by some UN analysts as an
9Another General (Edward M. Almond) thought the NKPA and CCF 
were "punchdrunk and ineffective, and I personally thought at the time 
that it was the time to finish the effort." US News and World Report,
"What Happened in Korea When Chinese Marched In," February 13, 1953? 
p. 1|0. William Vatcher has argued that "a limited victory was not 
inconceivable. The North Korean forces had been decimated. The Chin­
ese had suffered untold destruction. Under these circumstances it was 
wise policy for the Communists to seek peace before other gains were 
lost." Panmunjom, p. 22. Without the requisite Communist documents, 
scholars may never know for certain whether the UN Army could have 
pushed on to clear victory and a unified Korea. Viewpoints on the 
issue, then, amount to little more than speculation. The standpoint of 
this thesis is that Communist China, very probably with the full back­
ing (and possibly the troops) of the Soviet Union would not have per­
mitted the conquest of North Korea by the force of UN arms; by 1951 
the world prestige of China and, for that matter, of Communism itself 
was invested in Korea. The closer to China those "punchdrunk and 
ineffective" Communist armies approached the more sober and effective 
they would have become. In this sense, negotiations represented an 
insurance policy for the Communists: if they could not achieve their
aims by conferral, they could at least re-supply and re-build their 
army in hopes of preserving their military image.
66
indication that the Communists wanted peace.
On May 26, Lester Pearson, President of the UN General Assembly,
indicated that the surrender of the aggressors might not be necessary
if the fighting could be brought to an end. Trygve Lie, reversing his
former stand, contended on June 1 that a cease-fire along the 38th
parallel would be suitable. In that judgment he was supported by Lean
Acheson who said he was amenable to a reliable armistice on the 38th
p a r a l l e l . A s  T. R. Fehrenbach observed, "the United States had come
full cycle, back from its position of October 1950 > to its position of
12the previous June. The goal was containment, not victory."
The combination of diminished UN objectives and the battered 
state of their armies induced the Communists to accept the opportunity 
for peace talks. Their acknowledgment of willingness to talk came from 
an unusual source, a radio program. The Soviet Ambassador to the UN,
Jacob Malik, indicated on the "Price of Peace" program (June 23, 1951) 
that "the Soviet peoples . . . believe that the most acute problem of
■^Vatcher, Panmunjom, pp. 17-18.
~*~*~ibid. , p. 18. Acheson first made mention of the suitability 
of the 38th parallel for a settlement line on June 1. He repeated and 
confirmed the offer on June 2, June 7 and June 26, which explains why 
various sources may list the date of his offer differently. See: 
"Problems in Ending a War," US News and World Report, July 6 , 1951» P» 
16.
-^Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, pp. 525-526. The problem this 
new goal caused for the UN Army was explained this way by Walter Hermes: 
"They no longer sought to win by a knock-out, but rather on points.
They had to hurt the enemy enough to influence him to accept the UNC 
terms for a settlement, yet not enough to provoke an all-out counter­
attack and a widening of the struggle. The United States must win the 
decision, but not decisively." Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 52. 
That this policy of negotiation as opposed to victory by military means 
was not subscribed to by all concerned is amply demonstrated by Bavid 
Lawrence. See his "Civilian Stupidity," US News and World Report, May
ii, 1951, p. 132.
67
the present day- the problem of armed conflict in Korea- could be 
settled.M He was careful to include the demand that both sides should 
withdraw from the 38th parallel.^
Convinced that the Communists were willing to talk, UN leaders 
gave General Ridgway permission to contact by radio the commander of 
the Communist forces in Korea. On June 30? 1951» Ridgway sent this mes­
sage:
I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an 
armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities and all 
acts of armed forces in Korea, with adequate guarantees for 
the maintenance of such armistice. 1^-
"This was the first time," wrote T. R. Fehrenbach, "an American comman­
der in the field, while he was winning, offered to make terms with an
15aimed enemy without a complete victory or surrender." Despite the
fact that Pyongyang radio asserted that Ridgway1s truce proposal had
been made because "armed aggression of the United Nations forces has
l6ended in failure," an agreement was reached that liaison officers
13Robert Sherrod, "The Inside Story of the Korean Truce," 
Saturday Evening Post, October 17, 1953, P* 125. That the first hint 
of Communist willingness to talk peace came from the Soviet UN Ambassa­
dor lends credence to the contention that there was collaboration among 
the Soviets, the Chinese and the North Koreans. The extent of the col­
laboration, however, cannot be ascertained because reliable primary 
documents have not, of course, been made available.
■^Cited in Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, p. 527* (Original in 
italics.) See also "Exchange of Messages. . .," The Department of 
State Bulletin, Vol. 25, No. 628 (July 9, 1951), PP. U3“U5*
l5Fehrenbach, Fight for Korea, p. 9 6. See also The New York 
Times, July 2, 1951s "• • .In previous cases negotiations followed 
a clear-cut victory, with the United States and its allies dictating 
the terms and the enemy coming in to surrender. An armistice in Korea 
with the meeting place in a No Man’s Land therefore presents a new 
security problem." (p. 3).
•^ The New York Times, July 2, 1951, P* 3*
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should meet at Kaesong to lay the groundwork for subsequent talks. 
Ridgway was authorized to "discuss an armistice, providing for the ces­
sation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with ade­
quate guarantees for the maintenance of such armistice. Ihroughout
the talks, which concerned only a cease-fire, this authorization given 
to Ridgway remained the principal object of the UK negotiators.
The Selection of Kaesong
The United Nations Command suggested that the truce teams meet
on board the Danish hospital ship Jutlandia in Wonsan Harbor, but the
Communists suggested instead that the meetings be held at Kaesong. To
l8expedite matters, the UN agreed. As William Yatcher observed, this 
quick agreement was a mistake:
At the time that the meetings commenced, the U.N. forces 
were advancing at a substantial pace. By meeting at Kaesong it 
meant that a large area right in the path of advancing U.N. 
forces would be immune from attack. This contributed to re­
tarding our advance. Holding the conference at Kaesong, which 
was below the 38th parallel, represented a victory to the Reds. 
Kaesong was well within Red lines, which meant that the Commun­
ists would be the hosts.
Despite the fact that the UN negotiating team would have to 
enter Communist lines and that Kaesong was below the 38th parallel 
(which might serve to strengthen the Communist demand that the war be
■*-7ibid., July 1|, 1951» P« !•
-^Writing later, Captain George Miller, USN, made this reveal­
ing observation: "Impatience is an expensive luxury. It is possible
that the Communists recognize impatience as one of our weaknesses. 
Perhaps it is their hope that through the use of stalling and other 
irritating tactics it will be possible to wring a number of concessions 
from us. . . . "  "Shall We Blow Them Up?" United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings, Yol. 79» No. 2 (February, 1953)> P« 151*
19william H. Vatcher, Jr., "Inside Story of Our Mistakes in 
Korea," US News and World Report, January 23, 1953> P* 36.
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ended on that line), the site of the talks was given little considera­
tion "by UN leaders. As The New York Times reported on July 2, 1951,
"the place, and even the time, of the armistice talks were not regarded 
in official Washington quarters as vital." (p. l). What mattered most 
to UN leaders was that the Communists were willing to talk and it 
appeared senseless to quibble over something as apparently trivial as 
the place; after all, as one version had it, the Communists might have
thought that holding a conference on a ship was "a trick to capture the
20North Korean-Chinese leaders" or that substitution of Kaesong for
Wonsan (which is in North Korean territory) might simply have been a
21device for saving face.
Arguments of the variety that what mattered was the conference 
and not its petty administrative details, must have been very convinc­
ing in July, 1951* The prevailing opinion was that peace was at hand.
22Time, for instance, reported that "peace was in sight." Newsweek, 
that " . . .  the Korean affair was about to become the property of his­
tory. US News, with careful ambiguity, contended that "it's only a
matter of time until the real end of the Korean War."2 -^ With peace so
2QThe New York Times, July 2, 1951, P« 3*
PI
ibid., p. 1. Cf. Owen Lattimore, "Korea: We Win a Round,"
The Nation, July 21, 1951 > P* UU* Lattimore managed to convince him­
self that holding discussions at Kaesong represented a triumph for UN 
diplomacy; and, see "The Communists Accept," New Republic, July 9 ,
1951» P* 6, which argues that the need for the Communists to save face 
precluded the possibility of discussions on board the Jutlandia.
22"No Whistles Blew," Time, July 9, 1951, p. 15-
23"Peace-But With Our Guard Up," Newsweek, July 9, 195l» P« 17•
^"Moscow's Orders: Make Peace," US News and World Report,
August 10, 1951, P* 22. The front page of The New York Times on July 
8, 1951, reported the prevailing opinion: "Fighting for Several Weeks
is Foreseen by Washington." That was, if anything, the dim view of 
events at the time.
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close, there seemed little reason for undue concern with the timing and 
setting of the conference. Even Admiral Joy, the chief TOT negotiator, 
later wrote that he was convinced that a cease-fire would not he diffi­
cult to achieve:
• . . many people believed the Communists wanted an armistice 
badly enough to agree on reasonable terms. I was one of them.
Their armies had taken a beating on the battlefield . . . they 
had suffered some 200,000 casualties. The Eighth Army had 
counterattacked and was slowly pushing them beyond the 38th 
parallel. Though by no means decisively defeated, the Communists 
were in a bad way and needed a cease-fire to repair their bat­
tered war machine.^5
The first meeting of the liaison officers who were to work out
the details of the talks proper seemed to go smoothly. The TOT team,
led by Colonel A. J. Kinney, TJSAE, landed at Kaesong by helicopter on
July 8. Met by their Communist counterparts, they were escorted to a
near-by tea house. Kinney and his team proceeded immediately to a
table and sat down, facing south. Although Kinney had done this quite
by chance, the action so upset the Communist leader that he could manage
no more than stuttering in replying to Kinney's opening remarks. The
oriental custom is that the vanquished sits facing north and Kinney's
accidental seating had forced the Communists into sitting in this 
26direction. When the main TOT delegation returned to Kaesong two days 
later, they found their way to the north side of the table blocked.
The readiness to agree to the Communist suggestion that talks 
be held at Kaesong, the optimism that attended the opening of the talks,
and the US willingness to slow down, if not to halt altogether, the
2f?C. Turner Joy, "How We Lost Out in the Korean Peace Talks,"
US Nev/s and World Report, May 22, 1953» P* i+8.
^DCollins, War in Peacetime, p. 3^9; and Hermes, Truce Tent and
Fighting Front, p. 21.
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military progress of the UN Army (discussed below) are symptoms of what 
William Vatcher has described as naivete*T
Perhaps the most conspicuous UNC mistake was to assume at 
the outset that it could deal with the Communists on what it 
understood as an honorable basis, that a settlement would be 
reached within a few days or at the most within a few weeks, 
that the Communists were really sincere in seeking a peaceful 
resolution of differences, that negotiation meant to the Com­
munists what it meant to the UNC: to sincerely and frankly
discuss issues with a view to reaching an equitable and quick 
ending of the war. This initial naivete'on the part of the 
UNC led to the protracted talkathons and an extension of the 
war. UNC naivete'was first demonstrated by the acceptance of 
Kaesong as the site for the talks.^7
Caught up in the surging expectations that peace was imminent, 
few wanted to pay much mind to those who were more cautious, more 
reserved in their judgment. According to correspondent Rutherford 
Poats, the "pessimists" among the newsmen converging on Korea were say­
ing that it might be as long as six weeks before the signing of the 
28armistice. Two notable exceptions to those who thought the end of 
the war was near were Hanson Baldwin and David Lawrence. As Baldwin 
wrote, "the real danger in the Kaesong negotiations . . .  is that the 
enemy may accomplish by words what he has not been able to accomplish 
by bullets.
27yatcher, Panmunjom, pp. 205-206.
^^Leckie, Conflict, p. 299•
^^Hanson Baldwin, "Danger in Kaesong," The New York Times, July 
12, 1951, p. h. David Lawrence was arguing, perceptively, that " . . .  
to get no agreement except to stop fighting and begin talking means 
endless parleys. Such talks will not cause the Communists to concede 
in negotiations what they have not been compelled by battlefield opera­
tions to concede." See "Defeat?" US News and World Report, July 6,
1951, p. 96.
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The Curtailment of Military Operations
Although ROK President Syngman Rhee issued a statement on July-
11 that he would "rather die than see the war end "before total victory 
30or defeat,"-^ there was little he could do to influence TIM policy.
Through June, the UNC had been keeping up strong, constant pressure on 
the CCP and the NKPA, hut by the first of July with truce talks start­
ing, Ridgway was instructed to keep TIN military activity to a minimum. 
Ridgway fully agreed with his instructions. As he later said:
While both sides had immediately agreed that hostilities 
should continue during negotiations, it seemed to me, with a 
cease-fire faintly visible on the horizon, that I should do 
all I could to keep our losses at a justifiable minimum. I 
notified our commanders therefore that we would conduct no 
major offenses. . . .  I thought peace might be just around
the corner.32
The report of the liaison officers that the first meeting at
33Kaesong on July 8 had been "carried out without incident" ^ confirmed 
the feelings of military leaders that continued extensive military 
operations would only result in needless casualties. One Army officer, 
for instance, told reporters at a Pentagon briefing, "Don't go out and 
write that there will be a cease fire tomorrow. . . . These orientals 
move slowly and they may want to dicker two or three weeks. Despite
the feeling that the war was virtually over and the end of major
The New York Times, July 12, 1951? P* 5»
31ibid., July 2, 1951* p. 1.
3^Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. I82-I83.
33"Agreements Completed for Meeting to Discuss Truce in Korea,"
The Department of State Bulletin, Yol. XXY, No. 628 (July 9» 195^ )> P*
k3-
3Usherrod, "The Inside Story of the Korean Truce," p. 125.
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operations, there still were some small-scale, limited-objective attacks 
and frequent reconnaissance patrols were sent out. With the start of 
negotiations, however, the tempo of combat operations slackened consi- 
derably.
In a letter to the New Yorker, E. J. Kahn, Jr., described the
reaction of US officers and troops to the diminished operations.
"I wish we could have kept the news from the troops," one 
officer told me. "Now that they think there's a good chance 
everything may be over in short order, it's inevitable that 
some of them will ease up. Nobody wants to be the last man 
killed in a war. It doesn't rate the same kind of glory the 
first man gets."3^
Despite the best efforts of senior officers to maintain a fighting edge 
on the troops, the unofficial truce caused a problem as soldiers are 
understandably reluctant to die when a war is considered to be nearly 
ended.37 This problem for the UNC was not shared by its enemies, few 
of whose soldiers thought that peace was close at hand.-^ The slackened 
pace of operations cost the UN Army its combat edge and its initiative 
but worked to the clear benefit of the Communist forces, now more able 
to rest and recuperate.
One of the most stinging indictments of UN policy at this junc­
ture is Kissinger's:
3^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 32.
J. Kahn, Jr., "Letter Prom Korea," New Yorker, July 7,
1951, p . 5U*
■37see "Foothold on Peace," The Nation, July 7, 195l» P* U*
3^Particularly instructive in this regard is Alexander L.
George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action (New York: Columbia Uni­
versity Press, 1967). See especially Chapter Seven, "Motivation and 
Control of Combat Personnel," pp. 127-151* See also Hanson W. Baldwin, 
"China as a Military Power," Foreign Affairs, October, 1951, P* 57, 
especially p. 57*
Ik
The same attitude toward power which kept our diplomacy 
from setting limits to our military aims after we had the 
upper hand after Inchon also prevented us from drawing strength 
from our military posture after we had opened negotiations for 
an armistice. Our decision to stop military operations, except 
those of a purely defensive nature, at the very beginning of 
the armistice negotiations reflected our conviction that the 
process of negotiation operated on its own inherent logic inde­
pendently of the military pressures brought to bear. But by 
stopping military operations we removed the only Chinese incen­
tive for a settlement; we produced the frustration of two years 
of inconclusive negotiations. In short, our insistence on
divorcing force from diplomacy caused our power to lack purpose
and our negotiations to lack force.39
One should not be misled here, however. While ground operations were 
greatly curtailed, the Navy blockade of North Korea and Air Force bomb­
ing and interdiction missions continued unabated.^ This is not to say, 
however, that their operations could replace the pressure on the Commun­
ists from UN ground forces. It is enough to say that the initiative was
lost to the UN army.^
39Ki ssinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp. 0^-^ 1. 
Emphasis his. The impression should not be created, however, that all 
leading US political figures subscribed to the dichotomy of military 
and diplomatic power. The Administration was criticized by a number of 
leading Republicans whose policy it was that the UNC should continue to 
wage an offensive war. See Ronald J. Caridi, The Korean War and Ameri­
can Politics: The Republican Party as a Ca.se Study (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, i960), p. 180. Caridi further argues 
that "the Republican party's response to the Korean War in the July 
1991 July 1992 period can be characterized by: a determination to
increase pressure on the Administration to terminate its limited war 
policy; the conviction that the peace talks were being used by the Com­
munists to shield an ever-increasing escalation; and the genesis of an 
alternative foreign policy." (p. 182). See also his article "The G-.O.P. 
and the Korean War," Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 37 > No. k (Novem­
ber, 1968), pp. I423-I4I4.3 .
^Caridi, The Korean War and American Politics, p. 180.
^ O n  how militarily important it is for an army to seize and 
maintain the initiative, see Montgomery of Alamein, A History of War­
fare, p. 22.
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On Military Negotiators
While it is possible that a high-level political conference 
might have been held to resolve the Korean question, the situation 
seemed to warrant a military conference. Dean Acheson in his Present 
at the Creation sets forth the five reasons for the decision to hold 
military talks:
CD Neither Chinese nor North Korean authorities were recog­
nized by the United States.
(2) "It was highly desirable" to exclude political matters,
such as the status of Formosa or the admission of the
Chinese Communists into the UN, from the talks.
(3) The forum of the United Nations was undesirable ("worst of 
all places") as a setting for the conduct of negotiations.
(U) The talks hinged on battlefield conditions at the time.
(5) Neither the Soviets nor the Chinese assumed responsibility
for the CCF "volunteers."^
As Acheson pointed out, the military was very reluctant to assume re­
sponsibility for the conduct of negotiations, but once assigned the task 
by the President, they "loyally accepted."^ The task of actually choos­
ing the UN negotiating team devolved to the UN commander in the field, 
General Ridgway. As his choice as UN senior delegate, Ridgway picked 
US Navy Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy.^- While there would be little
^Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 686.
U3ibid., pp. 686-687.
^■Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 182. The first UNC delegation 
was composed of Joy; Major General Laurence C. Craigie, USAF; Major 
General Henry I. Nodes, USA; Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN; and 
Major General Paik Sun Yup, ROKA. The Communist delegation: General
Nam II, North Korea Senior Delegate; Major General Lee Sang Cho, North 
Korea; Major General Chang Pyong San, North Korea; Lieutenant General 
Tung Hua, Chinese; and Major General Hsieh Fang, Chinese. As Vatcher 
says in Panmunjom (p. 30n): "It was significant that the Communist
delegation contained three North Koreans and two Chinese, even though 
the Chinese had 95 Pe** cent of the front-line troops. This was obvi­
ously a propaganda move."
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dispute atout Joy's intellectual ability to handle his assignment, Wil­
liam Yatcher has pointed out that in terms of the negotiating team per­
sonnel, the advantage seemed to go to the Communists:
. . . the Communist senior delegate, North Korean General Nam 
II and his so-called assistant, the Commander of the Chinese 
People's Volunteers, General Hsieh Pang, who actually was in 
control of Nam II- "both of these men are political officers.
Both had been extensively trained in debating and the use of 
Communist logic. Our senior delegate, Admiral C. Turner Joy, 
and his successor, Lieut. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., had 
backgrounds as fighting men,^
Of course, it is possible for a military man to be a skillful
negotiator, but as Hans Morgenthau writes, it is unlikely:
. . . the military leader must think in absolute terms. He 
lives in the present and in the immediate future. The sole 
question before him is how to win victories as cheaply and 
quickly as possible and how to avoid defeat. . . . whereas 
the mind of the diplomat is complicated and subtle. It sees 
the issue in hand as a moment in history, and beyond the vic­
tory of tomorrow it anticipates the incalculable possibili­
ties of the future. +^6
As General Collins observed, the " . . .  vacillating instructions and a 
lack of firmness . . . distressed our negotiators, military men accus­
tomed to sticking to decisions once made."^ While we would be remiss 
in dismissing the military leader simply as a type, generally incapable 
of the conduct of diplomatic conventions, there is something to say for 
the thesis that by training and usually by temperament, the professional
^Yatcher, "Inside Story of Our Mistakes in Korea," p. 3 6. 
Ridgway corroborates Vatcher's point that Hsieh Fang was the real 
leader of the delegation. (The Korean War, p. 182).
^Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5 th ed. (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1972), pp. 55-6-51+7* See also Alfred
Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign
Relations (New York:King's Crown Press,1956),especially Chapter 
One, "Soldiers and Diplomats," pp. 1-12.
^Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 331 •
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soldier is less inclined toward understanding and employing the shift­
ing situations at the conference table than he would those on the bat­
tlefield. This was the opinion of Hanson Baldwin: "Our mistakes- mis­
takes that almost invariably recur when military men attempt to handle 
the intangible of public relations like an operations plan- have, 
regrettably, made it easier for the enemy to make black white.
The major mistake made at Kaesong was the failure of the Admin­
istration to appreciate the inherent political implications of the 
armistice talks. General Ridgway, however, seems to have understood 
that the conference was sure to have political ramifications. He wanted 
to keep Ambassador John J. Muccio and US political advisor William J.
Sebald at Munsan-ni, about twenty miles north of Seoul. However, his 
superiors in Washington refused permission fearing that the presence of 
these diplomats would encourage Communist efforts to introduce clearly
political issues into the talks. Ridgway had to ask Sebald to return
1±9to his post in Tokyo and Muccio to remain in Seoul.
If the composition of the Communist truce team was a propaganda 
ploy, the composition of the UN truce team indicated a cavalier disre­
gard for propaganda. The five team members (exclusive of staff) were 
maintained at a constant ratio of four Americans and one South Korean 
throughout the talks. By November, 195>1 , the British press and politi­
cians were asking why they had no representative on the UN truce team.^
This was a question that could have been asked with equal justification
^ The New York Times, July 12, 195>1 > P*
L.9^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, pp. 19-20.
^Freda Kirchwey, "Breaking the Circle," The Nation, November 
2hf 1951, P. U35.
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t>y any of the nations that provided more than token contributions of 
men to Korean combat. Had representatives of other nations been includ­
ed on the UN truce team, there would have been more emphasis to the
term "United Nations" and other nations could have shared the frustra­
te
tions of attempting to negotiate with the Communists.
At the time there appeared little cause for concern over such
matters as which nations should be represented on the UN truce team.
The State Department thought that the truce talks would last only four 
b2weeks. What real purpose, then, would be served by excessive concern 
over the availability of political consultants, the ratio of the member­
ship of the truce team or, as we have seen, the location of the site 
for negotiations? Matters thought trivial by the UN were regarded as 
significant by the Communists. What the UN team did not know in July,
1951» was that anything held to be important by either side during nego­
tiations is ipso facto important and must be so regarded.
The Start of the Talks 
At the time the Communists suggested that the talks be held at 
Kaesong, it was a kind of no-man’s land, three miles south of the 38th 
parallel and appeared to be neutral territory, but once Ridgway 
accepted, the Communists .immediately occupied it, requiring the UN 
delegation to pass through their lines to arrive at the conference
^Yatcher, Parmmn.iom, p. 206.
^"The Education of a General," Time, July 7* 1952, p. 2 3.
79
table. Colonel J. C. Murray, USMC, the commander of the white flag­
laden UN motor convoy to Kaesong on July 10, described the procession 
this way:
As the procession wound through the town these buffoons 
ludicrously assumed the demeanor of conquerors and perhaps as 
many as a dozen cameramen dropped off along the route to photo­
graph the spectacle. Without doubt these propaganda shots 
have been circulated widely throughout the Communist world to 
give substance to the myth of Communist victory in Korea.5U
Having arrived at his destination, Admiral Joy and his team, 
still upset that their convoy to Kaesong would serve a Communist propa­
ganda purpose, took their places at the conference table. He wrote 
latex*:
I seated myself at the conference table and almost sank 
out of sight. The Communists had provided a chair for me 
which was considerably shorter than a standard chair. Across 
the table, the senior Communist delegate, General Ham II, 
protruded a good foot above my cagily diminished stature.
This had been accomplished by providing stumpy Nam II with 
a chair about four inches higher than usual. . . .  I ex­
changed my foreshortened chair for a normal one, but not 
before Communist photographers had exposed reels of film.55
At a recess of the first meeting said Joy, MI was directly threatened by
56a Communist guard who pointed a burp gun at me and growled menacingly."^
^Pehrenbach, The Fight for Korea, p. 9 8. There is little 
doubt that the UN was in a position to dictate details and formalities 
had it insisted. In June-July, 1951 > time and momentum were on the 
side of the UN; it is probable that the Communists would have accepted 
any reasonable offer, such as the ship Jutland!.a, about the location 
at which the talks would be held. Although it may seem paradoxical, 
the hand of the UN would have been considerably strengthened by more 
intransigence on its part. In rushing to accept the Communist offer 
of Kaesong, the UN unwittingly undermined its own cause.
5^ -J. C. Murray, "The Korean Truce Talks: First Phase," United 
States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 79 > No. 9 (September, 1953)> 
p .  982; see also, Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 21.
55J0y, How Communists Negotiate, pp. i|-5-
56jbid., p. 5*
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Another American officer was told "by a Communist guard that the gaudy
57medal he wore had been awarded him for killing forty Americans.
Most observers might express surprise or shock at these calcu­
lated, some might say childish, tactics, but from just these first few 
hours it was evident that the Communists regarded negotiations as an 
opportunity to enhance their image, at least in their own nations.
They also regarded the conference as a highly political matter, whereas 
the UN employed every tactic to divorce this "military armistice" con­
ference from issues of political importance, naively failing to appre­
ciate the political undercurrents of the Kaesong meetings.
Nothing was overlooked by the Communists. Their painstaking 
attention to detail is attested to by William Vatcher in his account of 
the intricate preparations made for the UN team:
The Communists had anticipated that we would live and eat 
at Kaesong. They had prepared a building for the U.N. delega­
tion and staff. The beds were even made. They offered us 
food. They, being adept propagandists, recognized the value 
of the maxim that one does not bite the hand that feeds him.
Admiral Joy rightfully declined the offer.58
Even the contrast in dress among the delegates was deliberate. Except 
for the ROKA delegate (who wore fatigues), the UNC officers were wear­
ing summer tan uniforms. The Chinese wore drab uniforms without insig­
nia, but the North Koreans wore high-collar dress blouses, full insignia,
^ibid., p. 5* Joy amusingly relates that during one of the 
early conferences a UN interpreter placed a miniature UN flag in a 
stand on the conference table. After a recess the delegates returned 
to discover a miniature North Korean flag in a stand that rose six 
inches higher than that of the UN. "All in the United Nations Command 
Delegation speculated with amusement as to where an increase in the 
height of the United Nations Command standard would lead. I hastened 
to veto any tendency toward such competition, thereby perhaps averting 
construction of the two tallest flagpoles on earth." (p. 8).
^Vatcher, "Inside Story of Our Mistakes in Korea," p. 3&.
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and high leather hoots. They were clearly, in Hermes' phrase, the
"sartorial champions."
While Ridgway's instructions were simply to end the fighting on
£>0reasonable terms and obtain assurances that it would not be renewed,
the Communists approached the table with a comprehensive plan, designed
to achieve a number of purposes. The Communists were keenly aware of
the fact that no separation between the military and the political was
possible and they capitalized on every opportunity to make political,
psychological or propaganda capital out of a conference intended by the
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UH to concern only military problems.
Initial Problems 
Among the first difficulties for Joy and his team of negotia­
tors was the problem of language. Far more was involved than that 
there were a number of languages spoken at Kaesong; the roots of the 
problem went deeper, into the culture and into the political persua­
sions and perceptions of the negotiators themselves. If the mechanical 
problem of translation was fairly easily solved, the problems of the 
meanings and connotations of words were residual and persisted through­
out the two-year period of the negotiations. Words such as "logic," 
"reason," "injustice," and "democracy" meant markedly different things 
to each team and literal interpretation served only to exacerbate the
^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 23.
^Vatcher, Panmunjom, p. 28, and Collins, War in Peacetime,
P. 330.
^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. %0\\,
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62situation. Even the form of address first used by Admiral Joy was 
found unsuitable by the Communists. Joy's allusion to "Communist" was 
immediately rebutted by them: "The term 'Communists’ is not proper
here because you are not handling £  sic J  with the Communists but 
with the Korean People's Army and the Chinese Volunteers."
It was not unreasonable, as David Rees wrote, for the Commun­
ists to insist upon being called "the delegation of the KPA and CPV";
however, in turn, they consistently referred to the ROK President and 
Chiang Kai-shek as, respectively, "the murderer Rhee" and "your puppet 
on Formosa."^ At one point Joy made mention of military power and its
role in the defeat of Japan, but General Ram II adamantly refused to
accept any intimations that it was American military power that had 
defeated Japan. It was obvious, said Nam II, that it was the Korean 
people's struggle, the Chinese people's war, and the Soviet Union's 
resistance that had defeated Japan. The United States had fought Japan 
for three years inconclusively until the intervention of the Soviet
Union dealt Japan a crushing blow. "Can these historical facts be
66negated lightly?" asked Nam II.
These distinct differences in terms of history, logic and forms 
of address were later neatly summarized by General Mark Clark:
62ibid., p. £06. Hermes continued, "As the negotiations wore
on, the two delegations began to sound more and more like each other.
'The peace-loving peoples of the world' were always solidly lined up 
behind the UNC or the Communist proposal. . . . "  (p. £>06).
^Vatcher, Panmun.jom, p. 38•
^^Rees, Korea, p. 293.
^Vatcher, "Inside Story of Our Mistakes in Korea," pp. 35 and 
3 8. As Walter Hermes observed, "Each side was obviously using a dif­
ferent history book." Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 3 6.
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Consistency in argument never was a characteristic of the 
Communist negotiator. Nam II was no exception. We might "be 
able to embarrass him occasionally, but we never could budge 
him by argument or logic.
The manner in which the armistice talks were conducted 
gave free rein to this Communist tactic of negotiation. There 
was no moderator to decide whether a point had been proven 
satisfactorily. There was no chairman to decide whether a 
speaker was in order. There were no rules to require either 
side to answer questions. ^6
Despite occasional Communist intransigence and interruptions, 
despite the language problems and the irritation of incidents, some 
petty, some relatively more important, and others actually amusing, the 
negotiators were able to begin discussions on substantive issues. Al­
though the progress had been slower than most had expected, progress 
was at least being made and within ten meetings an agreement on the 
agenda had been worked out. The struggle to establish the agenda is 
representative of the clash of the two different viewpoints, if not two 
distinct cultures. Admiral Joy's apt illustration is worth full repro­
duction:
Americans meeting to discuss arrangements for a baseball 
game might adopt an agenda as follows:
1. Place the game is to be played.
2. Time the game is to start.
3- Selection of umpires.
Communists, however, would submit an agenda like this:
1. Agreement that the game is to be played at Shanghai.
2. Agreement that game be played at night.
3. Agreement that umpires be Chinese officials.
Thus the Communists seek to place their negotiating oppo­
nents on the defensive from the outset. If the rigged agenda 
is carelessly accepted by their opponents, the Communists are 
able to argue that the only questions x'emaining are: exactly
where in Shanghai the ball game is to be played, exactly what
^Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 103.
Joy, "How We Lost Out in the Korean Peace Talks," p. 1+8.
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time at night the game is to start, and precisely which Chin­
ese are to officiate. 68
The haggling over the agenda convinced a number of people that
in coming to the conference table the Communists were merely seeking a
de facto cease-fire. The Under Secretary of the Army at the time,
Archibald S. Alexander, convinced that the Communists were seeking only
to gain time, declared that, "the closer you are to the field, . . .
69the more you feel the truce talks are just a hoax." y Late in July, 
President Truman could say only that "we do not yet know whether the 
Communists really desire peace in Korea or whether they are simply try­
ing to gain by negotiations what they have not been able to gain by 
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conquest."
By July 27, the agenda problems had been settled as had, seem­
ingly, other problems such as Communist guardsf brandishing of weapons 
and the problems over the admission of western newsmen to cover the 
proceedings. The agenda that had been established called for discus­
sions of five topics:
(1) The adoption of the agenda.
(2) The establishment of a military demarcation line (and a 
demilitarized zone) as a basic condition for a cease-fire.
(3) Concrete arrangements for the cease-fire, including composi­
tion, authority and functions of a supervising organization.
(W Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.
(5) Recommendations to the governments of the countries con­
cerned on both sides.
/TO
Joy, How Communists Negotiate, pp. 18-19. Emphasis his.
6?The New York Times, July 2k, 195>1> P- 3«
7°ibid., July 29, 19£l, p. 1.
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As discussions began in earnest over item 2 of the agenda, 
there were recurring incidents culminating on August !{., when a heavily- 
armed company of Chinese troops passed within a few hundred yards of 
the UK team's headquarters. General Ridgway, angered over the viola­
tion of the neutral site, called off the conference until assured that
71similar violations would not be repeated. So assured, he permitted a 
resumption of the talks on August 10. The talks proceeded until the 
Communists called them off on August 23. During these days at Kaesong, 
the principal substantive issue that was debated was the 38th parallel.
The 38th Parallel Controversy
Although the discussion of the location of the cease-fire line
72as the second matter of business was later regarded by Joy as a mistake'
73or by others as a Communist trap, y those assessments do not appear to 
be warranted. At the time the Kaesong conference was begun, TJK Armies 
were north of the 38th parallel at almost every point. Moreover, the 
positions of the UK army were on naturally fortified key terrain and 
represented the successful ground-gaining effort of the past year. The 
military difficulties of the CCF and KKPA afforded them, at the time, 
little hope of regaining the ground they had lost. An acceptance of 
the offers of such UK leaders as Acheson, Ridgway and Lie that the 38th 
parallel would be a suitable demarcation line would have been the wise 
course of action for the Communists.
"^Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 199*
72jc>y, How Communists Kegotiate, p. 28.
73"gci.-u0aAi.cn of a General," Time, July 7» 1952, p. 2 3.
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However, at Kaesong:, the Communists discovered that the UN had 
completely reversed itself and refused to accept the 38th parallel as 
the cease-fire line. The UN now refused to consider any other cease­
fire line than the line of contact between the opposing* armies at the 
moment of signing. While the Communists were happy to have the cease­
fire line as the second item of the agenda, they were simply agreeing 
to something that UN leaders, in their premature public utterances, had 
already stipulated. Now, at Kaesong, the UN negotiating team had to 
endure Communist confusion, which was understandable, and their invec­
tive, which was not. As Robert Leckie points out, ". . . in fairness 
to the Communists, the fixing of a demarcation line had been designated 
as the first matter to be settled. The United Nations attempt to make 
it the line of contact at the time the armistice was signed looked like
For their part, the UN leaders realized that to accept the 38th 
parallel meant sacrificing both the ground gained in a year of war and 
their excellent defensive positions. Acceptance of the 38th parallel, 
in effect, meant a return to the status quo ante. That their earlier 
public position had been a faux pas was now seen by the UN leaders and 
just as quickly abandoned.
^Leckie, Conflict, p. 316. Emphasis his. Although the UN 
insisted that the truce line be the line of contact between the oppos­
ing armies, the first demand put forth at Panmunjom must have been 
even more disconcerting to the Communists. Joy records that he first 
proposed a northward adjustment of the line of contact to compensate 
for the withdrawal of UN air and naval operations which ranged hundreds 
of miles north of the battling armies. Although this was only a bar­
gaining position and Joy quickly returned to the line of contact demand, 
the Communists must have been discomposed by these insistences when, in 
fact, they had been led to expect a quick agreement by the UN on their 
goal of a cease-fire line on the 38th parallel. This is discussed by 
Joy in How Communists Negotiate, p. 60.
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Declaring on August 1 that the UN must have a defensible line
7and that the 38th parallel did not meet that requirement, ^ Dean Ache­
son later admitted that the Communists must have been shocked:
The Russians and Chinese could well have been surprised, 
chagrined, and given a cause to feel tricked when at Kaesong we 
revealed a firm determination as a matter of major principle 
not to accept the 38th parallel as the armistice line. . . .
So it seems to me highly probable that the Russians and 
Chinese . . . received a considerable shock when at the start 
of a negotiation to restore, as they thought, the status quo 
ante they found us demanding a new line for our sphere of influ­
ence, not only more militarily significant but involving con­
siderable loss of prestige for them. They would never imagine 
that what appeared to be trickery was wholly inadvertent on our 
part. It was exactly the kind of maneuver in which they would 
have delighted.76
The demand of the UN for a cease-fire at the line of contact 
was both sensible and justified. The UNC had fought its way beyond the 
imaginary parallel and established good defensive positions in key ter­
rain; to sacrifice the gain and positions simply to restore the status 
quo ante, and in effect to sanction the aggression, would have been 
militarily and diplomatically unwise. The problem was one of framework: 
Acheson, Lie and Ridgway had made no effort to be circumspect —  or 
reticent —  about UN objectives. In publicly stating that the UN would 
be willing to halt at the 38th parallel, they fortified the Communist 
cause, undermined their own, and added grist to the Communist propaganda 
mill which had a field day in holding up to scorn the UN chameleonic 
positions.
In international negotiation, closed societies have a distinct 
advantage. The statements of their political and military leaders are
7-^ Facts on File, XI, No. %6± (July 27-August 2, 195>1 )> P* 21+1. 
"^Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 689-690.
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not combed by the press for possible hidden meaning or ulterior motive; 
their opinions are not published in newspapers or magazines without 
careful censorship. In any tense international moment, the expressions 
of the leaders of the closed society are almost certain to be restrained 
and carefully guarded. Leaders of the open society, on the other hand, 
must be concerned with informing the citizenry and justifying the aims 
and directions of their adopted policies and their remarks, therefore, 
are apt to be more spontaneous. Even at tense moments, the leaders of 
the open society will be more inclined to air their views and are less 
likely to be censored than their counterparts in the closed society.
No better proof of this is available than that the statements of Secre­
tary Acheson about the willingness of the UN to accept the 38th paral­
lel as an armistice line were first made at the MacArthur Investigation 
77proceedings.
Had Acheson, Ridgway and Lie understood that their premature 
assessments of what would be suitable to UN purposes would later con­
tribute to the enervation of their positions, they very probably would 
have chosen to be less loquacious. This recalls the argument adduced 
in the first chapter that it is an error for public figures to specify 
goals. Such specificity severely restricts the opportunity for diplo­
matic maneuvering and betrays the nation's goals or policies prematurely.
The gaffe of the UN leaders is especially regrettable in the
7?The 38'fch parallel imbroglio illustrates the failure of key UN
leaders to appreciate the fact that before and during (and frequently 
even after) negotiations, public statements must be guarded. Impru­
dently uttered statements can easily be made to substantiate the 
charges or strengthen the cause of the rival negotiator. At Kaesong 
the Communists were able to charge the UN with deceit and dishonesty,
although ineptitude was the only offense of which the UN leaders were
guilty.
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context of the 38th parallel controversy "because that issue could so 
plainly have been resolved in favor of the UN from the standpoint of 
either military power or objective logic. That the Communists could, 
with some justification, accuse the UN of bad faith, is a clear indi­
cation of the extent to which the remarks of the UN leaders had served 
the purposes of their enemies. Robert Leckie summarizes the problem 
well:
Nam's insistence on the Parallel was so illogical and ab­
surd, even for Communists whose force of logic is the logic of 
force, . . . that he and his colleagues must have been impressed 
by Secretary of State Acheson’s remark on June 7 that the 38th 
Parallel would be a satisfactory demarcation line. A week 
earlier UN Secretary-General Lie had said that a cease-fire 
could be arranged at a line approximating the Parallel, and no 
one in the United Nations had challenged Jacob Malik's phrase 
in his June 23rd speech calling for "mutual withdrawal of forces 
from the 38th Parallel." Nam must have thought, then, that he 
could get away with it. . . .78
The UN team was adamant that the demarcation line would be the line of
battlefield contact, not the 38th parallel. As Admiral Joy said, "We
were not of a mind to save Communists face r sic J by withdrawing
from hard-won ground above the 38th parallel thus erasing any penalty
79for their war of aggression.’’ Because there was little of substance 
that the Communists could say to support their position, they resorted 
to a tactic not generally considered part of any US negotiator’s stock 
in trade, invective. Said Admiral Joy:
When their arguments failed them they took refuge in vitu­
peration, insults and rage. You could always tell their esti­
mate of the progress they were making from the amount of obnox­
ious propaganda that blared forth on the Communist radio and in
78Leckie, Conflict, p. 30U« See also: "The Course of Negotia­
tions for a Cease-Fire in Korea," United Nations Bulletin, Yol. XI, No. 
k (August 19, 195>l)> P- l^J-9 •
79j0y> "How We Lost Out in the Korean Peace Talks," p. 1+8•
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their press. When they were not doing1 so well it intensified.
I presume this was their way of putting pressure on their oppo­
nents. 80
Because the other items on the agenda were related to the set­
tlement of the cease-fire line, the problems that arose in settling 
that issue precluded agreement on or even discussion of the subsequent 
items. There was, however, no genuine alternative. The cease-fire 
line had to be discussed and agreed upon prior to attempts to solve the 
other problems. While the Communists could have used the cease-fire 
line issue to stall the conference in any circumstances, the inept pre­
conference diplomacy of the UN leaders made matters considerably easier 
for the Communists.
The Kaesong Talks Are Suspended 
Progress in the talks at Kaesong, and in those to follow at 
Panmunjom, was severely impeded by incidents which detracted from the 
main concern of agreeing on the five-point agenda. On July 12, just 
two days after the talks had begun, General Ridgway broke off the talks 
for three days because allied newsmen were not permitted to enter Kae­
song. Given assurances that Kaesong would become an open city, Ridgway 
permitted the talks to resume on July l£. On August a heavily-armed 
Chinese company passed within about one hundred yards of the UK truce 
team headquarters. This violation of Kaesong's neutrality resulted in 
another suspension of the talks, this time for five days. Other inci-
O  -1
dents contributed to the tension and hostility of the talks. The 
^Qjbid., p. U8.
^1-For a dramatic contrast of views concerning such issues as 
who staged the incidents and what purposes they were designed to serve, 
cf. Joy, How Communists Negotiate, pp. 30“38 with Stone, The Hidden 
History of the Korean War, pp. 281+-298,
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impasse over the 38th parallel only made a "bad situation worse. Some 
idea of the atmosphere at Kaesong is created by this description from 
US News:
. . . Historians would he hard put to find a parallel for the 
sessions Joy attends. Ten men, five for each side, sit facing 
each other across a long table in a dimly lit room. There is 
almost increasing argument, usually in the reserved form of 
prepared statements, or there is glowering, hostility-ridden
silence. 82
Whether Kaesong ever could have become the site of agreement on 
the issues of a cease-fire is now purely academic. On the night of 
August 22-23, Colonel Kinney, the Kaesong liaison officer, was summoned 
from his tent to investigate charges that a UNC aircraft had bombed 
Kaesong in an effort to kill the Communist negotiating team. Kinney, 
an experienced Air Force officer, was convinced that the attack was a 
sham. When the Communists demanded an immediate acknowledgment of the 
attack, Kinney refused. The Communists then announced an indefinite
o ^
suspension of the armistice conference. ^
The peace talks were to resume, but not at Kaesong. In late 
October when the negotiating teams returned to the conference table, 
the site, wisely if belatedly, had been changed to Panmunjom.
Chap t e r Summary
The conference at Kaesong conformed to the traditional American 
belief that a dichotomy should exist between war and diplomacy. Most
^"Admiral Joy Works for Cease-Fire Under Difficulties,” US 
Hews and World PLeport, August 2I4, 1951, P« 2+0•
83Admiral Joy thought that the Communists broke off the talks 
thinking that they had replenished their supplies and reinforced their 
units to a point at which they believed a resumption of attacks against 
the UNC would drive the battle line south to, or even past, the 38th 
parallel. How Communists Negotiate, pp. 36-37*
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Americans have been able to say with Churchill that "it is better to 
jaw, jaw, than war, w a r . T h e  de facto cease-fire which accompanied 
the start of negotiations at Kaesong testifies to the US inclination 
to separate war and diplomacy rather than to understand them as inte­
gral elements of foreign policy.
The works of the Prussian writer Karl von Clausewitz, for in­
stance, are out of the mainstream of US (and in the Korean context, UK) 
thinking. Clausewitz recognized the relationship among foreign, domes­
tic and military policies, whereas US diplomatic history suggests
American efforts to separate those policies. That Lenin appears to
Ac:
have been highly influenced by the writings of Clausewitz,  ^is, of 
course, no proof that the Communist negotiating team at Kaesong was so 
influenced. There is, however, something to say for the argument that 
Communists, on the basis simply of their ideology, appreciate the sym­
biotic relationship of politics and power; conversely, the UK negotia­
tors at Kaesong approached the conference with an attitude toward, and 
understanding of, diplomacy which excluded the notion that power and 
politics are two sides of the same coin.
Had the UK leaders been keenly aware of the relationship between 
diplomatic and military power, it is probable that the UK would have 
delayed its response to Malik's "peace" offer, that the talks would
^Cited in Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, p. 532.
^Edward M. Collins in Karl von Clausewitz, War, Politics and 
Power, trans. and ed. by Edward M. Collins, Gateway Edition (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Company, 1965), p. 31*
86as Admiral Joy wrote: "Washington immediately directed
General . . . Ridgway to broadcast . . . that the United Nations Com­
mand was willing to discuss an armistice. This was not only done in 
great haste; it was done without denouncing the 38th Parallel as a line 
of demarcation. The Communists, therefore, concluded that the United
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never have "been held at Kaesong, that the conference would have assumed 
a clearly more political character, that the UN team would have been 
professional diplomats from several nations (not professional soldiers 
from only two), and that the inexorable, although limited, military 
pressure upon the Communists would have been maintained not despite, 
but because of, the initiation of peace talks.
A critical indictment of the UN leadership was the way in which 
their ill-timed and ill-spoken remarks could later become so important 
to the Communist side that one writer could argue that the UN "raised 
their price" for peace (by insisting on the line of battlefield contact 
for a demarcation line as opposed to the 38th parallel) to avert
87peace. '
In the absence of victory as a policy alternative, the UN was 
confronted with the need to select one of two options: the first was
that of continuing a limited war, without negotiations, for an unlimited 
period of time. This obviously was an unattractive choice. The second 
was that of waging limited offensive operations within a diplomatic, 
negotiatory framework, carefully integrating military and diplomatic 
objectives. That the UN would choose the second option was evident 
from the outset once the idea of uniting Korea by force of arms was 
finally abandoned. That the Communists believed the UN would employ 
the second option only in a weak and ineffective manner may very well
Nations Command needed an armistice, and that the 38th Parallel would 
be a truce line acceptable to the United States. These misunderstand­
ings cost us many months of fruitless negotiations." How Communists 
Negotiate, p. l6f?. See also "U.S., Russia in Peace Deal," US News and 
World Report, June 22, 1991 > P» 131 similar analysis.
87stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, p. 287.
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have been one of their considerations in deciding to negotiate.
A good portion of the argument, of course, turns on the ques­
tion of how badly hurt the Communist armies were. Assuming that they 
needed a respite, and the evidence is strong in this regard, the Com­
munists had to choose the path of negotiation, hoping in the face of 
superior TOT military power to strike as agreeable a bargain as pos­
sible. To substantiate their hopes they had the public statements of 
TOT leaders. Similarly, even if the Communists never intended to nego­
tiate seriously, they had the evidence of ITS diplomatic history that, 
very likely, the UN military pressure would reside when talks began.
In either case, the Communists stood to gain: in the former, they
could achieve a settlement instead of suffer a defeat; and in the lat­
ter they could use the military recess to revivify their armies.
A combination of factors seems to have impelled the Communists 
to break off the talks in late August by manufacturing a bombing inci­
dent. They realized that the bargain they wanted, and had been led to 
expect, was no longer available to them. The stalled TOT military 
operations had afforded the Communists time to re-supply and their only 
prospects for a return to the 38th parallel were by earning it militar­
ily.
Kaesong was a strange and unpleasant experience to Americans.
Going to Kaesong to discuss peace, they instead found another kind of
war: a war of shortened chairs and heightened flagpoles, a war of
newsmen and staged incidents, a war of apparent trivia and childish
pranks. But if Korea, as one US soldier put it, was " . . .  the war we
88can't win, we can't lose, we can't quit," it was so largely because 
88cited in Leckie, Conflict, p. 9*
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the UN let it he that way. Above all else, the Kaesong conference 
demonstrated the UN failure to appreciate that the common denominator 
of various approaches to diplomacy is power; in understanding the peace 
conference as the conclusion of the war, instead of its culmination, 
the UN only strengthened the hand of its opponent.
CHAPTER III
THE TALKS AT PANMUNJOM 
Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or iron
wood.
— Stalin
The Military Situation 
Although the Communists had broken off the talks at Kaesong on 
August 23, 1951 > on the pretext of a TIN bombing raid designed to kill 
the members of their truce team, on August 28 they demanded a reinves­
tigation of their complaint. Fearing that the Communists planned to 
exhibit skillfully faked evidence, General Ridgway refused to re-open 
the investigation. While awaiting the Communists’ next move, Ridgway
had to endure the vilification of the Peking radio which called him a
2’’liar" and a "criminal." It is difficult to assess the Communist 
intention in demanding a re-examination of the "evidence." Perhaps 
they expected to be able to win a propaganda victory by extracting an 
apology from the TJNC and, with increased prestige and diplomatic momen­
tum, continue the talks at Kaesong. Perhaps the Communists believed 
that it was unwise to attempt another military confrontation with the 
TJNC and chose the re-examination-of-evidence ploy in hopes of continu­
ing the talks. Whatever their real motivation, with the talks
■ C^ited in Vatcher, Panmun.jom, p. 6 8.
2Facts on File, XI, No. $6$ (August 2U-30, 19!?l)* P. 273.
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suspended, the Communists were once again confronted with the strong 
military pressure from the TJN armies.
Between August 31 and November 12, the UNC waged some of the 
most bitter battles of the war. UN commanders began a series of lim­
ited offenses designed to win key terrain, disrupt the CCF build-up, 
and destroy the enemy forces. This was the period of Bloody Ridge, 
the Punchbowl, Heartbreak Ridge, and the siege of Kumsong. The UNC 
was taking casualties, but was inflicting serious damage upon the Com­
munist military position and prestige.
The UNC was on the offensive in three major sectors of the 
front in mid-September. On September 10, General Yan Fleet estimated 
that in the two previous weeks alone the Communists had suffered 2^,000 
casualties. On September 12, Yan Fleet said of the Communist army that 
"They're in bad shape, and we are hurting them more and more. They 
will want peace before winter before we’re through with them." As if 
to confirm Yan Fleet's observations, the Chinese radio complained the 
same day that the UN was "openly inviting war" with its "killer" 
atta.cks.^ During this period of unrelenting UN military pressure, it 
was General Ridgway who made the most telling comment. Ridgway let it 
be known that the farther the battlefront moved into North Korea, the 
farther north the eventual cease-fire line would be.^
While UN gains in September were important, they paled by com­
parison with the military successes achieved in early October. What 
Van Fleet called his "Autumn Offensive" resulted in UN casualty lists
^ibid., XI, No. 5>&7 (September 7“13> I95>1 )> P* 291.
•^"The Education of a General," Time, July 7> 195>2, p. 23; and 
Joy, "How We Lost Out in the Korean Peace Talks, p. i|8 .
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of up to 2,000 a week, but about ten to fifteen times that many for the
Communists. The ground gained was geographically small but strategi­
cs
cally important. Walter Hermes summarized the October operations this 
way:
In October 195>1 Eighth Army had inflicted upon the enemy 
the highest monthly total of casualties for the negotiations 
period and had won valuable defensive terrain as well. More­
over, there was little doubt that the UNC success on the bat­
tlefield was a factor in the enemy’s decision to resume nego­
tiations. ^
The clear relationship between military and diplomatic successes 
is illustrated by the chain of events in the fall months of 1951 • Ridg­
way was determined not to repeat his mistake of holding truce talks 
behind enemy lines and on September 23 refused to resume cease-fire 
talks at Kaesong. On September 27, however, he expressed willingness 
to resume discussions at Songhyen, 8 miles east of Kaesong, in truly
neutral territory. The Communists refused the offer and insisted that
7
the talks be held at Kaesong. It was after this refusal by the Commun­
ists that Ridgway said simply that the Eighth Army was ready if the
g
Communists wanted "to get on with war on an all-out scale."
Ridgway was willing to agree to practically any location for 
the site of the talks so long as it was in neutral territory. With the 
UNC pressing its attacks, the UN and Communist commands agreed on Octo­
ber 8 and 9 "to hold talks at Panmunjom, 6 miles southeast of Kaesong.
^Robert T. Oliver, Verdict in Korea (State College, Pa.: Bald
Eagle Press, 1952), p. 21.
^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 507»
7Facts on File, XI, No. 569 (September 21-27, 1951), p. 305-
®ibid., No. 570 (September 28-0ctober 4, 1951), P« 31^ 4-
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Although the Communists had insisted only days before that talks be 
resumed at Kaesong, they were now prepared to accept another site. 
William Yatcher has argued that the change of heart was a result of 
inexorable UN- military pressure.
Inasmuch as the Communists had thus conceded to UNC demands 
to change the site of the talks, it can be concluded that the 
military pressure being exerted against them at this time by 
the UNC forces had a telling effect. There is strong evidence 
to support the view that, had the meetings not been resumed at 
this time, UNC forces again could have forged their way to the 
vicinity of the Yalu and Tumen rivers within not too long a 
period. . . . This experience did demonstrate the logic that 
military pressure applied at vulnerable points at suitable 
times has caused the enemy to alter his otherwise obstinate 
stand.9
On October 25>, after a 63-day lapse, Joy and Nam II resumed 
their negotiations, this time at Panmunjom. Three days later the Com­
munists conceded on the cease-fire line impasse and agreed that the 
current battle positions, not the 38th parallel, could be the armis­
tice line. There still remained one major problem. The UN team wise­
ly insisted that the cease-fire line be fixed at the moment that the 
final agreement on all the agenda matters was signed. The Communists, 
on the other hand, pointed out that the agenda required the establish­
ment of the line before other matters were discussed. With an estab­
lished armistice line, the Communists effectively would have been free 
from UN military pressure and could have been as intractable as they 
pleased. While the Communists had given in on the idea of the 38th 
parallel as the armistice line, they still held out in this one impor­
tant, albeit subtle, respect. Admiral Joy offers a succinct explana­
tion:
^Vatcher, Panmun.jom, p. 73.
100
The Communists wanted to fix the then existing1 "battle line as 
the final demarcation line between both sides. Their strategy 
was obvious. If the line were fixed once and for all, there 
would be no reason for the Eighth Army to push them further 
north because we would have to give them back the territory we 
had gained when and if an armistice was signed. In short, the 
Communists wanted a de facto cease-fire then and there as a 
relief from the Eighth Army's pressure. But we insisted that 
the demarcation line be the battle line as of the time of the 
signing of the armistice. We realized, if the line were fixed 
permanently before completion of the negotiations, the Commun­
ists could stall to their hearts’ content over the remaining 
items of the agenda. General Ridgway and the delegation felt 
very strongly that this was a situation calling for more steel 
and less silk. We felt certain the Communists would eventually 
give in on this point, thus assuring us of the retention of the 
negotiating initiative and of continuing pressure by the Eighth
Army.10
What happened, however, was precisely the opposite of what Joy and Ridg­
way wanted. Known later as the "Little Armistice," TIE policy following 
the resumption of negotiations can be considered the greatest blunder 
by the UK in the course of negotiations.
The Little Armistice 
There is an important distinction to be made between what the 
UK Army had achieved and what it was likely to achieve by continued 
applied pressure and penetrations deeper into Korth Korea. Strategi­
cally, the Communist forward edge of the battle area had been pierced 
although the UKC could claim as tangible evidence of success only a few 
Korth Korean hills. What mattered was that the initiative at the time 
lay with the UKC; the tides of battle were working with the UK and 
against the Communists. When in late October the conference resumed 
and the Communists agreed to abandon their insistence on the 28th paral­
lel as the cease-fire line, there occurred another de-emphasis on
-^ Ojoy, "How We Lost Out in the Korean Peace Talks," p. 148.
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military operations with a concomitant belief that negotiations and the 
diplomatic process, independent of applied power, would soon bring the 
war to an end. As Time reported, "optimism burgeoned; to the U.K., 
somewhat chastened by the long delay, peace seemed just around the cor­
ner. n11
However, the UKC repeated the mistakes it had made when the 
truce teams had first gone to Kaesong: the emphasis was placed on bar­
gaining and there was a dramatic slow-down in military operations.
Curiously, the first order for limiting the operations came from Ridg- 
way himself. On November 12 Ridgway ordered Yan Fleet to limit his 
operations to the capture of outpost positions and to assume an "active 
defense." Van Fleet was, however, instructed to be prepared to exploit 
opportunities to inflict heavy casualties. As General Collins, then 
Army Chief of Staff, records:
The JCS supported this decision. We felt that the existing 
main line of contact would be satisfactory as the line of demar­
cation for a demilitarised zone and could not be greatly im­
proved without undue losses.
If Ridgway's orders retarded the progress of the UK army, the 
subsequent orders— from whatever source— ended it. While it is diffi­
cult to document a cause-and-effect relationship between public pres­
sure and actual military policy, there surely is a case to be made that 
public confusion or misconstruction of events played a role in the 
decision that the UK must now show good faith in its negotiations with 
the Communists. After all, had they (the Communists) not yielded on 
the matter of the 38"th parallel? As one source had it:
ll"The Education of a General," Time, p. 2 3.
1 p
Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 3H»
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. . . Every time the negotiators seem to he coming near to the 
moment when orders to stop fighting will be given, something 
happens. And usually- so far as the public knows- this takes 
the form of announcement by the U.N. negotiators that there is 
some new hitch they have just discovered and must iron out 
before a truce can be signed. This process began months ago 
when Secretary Acheson, on June 28, said we would agree to a 
truce at the 38th parallel and then, when the negotiations 
started, took that back. . . . Why, with the essentials agreed 
on and the Communists giving up their demand for the 38th 
parallel, is there no truce?13
When the actual line of battlefield contact between the oppos­
ing armies had finally been worked out (November 27), the plan later 
called the "Little Armistice" went into effect. The existing battle 
line would be considered by both sides as a provisional demarcation 
line for 30 days. Neither side was obligated to stop fighting while 
the other truce questions were debated; however, if a full armistice 
agreement were signed within the 30-day period, the provisional cease­
fire line of November 27 would become permanent and the ground gained 
by either side during the little armistice was to be given up. If 
there were no armistice by December 27» the truce line issue was to be 
re-negotiated. As Admiral Joy later wrote:
Presumably the decision had been made on the basis that it 
would serve as an incentive for the Communists to show good 
faith by speeding up agreement on honorable and equitable 
terms. Instead of showing good faith, they dragged their 
feet at every opportunity and used the 30 days of grace to 
dig and stabilize their battle line.^U
The Little Armistice was intended both to induce the Communists 
to show good faith and as ample testimony of UN willingness to nego­
tiate. Henry Kissinger has written of the fallacy behind these objec­
tives :
-*-3"Do We Want a Truce?" Christian Century, November 28, 195>1 >
p. 1361+.
■^Joy, "How We Lost Out in the Korean Peace Talks," p. 1+8.
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It is a mistake to assume that diplomacy can always settle 
international disputes if there is "good faith" and "willing­
ness to come to an agreement." For in a revolutionary inter­
national order, each power will seem to its opponent to lack 
precisely these qualities. Diplomats can still meet but they 
cannot persuade, for they have ceased to speak the same lan­
guage. In the absence of an agreement on what constitutes a 
reasonable demand, diplomatic conferences are occupied with 
sterile repetitions of basic positions and accusations of bad-, ^  
faith, or allegations of "unreasonableness" and "subversion."
Land fighting had come to a stop on almost the entire front on 
November 28, the day after the little armistice went into effect. 
Whether a cease-fire actually was in effect became a matter of some 
concern and of much debate. As reported by The New York Times on 
November 29:
An informal cease-fire seemed to be in effect yesterday 
along most of the Korean war front. Gen. James A. Van Fleet 
. . . indicated that he had not issued a cease-fire order,
and a spokesman for General Matthew B. Ridgway's headquarters
. . . supported the denial. But it was apparent that word
had gone out to commanding officers at the front to refrain
from taking aggressive action.-1-^
One dispatch indicated that orders to stop fighting unless attacked had
been passed down to UN troops from "the highest source, possibly the
White House." Other correspondents reported that UN troops were under
"don't shoot unless shot at" instructions. While air operations and
some artillery barrages continued, a lull had settled over the Korean
front.
Under the terms of the little armistice, offensive military 
operations were permissible but illogical. Even if the UNC won a great
■^Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1957)> P- 2.
-*-^ The New York Times, November 29, 1951, P« !•
•^Facts on File, XI, No. 57^ (November 23-29, 1951)> PP« 377~378.
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deal of territory, thereby forcing the Communists to sign the armistice,
the TOT would then have to surrender the territory it had won at a cost
of thousands of casualties. To a public understandably anxious to end
the war as inexpensively in casualties as possible, waging vigorous
offensive action at this juncture would have seemed counter-productive.
The Administration was in an awkward position. Although there was an
obvious unofficial cease-fire in Korea, the President and the UNC
generals had to deny it:
It was obvious that the White House had moved quickly to 
deny the dispatch /about a cease-fire/ lest the American pub­
lic, and especially that part of it with sons and relatives 
in the war zone, build up its hopes that all the fighting and 
suffering in Korea was //~ sic _J about to come to an end.-*-8
Although one briefing officer said that "We anticipate we will refrain
19from general offensive action during the thirty day period," Presi­
dent Truman strongly argued that battlefield pressure had to be main-
20tained on the Communists to force acceptance of "a just armistice."
In an effort to keep confusion or political embarrassment to a minimum, 
the Pentagon kept the Eighth Army's orders secret throughout November.
They were thought, however, to contain instructions to front-line com­
manders to hold their strong defensive positions but not waste men 
taking ground that would have to be returned to the Communists if the
items on the agenda were worked out and the armistice signed by Decem- 
21ber 27.
l^The New York Times, November 29, 1951» P* U* 
l^ ibid., p. 2.
^ibid., p. 1; and ibid., November 30, 1951, P* 1«
^ Facts on File, XI, No. 578 (November 23-29, 1951), P» 378.
See also, The New York Times, December 3> 1951, P« !+■ A good explana­
tion of the controversy is in Collins, V/ar in Peacetime, pp. 311-312.
Time neatly summarized the effects of the little armistice:
Since the lull on the “battlefield, the Red negotiators 
have been wholly intractable. The U.K. has no policy except 
to try to wear down the Reds at the conference table. In the 
game of waiting the U.H. is up against the champs. Once, the 
U.K. had the advantage in Korea; now it has got into a con­
test in which the advantage is with the e n e m y . 22
Throughout the 30-day period the front was relatively quiet, optimism
was again the fashion and the troops spoke of being home for Christmas.
Then, said Robert Leckie, "came the greatest disillusionment of the
Korean War." By December 27 not even the slightest agreement on the
issues had been achieved; all that had been accomplished by the 30-day
respite was that the Communists had fortified their positions. As
Leckie expressed it, "Communist diplomacy, assisted by American naivete
21had done Communist arms a great service." *
What William Yatcher thought was perhaps the greatest blunder 
by the UlT^ charted the course for the remainder of the Panmunjom talks 
The UK had learned "rather late," said Admiral Joy, "that progress 
negotiation with them /^the CommunistsT" is in direct proportion to the 
degree of military pressure applied." Admiral Joy thought that the 
little armistice was the turning point of the talks:
In retrospect, I believe this was the turning point of the 
armistice conference, and a principal reason progress slowed to 
a snail's pace from then on. In demonstrating our own good 
faith, we lost the initiative, never to regain it. We were no 
longer negotiating from a position of strength but from a posi­
tion of military stalemate. . . . The end of the 30-dny time 
limit was just another date on the calendar. Ho one wanted to 
launch another ground offensive because the psychological handi­
cap would be too large to overcome. The impetus was gone.25
22'iThe Reason," Time, April 28, 195>2, p. 28.
23Leckie, Conflict, p. 3^7•
2^ -Vatcher, "Inside Story of Our Mistakes in Korea," p. 36.
2£joy, "How We Lost Out in the Korean Peace Talks," p. 1+8.
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While the Communists worked feverishly to improve their defensive posi- 
26
tions, the UNC was even willing to extend the deadline. Washington 
authorized Ridgway to continue the deadline for 15 days if the Commun­
ists requested it. As Time observed, not without sarcasm, the Commun­
ists "did not ask; but it looked as if they would have it without 
asking.
The Stalemated Talks
With the issue of the cease-fire "settled," the conferees at 
Panmunjom began discussions of the third, fourth and fifth points of 
the agenda; that is discussions centered upon a supervisory commission, 
arrangements concerning prisoners of war (POW's) and recommendations to 
governments of nations on both sides. The cease-fire line was to 
change very little in the remaining months of the war. In early 1952 
the Communists did not have the strength to move it and the UNC did 
not have the authority; by 1953 the strengths of the opposing armies 
were roughly equal. Except for see-saw battles over certain hills and 
ridges, the main line of resistance between the armies remained pretty 
much the same as they were in late 1951* This is not to say that no 
bitter or bloody battles remained, but demonstrable military progress
^Leckie points out that by the spring of 1953» "the Chinese 
main line of resistance was "among the most formidable fortifications 
in the history of the world." Conflict, p. 317*
27 it After the Deadline," Time, January 7> 1952, p. 15* Shortly 
before the expiration of the 30-day agreement, the Communists released 
the names of some 12,000 UN prisoners, including 3,000 Americans. 
Because another 8,000 US soldiers had been reported missing in action, 
there was great public concern. Time observed: " . . .  Red timing was
adroit. . . .  In the excitement, the failure of the U.N. strategists to 
resume the war went almost unnoticed." "The Education of a General," 
p. 2i|.
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after the little armistice was slight. The war had become one of words
and the TIN no longer had any policy except "to try beating down the Red
negotiators with verbal maneuvers and high-flown rhetoric— which had no
28more effect than so much birdshot against a tank.”
As early as January, 1952, it was clear that the negotiations 
were deadlocked. The Communists were in the kind of battle for which, 
at least by comparison with open societies, they are well-prepared.
The war in Korea appeared to be endless and truce talks to be incapable 
of resolving the difficulties and engendering peace. The Communists
were able to hope for victory by default; secure behind a strong, rein­
forced main line of resistance they could now hope to erode TIN will­
power by degrees through protracted "peace talks" and indecisive mili- 
29tary attrition. ^
Because a good deal of the UN’s policy hinged upon subtle, if 
not really abstruse, reasoning and political realities, the Communists 
were able to employ diplomatic maneuvers which appealed to the western 
public’s desire for quick and uncomplicated solutions. An illustration 
of this is the January 3 (1952) suggestion of Soviet Foreign Minister 
Andrei Vishinsky. A comprehensive program proposed by him that day to 
the Security Council included the recommendation that truce talks be 
transferred into the Security Council in an effort to break the dead­
lock at Panmunjom. He added to his presentation a number of phrases 
which expressed his concern with ending the killing in Korea and
28niphe Education of a General," Time, p. 21+.
^See, for instance, "Korea: Formula for Endless War," US News
and World Report, November 23, 1951 > PP* lU-15; and "How to Deal With 
Communists," in ibid., January 11, 1952, pp. 19-21.
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lessening cold war tension. Pointing out that in the Security Council
Russia would have a veto over any truce talk results, the United States
argued that Yishinsky's suggestion about the truce talks was a trick to
disrupt the talks at Panmunjom. While a number of small nations in the
UN at first favored the Yishinsky peace proposal, the United States,
aided by Britain and Prance, warned that both the system of collective
security and a safe Korean truce would be endangered by this diplomatic
trap. During this debate in the United Nations, truce talks at Panmun-
jom came to a standstill while the Communists awaited the outcome of
the Yishinsky proposal. In separate votes on various aspects of his
30plan, it was voted down on January 8-9, 1952. Importantly, however,
Yishinsky had managed to win a propaganda victory, at least in some
quarters. As one magazine reported:
/The rejection/ gives Communist propaganda a chance plaus­
ibly to claim that we refuse even to explore Russian peace ad­
vances which on their face appear reasonable. . . . Unless
there was something about the Yishinsky offer which has been 
concealed from the public, the American response seems to us 
to have been woefully mistaken.31
Any end to the war would have to come, therefore, at Panmunjom. 
General Ridgway had let it be known that the object of his forces was 
not victory, limited or complete, but peace. UN negotiators had repeat­
edly stressed that their goal was not to impose terms upon a vanquished
32enemy but to negotiate a fair deal. While patrolling and some
30Facts on File, XII, No. 581+ (January J+-10, 1952), p. 2.
3^!,Aaother Free Gift to Red Propaganda,1' Christian Century,
January 16, 1952, p. 60. The intriguing point about this passage is, 
of course, that the editors themselves apparently had been taken in by 
the Vishinsky proposal.
1 Climax in Korea," US News and World Report, May 9> 1952, p.
15.
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skirmishes were authorized by Ridgway, several limited-objective attacks 
proposed by Yan Fleet were turned down by Ridgway, either because they 
would M. . .be too costly in casualties or would adversely affect the 
negotiations.Under these conditions the type of negotiatory tac­
tics best used by the Communists come to the fore. Because the Commun­
ists were relatively insulated from UR military power, they were able 
to employ their standard tactic, explained by Admiral Joy:
On day after barren day the Communists will regurgitate the 
identical statements, the same arguments, used endlessly before.
They seem to follow the philosophy of the small lad who had a 
dollar bill changed into pennies at one bank, then back into a 
bill at another, then back into pennies, ad infinitum. When 
asked why he pursued this seemingly senseless practice, the lad 
replied, "Sometime somebody is going to make a mistake, and it 
isn't going to be m e . "34
By the spring of 195>2, it was clear that the Communists had all 
along intended truce talks to serve a totally different purpose from 
that intended by the TOT. The Communists, by this time, had fortified 
their positions so well that the TOT— unless it wanted to suffer dispro­
portionate casualties— was able only to regret its mistakes, not cor­
rect them. As US Hews pointed out:
Truce talks, it finally is clear to U.S. negotiators, were a 
Communist ruse and stalling tactic from the start.
Talk induced U.S. to end military pressure on Communist 
armies when they were hard pressed. Talk led U.S. officials
^ C o l l i n s ,  War in Peacetime, p. 322. Ridgway's conduct is 
among the most puzzling aspects of the diplo-military side of the 
Korean War. At times he appears to be the champion of the Realpolitik 
viewpoint, the disciple of Clausewitz; at others, however, he seems 
utterly oblivious of the relationship between politics and power. The 
perplexing question of Ridgway's bifurcated approach, urging military 
power at one time and forbidding its application at another, was not 
resolved by research for this thesis. Surely part of the answer must 
lie in the orders he received prior to the start of talks at Kaesong 
and Panmunjom, although Collins offers little help in this regard.
-^Joy, How Communists Negotiate, p. 137-
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to announce that they no longer intended to try for a military 
victory. . . . Truce talks, it turns out, have paid off in a 
big way for the Communist forces.35
As is discussed below, the Communists’ use of wearying tactics was com­
plemented by their employment of other, far more insidious, methods.
Despite Joy's best efforts, the nadir of negotiations for the UNC
"36occurred in his last month as UNC senior delegate.
Issues and Techniques
If the UNC now fully understood that the Communists were using
the truce talks to wage war, not end it, it was equally clear by the
spring of 1952 that the methods of negotiation they used were based on
ethics and customs markedly different from those of the UN team. One
of the techniques employed by the Communists, called "Red Herrings" by
Admiral Joy, became very important in early 1952:
A basic negotiating technique of Communists is to intro­
duce spurious issues and use them as bargaining points. To 
illustrate, imagine that two men are discussing the sale of an 
automobile. Suppose that the seller demands $1,000 for his 
car; the buyer offers $700. If the seller followed the Commun­
ist method something like the following would occur. The Com­
munist seller would propose that the buyer agree in writing to 
purchase all his future automobiles from the same Communist 
salesman. . . . You or I would terminate the discussion peremp­
torily and find another source of the automobile we need. This 
is not possible in international negotiations, however, since
"36-'-'"Why Communists Don't Want Truce," US News and World Renort, 
May 16, 1952, p. 21*.
3^It is interesting to note that even at times when progress 
was least evident, there were predictions of imminent success. For 
instance, one of the bleakest months for the UNC was May, 1952; how­
ever, the following had been reported in The New York Times on April 
13, 1952: "Officials guiding truce negotiations in Korea said today
that an armistice probably would be agreed on fairly soon, possibly by 
May 1." (p. 10). One is rarely justified in generalizing from speci­
fic cases; however, one of the lessons of the Korean truce talks seems 
to be that both negotiators and the general public are better served 
"by moderate skepticism than by buoyant optimism.
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matters of life and death are at stake. Accordingly, our anal­
ogy must continue. After pressing his proposal to commit the 
automobile buyer forever to buy from only one source, himself, 
the Communist seller at last states that he will withdraw his 
proposal only if the buyer will agree to pay $1,000 for the car 
in question. When the buyer protests, the Communist seller 
contends that he has made a great concession in withdrawing his 
proposal; therefore the buyer should be willing to make a con­
cession on the price of the car.37
While Admiral Joy's analogy sounds far-fetched, the tactic he 
explained was used to advantage by the Communist team in early 195>2.
By the spring of 1952, their demands had been reduced to three. They 
wanted to build as many airfields as they desired in North Korea after 
the truce; they wanted Russia accepted as a neutral in the truce super­
vision; and they wanted all 132,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners 
returned, regardless of whether they wanted to go back. In return, the 
UNC prisoners of war would be turned over. As Joy wrote, the second 
demand (acceptance of the USSR as a supervisory neutral) was inter­
jected merely for trading purposes. In due course, it was traded for 
the right to build airfields. The remaining months of frustrating 
negotiations involved essentially one issue: the plight of CCF and
NKPA POW's who did not wish to return home. From their demand that all 
prisoners be returned the Communists said they would never retreat; the 
UN determination to resist involuntary repatriation was equally strong.-^
37j0y, How Communists Negotiate, pp. 89-90.
Sherrod, "The Inside Story of the Korean Truce," p. 125. It 
should be pointed out, however, that Admiral Joy has written that the 
UNC delegation at Panmunjom opposed the principle of voluntary repatria­
tion, fearful that the Communists would subvert it to their own pur­
poses on subsequent occasions. Joy favored an all-for-all exchange of 
POW's which, he thought, could be effected much more quickly; he was 
overruled by his superiors who saw in the principle of voluntary re­
patriation both humanitarian considerations and propaganda potential.
How Communists Negotiate, pp. 150-153*
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The UN was completely •unprepared for the POW problem. As Dean
Acheson later pointed out,
In the first place, it was a wholly unexpected issue to the 
United Nations Command. It never occurred to the United 
Nations negotiators that this would be an issue. . . .
When we saw the numbers who held these views /about not 
wanting to be repatriated/ and the violence with which they 
held them, it became clear that it would not only be highly 
immoral and illegal to force these prisoners to return, but 
that it would also require a military operation of no incon­
siderable proportions to do it.39
A poll of the prisoners had been taken to determine how many wanted to
return to their Communist homelands. Time reported the results:
These said they would "forcibly resist" repatriation: 
l+lj.,000 out of 96,000 North Korean soldiers
15,600 out of 20,700 Chinese soldiers
The following were also unwilling to go back to Red Korea:
12,200 out of 16,000 South Koreans pressed into North 
Korean service 
29,800 out of 37>000 Korean civilian internees . . .
Red negotiators tried to persuade the UN to "revise" the
figures upward. When these efforts were unavailing, they 
broke off the secret sessions and denounced the UN publicly, 
alleging coercion and a "disgusting Anerican t r i c k . " U 0
President Truman knew that his intransigence on the matter of
voluntary repatriation would deadlock the conference indefinitely but
considered his decision morally necessary. As he said:
To agree to forced repatriation would be unthinkable. It 
would be repugnant to the fundamental moral and humanitarian 
principles which underlie our action in Korea. To return 
these prisoners of war in our hands by force would result in 
misery and bloodshed to the eternal dishonor of the United 
States and of the United Nations.
39pean Acheson, "The Truce Talks in Korea: A Pull Report to
the United Nations," Harper* s Magazine, January, 1993> PP» 23> 29-
^"The Prisoners Speak," Time, May 9> 1992, pp. 30-31? see also 
"Climax: in Korea," US News and World Report, May 9> 1992, p. 17*
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We will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings
for slaughter or s l a v e r y .  ^ 8-
It is instructive to note that President Truman was willing, in the
Presidential election year of 1952 , to concede to the Communists on the 
point of letting them build airfields in North Korea. When on April 28 
Admiral Joy presented the UN’s Mfinal offer1’ it included approval for 
the Communists to build airfields, a sacrifice of the UN premise that 
no power should use the truce to make itself stronger.^ While Truman 
may have been willing to give permission for the Communists to build 
airfields, he was, to his credit, unyielding on the matter of voluntary 
repatriation. Robert Sherrod has called Truman’s refusal to permit 
involuntary repatriation ’’one of the most important in history, perhaps 
more important than the basic decision to halt communist aggression in 
Korea.
Sherrod points out that the United States "could have had a 
truce in a minute if we had chosen to turn back the 132,000 prisoners."^ 
Truman, however, did not want peace that badly. For the first time in
the truce talks, the UN team was debating something that clearly was
more a political than a military issue. To be sure, this was the most 
important issue of the negotiations, political or military. The refus­
al of great numbers of Communist soldiers to return home was a tremen­
dous blow to Communist propaganda. Despite their allegations of
^-’’Statement by the President," Department of State Bulletin,
Vol. 26, No. 673 (May 19, 1952), p. 787-
^Leckie, Conflict, p. 326.
^Sherrod, "The Inside Story of the Korean Truce," p. 127-
^ibid., p. 127.
Ilk
"American trickery," there was little the Communists could do to smooth
over such a stinging and residual political issue. ^
Appointed Superintendent of the US Naval Academy, Admiral Joy
left Panmunjom on May 22, 1952. Before he left, he delivered his final
remarks to the Communists in which he said in part:
You have increasingly presented evidence before the world that 
you did not enter these negotiations with sincerity and high 
purpose, but rather that you entered them to gain time to re­
pair your shattered forces and to try to accomplish at the con­
ference table what your armies could not accomplish in the 
field. . . . You impute to the United Nations Command the same 
suspicion, greed and deviousness which are your stock in trade.
You search every word for a hidden meaning and every agreement 
for a hidden trap.^-°
Joy's replacement, US Army Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, Jr.,
was a lay Baptist evangelist who considered his bargaining rivals to be
criminals. "The most important thing in dealing with a Communist,"
Harrison observed, "is to remember- and never forget- that you are deal-
) 7
ing with a common criminal."^' William Vatcher pointed out in his book
^One Communist propaganda technique, the half-truth, is ex­
plained in Joy’s book. Although Joy chooses an amusing illustration 
with which to make his point, the technique he exposes is a particu­
larly cunning and insidious one: "A man was accused of mayhem, it
being alleged that during a street fight he had bitten off the ear of 
his opponent. There was only one witness to the fracas. The witness 
was put on the stand by the lawyer for the accused. The lawyer asked: 
'Bid you see my client bite off the ear of this man during the fight?' 
The witness replied, 'I did not.' The lawyer for the accused, being 
encouraged, then pursued the point further. 'I want this to be very 
clear. You witnessed the entire fight, but you did not see my client 
bite off his opponent's ear?' The witness replied, 'No, but I saw him 
spit it out.' Now the Communist would never have allowed that last 
statement to appear. He would have halted the record at the witness' 
first reply, leaving an utterly false conclusion to the hearer." How 
Communists Negotiate, pp. 102-103.
^Cited in Vatcher, Panmun.jom, p. 1^0.
^Cited in ibid., p. 201).. See also "Joy's Successor," Newsweek, 
June 2, 1952, p.
n 5
that after one meeting in which Harrison has argued his case well,
Vatcher complimented him on his eloquence. Harrison replied, "Vatcher, 
those weren't my words. It was the Lord that put those words in my 
m o u t h . D e s p i t e  Harrison's military experience and his theological 
erudition, his dismissal of the Communists as criminals and his appar­
ent readiness to understand himself, in some circumstances, at least, 
as an interlocutor with the Lord, are questionable personal attributes
of an international negotiator. Without reflection on Harrison's 
la
abilities,  ^one is justified in at least questioning whether one so 
committed to absolutes is able to understand— and effectively deal 
with— the nuances of international bargaining. To Harrison was en­
trusted the most delicate political bargaining of the two-year talks; 
while he appeal’s to have done a creditable job under demanding circum­
stances, his performance, as a professional soldier and as a man of 
rigid opinion, would seem to be the exception and not the rule.
The Koje-do Riots
To the Communists the Korean War was more than a military con­
flict to be waged by their armies; it was an opportunity to enhance 
their prestige in the world. In an effort to wring as much of propa­
ganda value as they could from the war, the Communists resorted to 
duplicity and deceit. Trickery of the kind Admiral Joy first encoun­
tered at Kaesong was complemented by a more vicious and brutal type of
^8Cited in Vatcher, Panmunjom, p. ll*9»
^See ibid., p. li|9» &nd Collins, War in Peacetime, p. for
an appraisal of Harrison's experience and ability. For a discussion of 
religious people as diplomats, see Thompson, The Moral Issue in State­
craft , p. 127.
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propaganda. To the Communists their capture of UNC soldiers provided 
them the chance to gain "confessions" or "apologies" or similar state­
ments from their captives that would he useful as propaganda weapons. 
Although it is beside the point here to go into great detail about 
Communist methods of brainwashing and their allegations that the UN
5owas waging a bacteriological warfare against North Korea, it is 
important to point out that no aspect of the war was overlooked by the 
Communists as a possible source of propaganda. While much of the pro­
paganda they used would have been quickly dismissed as such by most 
Americans and west Europeans, the Asians— at whom most of the propa­
ganda was directed— generally did not have the benefit of high levels 
of education; they were less able to distinguish between objective fact 
and manufactured fiction. As Ridgway pointed out, the Communists "had 
propaganda points to make and we did not perhaps appreciate that what 
looked like obvious fakery and deception to us could be made to look
5lwholly different to the Asian peoples."
purposes that one can begin to appreciate their thinking about the pos­
sible use of their own captured soldiers as a propaganda weapon. Some­
thing beyond the imagination of UN military planners occurred in Korea 
as a matter of Communist routine: over a period of months, the Commun­
ists "gave" the United Nations Command prisoners, including even North 
Korean colonels and commissars. Understandably happy to capture these 
high-ranking officers, the UN had imprisoned them on the island of
It is only with some understanding of Communist propaganda
^For a good analysis of Communist propaganda see Rees, Korea: 
The Limited War, ch. 19 ("Peking: Bacteria for Peace").
The Korean War, p. 202.
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Koje-do, h-undreds of miles from the front. As John Dille wrote:
. . . too late, we found out we had "been had. In our own rear 
area, and under our very noses, the same colonels we had once 
thought ourselves so lucky to capture set about organizing an 
army. It was equipped with crude weapons made in our own com­
pounds, and it was so defiant and well-led that it engineered 
a series of mass prison revolts which stood us right on our 
ears.52
In early 1952 there had been several riots on Koje Island which 
were a source of some embarrassment to the UUC. However, instead of 
fairly but firmly tightening the military discipline that should have 
prevailed, the Koje camp commander, Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, 
was told by the Pentagon that his captives should be ’’pampered, soothed, 
appeased— to make the truce talks run more s m o o t h l y . T h e  organizers 
planted by the Communists were not to be placated by a policy of leni­
ency.
Asked to meet with a group of prisoners to discuss camp condi­
tions, Dodd and another officer, unaccompanied and unarmed, went to see 
them on the afternoon of May 7, 1952. As Dodd indicated that the talks 
would end, he and his aide were surrounded. Unable to resist, Dodd was 
captured and carried off into the compound, a prisoner in his own POW 
camp. His aide averted capture by hanging onto a gatepost for dear 
life; even then the POW's would not release him until one of them was 
bayonetted in the face by a US guard.^
52John Dille, Substitute for Victory (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1952), p. 12.
"^’’Koje Generals: Clark is Cleaning Up Mess. . .,” US Hews and
World Report, May 23, 1952, p. 52.
5^Hal Vetter, Mutiny on Koje Island (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E.
Tuttle Company, 1965), p. 23.
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Sent to restore order in the compound, BG Charles P. Colson 
found himself on the horns of a dilemma. The Communists wanted him to 
sign statements to the effect that there would "be no more brutal treat­
ment of the POW's at Koje. Colson was told that if he refused to sign 
the statements, the POW's would kill BG Dodd. While Colson knew that 
the Communist demands and allegations were ridiculous, he was anxious 
to save Dodd's life. Accordingly, he met their demands and on May 10,
Dodd was released. As T. R. Fehrenbach has put it, it was as if the 
Communist prisoners were saying, "please stop torturing us and we'll 
give you your general back." Colson's signing of statements to the 
effect that the Communist POW's had been tortured was a tremendous 
propaganda victory for the Communists.^
On May 12, General Mark Clark took over command of the TOT Army
from General Ridgway, As Clark later wrote, Admiral Joy (still the TOTC
senior delegate at Panmunjom) was "absolutely flabbergasted" by the
Dodd incident. Convinced that the incident had undermined him in his
negotiations, Joy said, "I'm certainly going to take a beating over
this at the conference table." Of that there was no doubt. Because
General Nam II had ordered the Koje riots, he was in an excellent posi­
es
tion to exploit them at Panmunjom.
The numbers of Communist soldiers who had announced that they
^Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, p. 612. For General Clark's 
version of the Koje affair and the statements signed by Colson, see 
Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 33~b9•
^Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 39.
tin
^'Leckie contends that Nam II had ordered the Koje kidnapping 
(Conflict, p. 33U), and Yatcher agrees, saying that it was Nam II who 
directed the riots (Panmunjom, p.
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would refuse repatriation were a major embarrassment to the Communists. 
There was no better way to reverse the embarrassment and heap discredit 
upon the UNC than by extorting statements to the effect that the pri­
soners' refusal to return to their Communist homelands was the result 
of UN torture. Whether the prisoners "given" to the UNC were planted 
expressly for the purpose of achieving these ends is unknown; there is 
no question, however, that the organizers planted at Koje Island were 
a credit to whoever first planned their objectives.
Although General Clark repudiated the statements signed by Col­
son as extorted under duress, Nam II could still say that "your comman­
dant admitted to the world your inhumane treatment and murderous vio­
lence against our captured personnel." His most important point, how­
ever, was that the riots had "killed and buried the myth that our cap-
98tured personnel refused to be repatriated.Still  more ammunition 
was available to Nam II when the UNC had to bring in BG Haydon L. Boat- 
ner to return discipline to Koje Island. Boatner had to use force to 
accomplish his mission: although order had been re-established by mid-
June, about IjO POW's were killed and at Panmunjom the Communists were 
able to claim that the UNC was once again using repressive violence 
against the POW's.
The Koje-do incident illustrates the extent to which the Com­
munists were prepared to go to maximize advantageous propaganda or to
99neutralize disadvantageous propaganda.  ^ Had it not been for the will­
ingness of the UNC to tolerate the early POW disruptions and defiance
5®The New York Times, May 21, 1952, p. 2.
^See, for instance, Henry E. Lieberman, "Koje Prison Case 
Grist for Propaganda Mill," in ibid., May 25, 1952, IV, p. 5*
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in the "interests" of progress in the truce talks, the Koje situation 
might never have deteriorated so badly. US News summarized the Koje 
problem well:
. . .  In return for the American general’s release, the pri­
soners exacted a propaganda-rich statement implying that U.S. 
troops had mistreated their prisoners grossly. The Communist 
world chortled, broadcast the document throughout the Orient.
Red spokesmen pounced upon its terms to prolong the Korean 
truce talks. The U.S. was seriously embarrassed. . . .
And, behind the Koje episode, critical observers find a 
reason for many U.S. troubles in Korea. Communist officers 
are trained not only in war, but also in politics and propa­
ganda. American military men know how to fight, but little of 
politics. So, in a war that has become more politics than 
fighting, the Communists have outmatched American leaders.^0
Break-Through in Negotiations 
Although the Koje-do affair, with its attendant adverse reac­
tions among UN allies,^ hardened the opposition of Communist negotia­
tors to the UNC's principle of no forcible repatriation, there was still 
hope that the truce negotiations could be successfully concluded before
1953* General Van Fleet, however, proved right in saying in July that
6 P
there was "less chance for an armistice /now/ than ever before." If
the present approach to resolving the conflict was not working, extreme
solutions, such as unilateral withdrawal of UN forces or all-out war,
61were not seriously advocated, and the wisdom of even limited-objective
^"Koje Generals. . .," US News, p. 5>2. See also Haydon L. 
Boatner, "The Lessons of Koje-do," Army Magazine, March, 1972, pp. 3h-
37.
61Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 3^7* li is a measure of the 
success of Communist propaganda that, as Fehrenbach writes, " . . .  some 
of the United States' staunchest allies rather politely queried, 'just 
what the hell is_ going on over at Koje-do?1" This Kind of War, p. 612.
^The New York Times, July 31 > 1952, p. 2.
^3jbid., editorial, p. 22.
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attacks was questionable because of the well-fortified Communist main 
line of resistance.
As General Clark later said, his mission in Korea was fundamen­
tally defensive:
. . . My military mission as left for me by General . . . Ridg- 
way, which had been prescribed to him by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and which I inherited, was a defensive mission. I did 
not have the authority to launch a general offensive designed 
to defeat the enemy.
Although there were costly battles such as those for Baldy Hill and 
White Horse Hill, the general stalemate along the battlefront matched 
the deadlock at the Panmunjom conference table. If the two opposing 
armies were roughly equal in strength, the two opposing truce teams had 
reached an impasse on the POW repatriation issue. In the general US 
elections in November, the Republican ticket of Eisenhower and Nixon 
had won. Keeping his promise to go to Korea, President-elect Eisenhower 
arrived there on December 2. General Clark hoped that the new Adminis­
tration would unleash his army and let him resume the offensive. Al­
though Clark was often with the new President, he did not have the 
opportunity to present his plans for victory to Eisenhower. Clark
became convinced that Eisenhower would seek an armistice on honorable
65terms rather than outright military victory. ^
At the time of Eisenhower's visit to Korea, the prospects for 
negotiated settlement were bleak at best. On October 8, 1952, General 
Harrison had walked out of the Panmunjom conference saying that he had
6^"You Can't Win a War if Diplomats Interfere," US News and 
World Report, August 20, 195U, P« 75*
^Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 233> Collins, War
in Peacetime, p. 3 .
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no intention of returning until Nam II had something of substance to 
say. That substance was to come not from Nam II, but from India which 
on November 17 offered an armistice settlement. India proposed that no 
prisoners should be repatriated against their wills but that those un­
willing to be repatriated should be supervised by a five nation commis­
sion made up of Poland and Czechoslavakia, both Communist, and Sweden 
and Switzerland, both neutral, with a fifth nation serving as umpire.
Despite the fact that this was what the Communists would finally agree 
to seven months later, Andrei Vishinsky automatically denounced the 
proposal as "unacceptable, unsuitable, unbelievable, unsatisfactory."^
Robert Sherrod had made the point that the Communists might 
have compromised, even on the POW issue had it not been for the defec­
tion of so many Chinese. It did not matter, Sherrod argues, that so 
many North Koreans refused repatriation; but when llj.,000 of the 20,000 
Chinese prisoners refused, "the loss of face was too much." ' Despite 
the intransigence of the Communists on the repatriation issue, General 
Clark in a letter of February 22, 1953? requested at least an exchange 
of sick and wounded prisoners. More than a month later (March 28) the 
Communists agreed to the exchange, which was effected between April 19
/TO
and May 3> 1953*
In mid-April the battle for Pork Chop Hill competed for the 
attention of the world's press with the exchange of the sick and wounded
^Sherrod, "The Inside Story of the Korean Truce," p. 127.
^ ibid., p. 127-
^For details see "Real Story of the Returned Prisoners," US 
News and World Report, May 29, 19535 PP* 5U-&3• this exchange,
called "Operation Little Switch," there were 6,670 Communists and 681).
UNC personnel repatriated.
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69prisoners which was about to occur. y In May, as the negotiators 
worked out details of the truce, the fighting along the stalemated 
battle line was savage. The Communists had come full circle: they
were now attempting to gain on the battlefield what had been denied 
them at the conference table— a claim to victory. With a genuine 
diplomatic breakthrough on the horizon in the spring of 1953 > "the Com­
munists decided to use the battlefield to win political points. Com­
munist military efforts to gain the last propaganda victories of the 
war were described this way by Walter Hermes:
. . . the Communists decided to use the battlefield to apply 
pressure upon the negotiations and to prepare some basis for 
their claim of military victory. They had little hesitation 
in expending lives to take a few more hills when the sacri­
fice seemed to promote future political gain.70
If the spring, 1953? fighting was savage and costly to both 
sides, it was strategically indecisive. The plenary talks, which had 
not been in session since General Harrison walked out of them in Octo­
ber, were resumed on April 26, 1953* ®:le talks were now able to show 
progress, although it was slow and unsure. There were indications in 
the spring, the fighting notwithstanding, that the Communists really 
did want to conclude a truce. After nearly three years of indecisive 
combat and frustrating negotiations, the Communists' positive response 
to General Clark's letter requesting exchange of sick and wounded 
prisoners seemed to break the diplomatic logjam. The Communists had 
at last retreated from their former intractable position on the POW's 
and, for the first time in the Korean truce talks, discussions
^For an account of this battle, see S. L. A. Marshall, Pork 
Chop Hill (Hew York: William Morrow and Company, 1956).
Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. $0Q.
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concerned substantive issues and seemed capable of bringing about an 
armistice.
Signing of the Armistice
As with many other questions dealing with the politics of the 
Korean War, the question of what induced the Communists to sign the 
armistice has only speculation as an answer. While it is difficult to 
point to a single incident or cause that so motivated them, one can 
make the case that a number of occurrences, understood as a pattern, 
convinced the Communist leaders that the expedient thing to do was to 
make the truce.
On December 17» not long after his return from Korea, President-
71elect Eisenhower met with General MacArthur in New York City. Al­
though little of their conversation was made public at the time, the 
President's eagerness to have the counsel of his nation's best-known 
proponent of victory, as opposed to negotiated peace, established a 
pattern followed by Eisenhower after his inauguration. In his Febru­
ary 2, 19^3, State of the Union message, Eisenhower said that the US 
Seventh Fleet would no longer be employed to shield Communist China 
from attacks by the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa. As Robert Sherrod 
has said, Eisenhower's deneutralization of Formosa was a signal that
"Chiang Kai-shek was being 'unleashed' to invade the China coast if he 
72chose." Prudently, however, Eisenhower withheld from Chiang the use 
of the Seventh Fleet which meant that Chiang1 s troops had no way to 
cross the Straits to attack the mainland. Although the deneutralization
7^See MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. I|09-Ul5 for details.
72sherrod, "Inside Story of the Korean Truce," p. 127.
of Formosa was not of itself impressive, understood as part of a mood 
of increasing belligerency, it gained significance. As General Clark 
has written, "I think /the Communists/7" feared that a new administration 
with the backing of an exasperated American people, would go all out 
for a military decision, whatever the cost, if a stalemate continued
73much longer."
At a moment of uncertainty in Communist circles about the inten 
tions of the Eisenhower Administration, their chief leader, Joseph 
Stalin, died on March 5, 1953- While it is difficult to ascertain the 
effect of his death on the end of Communist intransigence at Panmunjom, 
one can say at least that his death in no way interfered with the end 
of the war and very probably hastened it.
As early as December, Senator Styles Bridges had advocated 
"use of some of the new weapons, including atomic weapons if their
r j  J
employment would save American lives." For his part, Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles was already on record as saying that atomic 
weapons in the hands of statesmen could serve as effective political 
weapons. If the Communists at this stage could only guess that the 
Eisenhower Administration had adopted an atomic policy, they could be 
sure after Dulles' visit to Indian Prime Minister Nehru in May. Sher­
man Adams later discussed these events in his book in which he points 
out that the Eisenhower Administration had chosen an atomic solution
7^Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 2.
^"Atomize Foe If We Must," (interview with Senator Styles 
Bridges) Newsweek, December 22, 1952, p. 19.
7^ \John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," Life, May 19,
1952, p. 152.
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to the Korean War:
The solution was a precisely stated intention to drop an 
atomic bomb after full notification to the North Koreans of our 
purposes. MacArthur was sure that there was not the remotest 
chance we would actually have to carry out the threat; the Com­
munists would simply throw up their hands and the war would be 
over. Although not as blunt and specific as MacArthur had sug­
gested, it was indeed the threat of atomic attack that even­
tually did bring the Korean War to an end. . . .
That spring we moved atomic missiles to Okinawa. In May, 
during talks with Nehru in India, Dulles said that the United 
States could not be held responsible for failing to use atomic 
weapons if a truce could not be arranged. This message was 
planted deliberately in India so that it would get to the Chin­
ese Communists, as it did. . . .  I //ater/ asked ^/Eisenhower/ 
what it was that brought the Communists into line. "Danger of 
an atomic war," he said without hesitation.76
As Secretary Dulles was to say in the famous "Drihksmanship"
article, "on the question of enlarging the Korean War, . . .  we walked
77to the brink and we looked it in the face. We took strong action.™ ' 
President Eisenhower supported Dulles by saying simply that his strat­
egy was, if need be, to expand the war. Eisenhower intended
to let the Communist authorities understand that, in the ab­
sence of satisfactory progress, we intended to move decisively 
without inhibition in the use of our weapons, and would no 
longer be responsible for confining hostilities to the Korean
Peninsula.7o
’There is plenty of evidence," wrote David Rees, "that Eisenhower and 
Dulles were in earnest about fighting a no-holds-barred war to unite
7^Sherman Adams, Firsthand Renorb (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1961), pp. J48-I19. See also Sherrod, "Inside Story of the 
Korean Truce," p. 128.
77james Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," Life, January 16, 
19^6, P* 78. Dulles indicated that no effort or weapon was to be held 
back if the war continued (p. 71 )•
7^Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years, 1993-1996. Vol. 
I. Mandate for Change (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc.,
1963), P. 181.
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Korea, using atomic weapons and in which the trans-Yalu "bases would
79have "been attacked.^ It is enough to record that, with his threat
registered, Dulles was listened to in June when he indicated that the
8 0Communist military offensive was delaying peace. The Eisenhower 
Administration meant to have peace, even if it had to go to atomic war 
to get it.
The two-month delay "between the time Dulles informed Nehru 
that the US was willing to use atomic weapons in Korea and the signing 
of the truce in June is attributable to a number of factors, foremost 
among them the difficulties caused by Syngman Rhee* When in early 
June, 1953, it at last became clear that a concord of sorts was about 
to be reached, the ROK president became as hard to deal with as the 
Communists. He continued his demands that Korea be unified by force 
and, to emphasize the depth of his feelings, on June 18, he had his 
troops cut the wires of prisoner compounds releasing about 25,000 pri­
soners into South Korea (there was no danger here because most of the 
prisoners had already indicated their desire to remain in the South.)
Although President Eisenhower called Rhee’s action "a bomb­
shell" and on July 1 found it necessary in a news conference to remind
Q  “ I
a questioner that "the enemy is still in North Korea," General Col­
lins has pointed out that Rhee’s actions were really a service to both 
the UNC and to the Communists:
Rhee’s solution of the nonrepatriates problem was far 
simpler than anything evolved at Panmunjom. His action per­
formed a service to both the United Nations Command and the
^David Rees, Korea: The Limited War, p. 5-18.
®^The New York Times, June 16, 1953, P« i*
^Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 185, 187.
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Communists. It effectively reduced the number of repatriates 
to he handled later by the TJ.N. Command, and it provided a 
face-saving1 alibi to the Communists to cover their propaganda 
defeat when so many of their captured soldiers refused to he 
repatriated. They could now claim, as they did, that these 
men had been "kidnapped" by the ROK f o r c e s . ^2
Rhee's "final solution" to the P0¥ problem and the Communists 
consent to the plan for screening of the remaining POW’s (the same one 
toward which Vishinsky had been so bitter in November) cleared the way 
for the signing. Minor problems still remained. The Communists wanted 
to paint Picasso’s peace doves at the entrance of the building in which 
the armistice would be signed; the UN refused to permit the painting, 
claiming it was a Communist propaganda device.^ Similarly, General 
Clark demanded construction of another door on the building rather than 
let his truce team pass through the only door on the north side, through 
the Communist section of the building, and thus appear as suppliants for 
peace. To resolve the problem of vietor-vanquished seating, the tables
D)
were arranged on an east-west line.
On July 11, the ROK president agreed to the peace terms, al­
though the ROK truce team representative boycotted the signing of the 
armistice. On July 27, 1953? after two years and seventeen days, 579
regular meetings and 18 million words, the Korean Armistice Agreement 
85was signed.  ^ General Clark commented simply, "I cannot find it in me
^^Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 357*
^Caridi, "The G.O.P. and the Korean War," p. 1+1+2; and Pacts on 
Pile, XIII, No. 665 (July 2^-30, 1953), p. 21+5.
^Collins, War in Peacetime, pp. 362-363.
^Vatcher, Panmun.iom, p. 1. For three views of the signing, 
see: Dulles, "A Solemn Hour," Yital Speeches, Vol. 19, No. 21 (August
15, 1953), P« 61+3? Irving T. McDonald, "The Korean Truce: Will the End
Justify the Means?" in ibid., Vol. 19, No. 22 (August 15, 1953), PP* 
677-678; and Vera M. Dean, "Neither Munich nor Armageddon," Foreign 
Policy Bulletin, Vol. 32, No. 20 (July 1, 1953), p. h*
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to exult in the hour."
Chapter Summary
As General Van Fleet pointed out, before the conferences at 
Kaesong and Panmunjom, the Communist armies were in serious trouble,^ 
and had to negotiate in order to assuage the UP military pressure. 
However, the UP, on balance, was more anxious to demonstrate its good 
intentions, its cordiality and its willingness to negotiate openly and 
honestly than it was to exploit at the bargaining table its clear 
superiority in the field.
The persistent desire of the UPC to understand negotiations as 
the completion, rather than as the culmination of its efforts led at 
Panmunjom to the single greatest diplo-military blunder of the war. At 
a moment of major strength, the UPC not only sacrificed its initiative 
but guaranteed a self-imposed halt to its operations for 30 days. At 
the end of that time limit, the UPC offered to extend it for another 
15 days. During this period, the Communists built a major field forti­
fication that, some sources contend, effectively changed the military 
course of the war and ended the initiative of the UP Army for the rest 
of the war. At Panmunjom, the UPC learned that good diplomatic inten­
tions are no insurance of equally desirable consequences.
^Cited in Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, p. 693* -An excellent 
analysis of the events and actions which led up to the signing of the 
armistice is contained in Caridi1s The Korean War and American Politics, 
ch. 9, "The Eisenhower Peace," pp. 246-281.
"Enemy in Korea Stronger Than Ever," (interview with Van 
Fleet), US Pews and World Perort, March 28, 1952, p. 24. Van Fleet 
contended, "I have always felt that the enemy’s desire for a cease-fire 
was in direct ratio to the military pressure on him." (p. 24).
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The best UP efforts to maintain a diplomatic equilibrium pro­
duced precisely the opposite effect in the Koje incident. Unwilling to 
risk the possible bad publicity of a disciplinary crack-down on the 
obstreperous ROW compound, the UPC permitted a bad situation to get 
worse; had the Koje commander been ordered to tighten discipline, the 
UPC might have had to endure a few days of unpleasant Communist rhetor­
ic. As it turned out, Koje Island became a two-month imbroglio that 
upset the whole course of negotiations.
Only after the Eisenhower Administration threatened the Commun­
ists with an expanded and atomic war, did they end their dilatory tac­
tics and begin to discuss matters of substance. In the opinion of 
Admiral Joy:
. . . what influenced them most, I feel certain, were ominous 
sounds of impending expanded warfare, the prospect of United 
Pations Command forces being released from their confinement 
to Korea and allowed to range over Red China. . . . Thus at 
the last, the one negotiating factor that Communists respect 
above all else was beginning to appear: naked, massive power
and the willingness to use that power when n e c e s s a r y .
The temptation is to say that much the same results could have been 
attained earlier by the Truman Administration. This question, of 
course, cannot be resolved; what is more likely is that by the time 
Eisenhower threatened to use atomic bombs, Communist prestige was not 
so much in jeopardy as it was, say, one or two years earlier. Because 
the Eisenhower Administration had the prudence not to broadcast its 
ultimatum to the world, the Communists could conclude an armistice 
without a concomitant loss of face. The matter of timing is particu­
larly important to any diplomatic effort and belies general principles 
claiming to be universal.
88joy, How Communists Pegotiate, pp. l6l-l62.
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The proper method and timing of the Eisenhower Administration 
only underscores the failure of earlier efforts at Kaesong and Panmun­
jom. At those conferences the UPC was anxious to prove its good will 
and thus subverted its own power. Particularly at Panmunjom, the UPC 
mistook the shadow of a promised peace for the substance of applied 
power; it failed to recognize there, as at Kaesong, that diplomatic 
and military activities are correlates. This point and matters related 
to it are discussed in the Conclusion.
CHAPTER TV
CONCLUSION
It is as fatal in politics to ignore power as it is to ignore 
morality. 1
— E. H. Carr
This study of the diplo-military events of the Korean War
reveals a mixed success for UN leaders. Two themes help explain the UN
involvement in and prosecution of the Korean War: high purpose and
self interest. One of the principal reasons that this thesis has been
/
given the sub-title "a study in negotiatory naivete” is that the UN 
leaders invariably confused these two themes or attempted to explain 
their participation in the war primarily in terms of the former theme, 
while attributing the latter to the baser instincts of the Communist 
bloc. When the UN resorted to explaining its conduct on the basis of 
high purpose, it impaired the progress of negotiation, for nations 
negotiate on the basis of self-interest, not high purpose. As 
explained by Fred Ikle'*:
Two elements must normally be present for negotiation to 
take place: there must be both common interests and issues
of conflict. Without common interest there is nothing to 
negotiate for, without conflict /there is/ nothing to nego­
tiate about. ^
■^Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis. 1919-1939» Harper 
Torchbooks (New York: Harper and Row, I96I4.), p. 97*
2 /Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, p. 2.
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There is, however, something to be said for the UN "high pur­
pose rationale." As Robert Leckie has put it:
The United Nations made no attempt to deceive the world, 
did not torture or murder or brainwash or remain indifferent 
to human suffering. There might have been lapses in this 
direction, as there are in every army, but they were in con­
tradiction to a policy of compassion.3
"While the two elements of successful international relations (self- 
interest and high purpose) were present in the policy of the United 
Nations, it was in seeking to maintain an arbitrary division between 
politics and power that the UN leaders confounded their purpose^- and 
compromised their strength. The rhetoric of UN leaders obscured their 
understanding of the role of the UN in Korea as having been fundamen­
tally shaped by a regard for self-interest and the desire to save face. 
Thomas Schelling offers this explanation:
"Face" is merely the interdependence of a country’s com­
mitments; it is a country’s reputation for action, the expec­
tations other countries have about its behavior. We lost 
thirty thousand dead in Korea to save face for the United 
States and the United Nations, not to save South Korea for 
the South Koreans, and it was undoubtedly worth it.3
^Leckie, Conflict, p. 399* As Walter Hermes has observed, the 
Communists could distort history, manufacture false charges and create 
incidents in POW camps because for them the dialectic permits the end 
to justify the means. These tactics, he says, "were as much a part of 
the Communist arsenal as the yelling, cursing, insults and discourtesy 
in the conference tent. They were all part of the game to discompose 
the opponent through every kind of pressure." Truce Tent and Fighting 
Front, pp. 505-506»
"^As Henry Kissinger said: "Throughout the Korean War we made
our objectives dependent on the military situation: they fluctuated
with the fortunes of battle between repelling aggression, unification, 
the security of our forces, and a guaranteed armistice." Nuclear 
Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. %0.
^Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 121+.
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In coming to the negotiating tables at Kaesong and Panmunjom, 
the UN practically ceased its offensive military operations, thus 
removing the sole impetus for the Communists to come to reasonable 
terms. The diminished operations were the natural result of the buoy­
ant UN hope that the start of the talks signalled the end of the war.
Thus, for the UN, talks meant the imminent end of hostilities; for the 
Communists, truce talks meant the opportunity to continue hostilities 
by other, that is non-military, means. Instead of regarding the talks 
as a diplo-military conference, the UN sought to segregate political 
affairs from the problems of the battlefield. Yet, contrary to their 
wishes and despite the protests of Admiral Joy, UN negotiators were 
called upon to handle the most inflammatory (and clearly political) 
issue of the truce talks: the POW voluntary repatriation affair.^
In handling the political matters that arose at Kaesong and 
Panmunjom, the UN negotiators, despite their creditable performance, 
were at a disadvantage because the Communist "soldiers" were in fact 
trained, professional diplomats. While dealing in stereotypes and 
generalities is rarely very helpful, it is at least worth considering 
the possible influence upon the negotiations that professional UN 
diplomats might have exerted. An example is provided by Lord Strang:
Apart altogether from effective military power or the 
prestige that rests on military potential, there are fac­
tors which can weigh substantially in the diplomatic scales.
One of them is sheer diplomatic skill. Power of exposition, 
choice of timing, the appeal to reason or to good faith or
6Admiral Joy pointed out that "It must be admitted . . . that 
besides humanitarian considerations, the major objective of the 
Washington decision to insist on voluntary repatriation was to inflict 
upon the Communists a propaganda defeat. . . . Voluntary repatriation 
cost us over a year of war." How Communists Negotiate, p. 152.
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to international comity and morality, or to personal relation­
ship, or to self-interest; the canvassing of support, the 
judicious threat, the dangled inducement, the hint of support 
or opposition on other issues, the sagacious estimate of the 
. . .  strength and standing of the other government: as
between well-matched adversaries, these skills can play a 
substantial role.^
Because the TIN tried so hard to separate political and military matters, 
the employment of professional diplomats at the truce talks was out of 
the question.
Shortly before the armistice pact was agreed upon, General Mark
Clark said of dealing with Communists, whether at Moscow or Panmunjom,
that they showed the "same dishonesty and the same duplicity. They
have no decency, no honesty. They are cheaters, murderers and liars
and they would stoop to anything to attain their aim of world con- 
o
quest." Although he probably did not have Clark in mind, William 
Yatcher offered a comment that may be understood as an answer to 
General Clark:
It must be understood that such methods as the Communists 
employ in negotiations are to them entirely legitimate. To 
them the nature of their ultimate end justifies the use of any 
tactic. The tragedy of Korea was that the United Nations Com­
mand did not accept this fact from the beginning.''
In negotiation, the bargainer must have sure knowledge of his 
own means and ends and have the best intelligence about those of his 
opponent that can be ascertained by serious and sustained study. The 
TIN leaders failed to appreciate that at least in dedication to the
^Lord William Strang, Britain in World Affairs: The Fluctua­
tion in Power and Influence from Kenry VIII to Elizabeth II (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 153*
®The New York Times, March 28, 1953» P* 3«
^Yatcher, Panmunjom, p. 216.
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realization of their goals, the Communists were paragons of moral vir­
tue. In expecting or hoping that the Communists would subscribe to 
western rules or traditions, cherish western values and conduct their 
diplomacy according to some western-fashioned handbook of negotiations, 
the UN leaders were chimerical. Ethics, morality, justice and other 
paradigms of spiritual excellence are important to the life of any 
society. Yet in the relations that occur among states, who will be 
chosen as umpire to determine which local paradigms shall be univer­
salized? Until there be consensus upon the right means and ends, the 
currency of diplomacy will be power.
According to Hans Morgenthau, power "may comprise anything that 
establishes and maintains control of man over m a n . W h i l e  the UN 
leaders were loath to recognize the residual importance of power to 
diplomatic concerns, the Communists used every opportunity and device 
to enhance their standing by winning propaganda victories and combining 
their military and diplomatic resources. The failure of the UN in 
Korea was a failure of its power. The UN did not prosecute the war 
with unrelenting determination, even within its self-imposed restric­
tions, thus requiring the Communists to come to and stay at the bar­
gaining table; the UN did not assess its options and exploit them in 
light of its power premium; the UN failed to produce and adhere to a 
comprehensive program of goals and diplo-military objectives.
The failure of the UN to use and exploit its margin of military 
superiority— to translate it into advantage at the conference table— is 
amply testified to by events in the first year of the conflict alone.
10jYjorgenth.au, Politics Among Nations, p. 9«
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On December 13, 1990, the United Nations passed a measure asking the 
Communist Chinese for a cease-fire in Korea. Peking’s answer was to 
demand a UN withdrawal from Korea, US withdrawal from Formosa and ces­
sation of rearmament plans by the entire anti-Communist world. ^  On 
December 22, Chou En-lai indicated that his government would not even 
discuss a cease-fire until his demands were met. Demands for UN with­
drawal from Korea and US withdrawal from Formosa were reiterated and 
the ultimatum was made that Fed China have a seat in the UN. Chou 
En-lai also declared that when US forces crossed the 38th Parallel in 
October, it had been "obliterated forever" as a "demarcation line of
political geography," and that he would not be taken in by "U.S. strat-
12egy to first obtain a cease-fire and later negotiate."
As was pointed out in the preceding chapters, all these goals
were abandoned by the Communists when they were subjected to sufficient 
11pressure. "Pressure" may be understood either as overt, such as 
military attack, or covert, such as psychological influence. Fred Ikle" 
offers a succinct explanation:
The Korean armistice negotiations might have been ended 
faster or on terms more agreeable to the West had Peking been 
left in greater doubt whether or not the mainland (then exceed­
ingly vulnerable) might have been attacked from the air or the 
sea. At least the threat should have been kept alive that the 
United Nations forces would try to regain part of North Korea.
On February 3> 195>11 months before the armistice talks had even 
started, the State Department declared . . . "that the restora­
tion of peace in Korea would not be helped by ’speculation’
Facts on File, X, No. 5>28 (December 8—l2p, 1990), p. 397; and 
The New York Times, December lip, 1990, p. 1.
Facts on File, X, No. 930 (December 22-28, 1990 ) , P- Ipllp; and 
The New York Times, December 23, 1990, p. 1.
^3see Fred C. Ikle^ Every War Must End (New York: Columbia
University Press, 197l)> P* 88 for a discussion.
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about whether U.N. forces would or would not cross the 38th 
Parallel if they reached it in a new offensive." The restora­
tion of peace might indeed have been helped if just such 
speculation had been encouraged very loudly in Washington! ^
Desire to expedite negotiation was a critical factor in at 
least the initial approach to the truce talks adopted by the UN leaders.
As General Collins has pointed out, the UNC delegation was under pres­
sure from the US government to conclude the talks on agreeable terms as 
quickly as possible. Responsible both to American and allied public 
opinion, the US government knew that people were becoming anxious to 
end the war. The Communists, however, were "habitually less concerned 
with time and human losses _/and7 were better equipped, both tempera­
mentally and with instructions from their governments, to hold out for 
15> fconcessions." Ikle has made the point that "often one side suffers
far more from the postponement of an agreement than the other side.
Such an asymmetry is one of the most cogent factors in pushing the side
that is in a hurry toward its minimum position. With the UN so
desirous of a quick peace, it is all the more puzzling that they were
17so ready to abandon military pressure when the talks began.
Cataloguing the diplo-military mistakes of the United States 
during the Korean War is not a particularly difficult task. What is
"^Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, pp. 2^0-2^1; and The New York 
Times, February 3> 1951» P« 2.
■^Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 331* Vatcher discusses the 
influence of the US government in the UNC delegation in Panmunjom, p.
208.
•^Ikle^ How Nations Negotiate, p. 72.
■^Ikle^ says in ibid. that the "negotiations would probably have 
led to an agreement much sooner, or on terms more favorable to the 
United Nations side, if the latter had been able to demonstrate to the 
Communist side that it might launch a major offensive." (p. 29)
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difficult, however, is the job of weaving those mistakes into the 
fabric of a conspiracy either by or against the US. Two "schools of 
conspiracy" have made the effort. The first, arising during the Korean 
War and reaching its climax shortly after it, saw the mistakes made 
during the war and the war's inconclusive end as evidence of a pattern 
of Communist influence upon or control of the workings of the US govern­
ment. The second, the most visible advocate of which is I. F. Stone,
"I ^
saw the "mistakes" of the war as a pattern of American aggression; 
he saw in the truce talks, for instance, evidence of American procras­
tination and attributed to the US government— or certain of its leaders 
— a conspiracy against world peace.
The trouble with conspiracy theories is not that those who hold 
them find in the conspirators an -unparalleled bent for fiendish and 
diabolical scheming. Rather, the problem is that those who have "dis­
covered" conspiracies attribute to the conspirators an efficiency and 
purposiveness to the point of perfection. It is instructive that both 
schools draw on much the same data presented in the three preceding 
chapters of this thesis; while each school draws totally different con­
clusions, the basic information is, remarkably, much the same.
The evidence adduced by this thesis has not been that the US 
government was the victim of an internal Communist conspiracy nor that 
the US government plotted against the peace of the world. The argument 
presented throughout has been that the UN-US fought a necessary fight
“| O
Besides Stone's Hidden History of the Korean War, see a 
Christian Century editorial, August 22, 1951* examples: "There
have been suggestions that the delays at Kaesong were caused by a 
mutual face-saving contest and even more cynical suggestions that the 
U.S. administration did not want the Kaesong talks to end before its 
gigantic $58 billion arms bill had passed Congress." (editorial, p.
955).
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in Korea and, on the whole, performed creditably. There were, however,
serious and repeated mistakes, misconstructions and misjudgments, the
roots of which were in the reluctance of UN leaders to regard power and
politics as two sides of the same coin. The thesis, in short, has
sought to marshal data to demonstrate that the UN effort in Korea is a
/
suitable subject for "a study in negotiatory naivete."
The problems of the Korean War truce talks are not peculiar to
that trying two-year period of negotiation. Panmunjom was also the
site of negotiations between North Koreans and Americans bargaining for
the release of the U.S.S. Pueblo. While it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to dwell at length on the Pueblo negotiations, it is interesting 
to note the similarities in the styles of the Communist negotiators.
During the Pueblo talks, North Korean General Pak Chong-guk, while con­
demning the United States in obscene terms, referred to the late Presi­
dent Kennedy as a "putrid corpse" and to then President Johnson as a
"living corpse" sure to meet Kennedy’s fate if the US persisted in its
19"mad imperialism." The vilification and seemingly senseless ad 
hominem argumentation was a page from the notebook of General Nam II, 
fifteen years before. Calculated to enrage and disconcert the western 
negotiator, the Communist method of invective and insult will be ineffec­
tive against a dispassionate diplomat, intent upon the substance of 
negotiation. While it is difficult to determine if the Communist 
imprecations were successful in distracting the US negotiators during 
the Pueblo talks, Admiral John V. Smith, a US Pueblo negotiator, said 
of the North Koreans in 19&9 that they were "Mongolian savages . . .
-^Fehrenbach, The Fight for Korea, p. 1^2.
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disciplined rabble . . . mad dogs just a step above animals." As 
long as western negotiators expect their cultural ethos to prevail at 
international conferences, there will be substantive problems for 
negotiators of all nations. While the maledictions uttered by the 
North Koreans during the Pueblo talks surely would have been distaste­
ful to (and perhaps beyond the ken of) any western or democratic nego­
tiator, the diplomat must steel himself to the problems at hand and 
regard insult as an annoying tactic, not a substantive issue.
If there is an example of the ideas and arguments presented in 
this thesis, it is the resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam in 
December, 1972. In the words of Henry Kissinger, the President and he 
"came to the conclusion that the negotiations as they were then being 
conducted were not serious, that . . . the North Vietnamese at that 
point had come to the conclusion that protracting the negotiations was 
more in their interest than concluding them." Kissinger had observed 
that "the more difficult Hanoi was, the more rigid Saigon grew, and we 
could see a prospect, therefore, where we would be caught between two 
contending Vietnamese parties with no element introduced that would 
change their opinion." Afraid that his negotiations with North Viet­
namese negotiator Le Due Tho would serve only the ends of propaganda,
Kissinger said that "it was decided to try to bring home really to both
21Vietnamese parties that the continuation of the war had its price."
2QFacts on Pile, XXVIII, No. 11*82 (March 20-26, 1969), p. 166.
Recent books concerning post-Korea negotiations with the Chinese are:
Arthur Lall, How Communist China Negotiates (New York: Columbia Uni­
versity Press, 1968) and Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating With the Chinese 
Communists: The United States Experience. 1998-1967 (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1908.
21Pacts on File, XXXIII, No. 1683 (January 28-February 3, 1973)»
P. 71.
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When the last round of talks between Le Due Tho and Kissinger 
collapsed on December 13, 1972, the United States began a series of 
massive air strikes on North Vietnam. A December 22 statement issued 
from the White House indicated that President Nixon was determined to 
continue the bombing until Hanoi decided to resume serious negotiation. 
Although North Vietnamese Defense Minister Giap said that the bombing 
would have no effect on North Vietnam’s will to resist, the air strikes 
continued with unabated fury except for a 36-hour halt during a New 
Year's truce arrangement, after which they were renewed. By January lf>,
1973 > "the President had ordered a halt to the bombing and on January 23, 
he announced that a truce had been concluded.
Was this use of military power an impetus for the resumption of, 
and even the conclusion to, the Vietnamese-American negotiations? This 
question alone represents an intriguing aspect of international nego­
tiation between belligerents. If the negotiations were resumed as a 
result of the American bombing raids, the North Vietnamese could admit 
it only with a concomitant loss of face. Similarly, it would be an 
egregious error for Americans to boast that bombing had brought the 
North Vietnamese back to the table. Por his part, Kissinger, in answer 
to the question, would say only, "There was a deadlock which was 
described in the middle of December, and there was rapid movement when 
negotiations resumed. These facts will have to be analyzed by each 
person for himself." Predictably, Tho insisted that the bombings "failed
completely," actually delayed a settlement and were halted because of
22the international outcry against them.
22"paris Peace in Nine Chapters," Time, February 9, 1973, P»
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An equally interesting issue of the bombing of North Vietnam 
was the ’’disappearance” of the President after the decision to bomb was 
made. He offered no public explanations and kept his personal appear­
ances to a minimum during the crisis. Why?
If he had tried to give the reasons for the breakdown of 
the talks, said Kissinger, he would have violated the "confi­
dentiality” that had been agreed on. If he had revealed his 
conditions for ending the bombing, he would have put Commun­
ist prestige at stake. "Therefore the President decided that 
if this action succeeded, then the results would speak for 
themselves in terms of a settlement."^3
There is a painfully thin line between the President’s duty to respond 
to public opinion and his responsibility to help mold it. Which option 
he chooses in a given set of circumstances depends both upon the intri­
cacies of the situation and the character of the President involved.
Although no formula can hope to apply to every situation, Morgenthau’s 
dictum that the government must be the leader of public opinion and not 
its slave seems apropos.^
The inevitable and eternal tension between politics and power, 
right and might, self-interest and high purpose— evidenced by the 
humanitarian concerns about the bombing of North Vietnam— is a constant 
reminder that in the realm of international politics, pat answers are 
not to be had. If we regret that international politics is not a care­
free matter, something to be epitomized into a snappy shibboleth, we 
must do more than mourn. We must ■understand that no universal
’ ’ N i x o n  Reappears on the Scene," Time, February 12, 1973> P- 9«
2UMorgenth.au, Politics Among Nations, p. 5>U7» ^ne d-oes no"k 
need much imagination, however, to conceive of scenarios in which the 
President might be contemptuous of public opinion. The distinction 
between the President's making and following public opinion is of neces­
sity blurred and is a persistent problem of democracy.
1 U
prescriptions for the problems of international relations exist. There 
are no formulas certain to cure various international ailments with a 
mixture of so much diplomacy on the one hand and so much military power 
on the other.
To be sure, military power is no panacea for problems requiring
the craft and competence of the professional diplomat. At the same
time, we must understand that power, like fire, is evil only with evil
employment. Admiral Joy's book contains a final chapter entitled "From
This Thorn, These Wounds, These Warnings." The warnings and the les-
/
sons of Korea are valuable and can remedy US negotiatory naivete if we 
pay them the proper attention. For those who would fear the mixture of 
power and politics and who would seek refuge in any utopian scheme 
wherein power does not exist (as in this imperfect world, it must), a 
warning, not from Joy, but Matthew (21;:6) —  "And you shall hear of wars 
and rumours of wars. See that ye be not troubled. For these things 
must come to pass, but the end is not yet."
GLOSSARY
BG ---- Brigadier General
CCF ---- Chinese Communist Forces
cincunc ---- Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command
CFV ---- Chinese People's Volunteers (CCF)
KPA ---- Korean People’s Army (NKPA)
LTG ---- Lieutenant General
MLR ---- Main Line of Resistance
NKPA ---- North Korean People’s Party
POV ---- Prisoner of War
ROK(A) ---- Republic of Korea (Army)
UN ---- United Nations
UNC ---- United Nations Command
u s (a ) ---- United States (Army)
USAF ---- United States Air Force
USMC ---- United States Marine Corps
USN ---- United States Navy
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APPENDIX A 
CHRONOLOGY
II4.6
1U7
(The discrepancies among chronologies of the Korean War are 
attributable to a lip-hour time difference between Korea and New York 
City and disputes in judgment about decisive moments in combat opera­
tions. Below is a brief listing of a number of important dates in the 
diplo-military history in the Korean War.)
1950
June 25> —  North Korean People’s Army crosses 38th Parallel to invade 
South Korea.
June 2^ —  UN Security Council calls for cease-fire in Korea and with­
drawal of North Korean troops.
June 27 —  TIN asks members to go to aid of ROK. President Truman 
orders US air and sea units to support South Korea.
June 30 —  President Truman orders US ground forces committed in Korea.
July —  Pirst US ground troops go into action in Korea.
July 7 —  UN creates United Nations Command, under commander appointed 
by US.
Aug 1 —  UN forces in Pusan Perimeter.
Aug —  Pusan Perimeter established and Soviet Delegate Malik calls
Korean fighting an "internal civil war” and demands withdrawal 
of "all foreign troops from Korea."
Aug 27 to Sept 15 —  Perimeter battles, heaviest fighting of war.
Sept 15 —  United Nations forces land at Inchon.
Sept 16 —  Breakout from Ptisan Perimeter
Oct 7 —  NS troops begin crossing 38th Parallel: UN General Assembly
authorizes UN forces to pursue the enemy across the 38th Paral­
lel: UN sanctions defeat of North Korea, reunification of
country.
Oct 16 —  First Chinese Communist troops— the "People's Volunteers"—  
secretly enter Korea from Manchuria.
Oct 19 —  Pyongyang, capital of North Korea, captured by UN forces.
Nov 2I4 —  General Mac Arthur announces "win-the-war" offensive.
Nov 26-27 —  Communist forces, now controlled by People's Republic of 
China, attack on both fronts; deep penetration around Tokchon 
threatens to turn Eighth Army's right flank, in the east 1st 
Marine Division flanked and cut off at Chosin Reservoir.
Dec 23 —  Walker killed; Ridgway takes command of Eighth Army.
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1951
Jan 1 —  Communist forces launch all-out offensive against United 
Nations; Ridgway begins orderly retreat.
Jan i| —  Seoul again captured by Communists.
Jan 1$ —  Enemy offensive halted.
Jan 21 —  General Ridgway issues orders for counteroffensive.
March llj —  Seoul recaptured by UN forces for second time.
March 31 —  Leading elements of United Nations Command reach 38th 
Parallel.
April 11-llj. —  President Truman relieves General MacArthur as Supreme 
Commander of UN forces and replaces him with General Ridgway; 
Lieutenant General James Van Fleet appointed as commander of 
US Eighth Army.
April 22 —  Chinese Communist forces launch spring offensive.
May 3 —  Enemy offensive halted.
May 21 —  United Nations Command launches counteroffensive which suc­
ceeds in driving enemy north of the 38th Parallel.
June 23 —  Soviet delegate Malik proposes truce in the Korean War.
June 30 —  General Ridgway notifies enemy he is ready to discuss pos­
sibility of arranging a cease-fire.
July 10 —  Truce talks begin at Kaesong; UN delegation led by US Vice- 
Admiral Charles Turner Joy, Communist group led by Lieutenant 
General Nam II of North Korea.
July 27 —  Negotiators at Kaesong agree on agenda.
Aug 5 —  HN Command breaks off truce talks on grounds of armed enemy 
troops in the neutral area.
Aug 10 —  Cease-fire talks resumed.
Aug 23 —  Communists suspend cease-fire talks on grounds of MbombingM 
of their delegation at Kaesong.
Aug 31 —  HN forces open drive against northern portion of Punch­
bowl area, securing their objective on Sept 18.
Oct 25 —  Armistice conference resumed at new site, Panmunjom.
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Oct 28 —  Agreement reached on battle line as the line of demarcation.
Nov 12 —  Ridgway orders Van Fleet to cease offensive operations and
begin active defense of UN front, thus introducing the stale­
mate which lasts until June, 1952.
Nov 26 —  Agreement reached on location of battle line, "Little 
Armistice" begins next day.
Dec 18 —  Prisoner of war lists exchanged by both sides.
Dec 27 —  "Little Armistice" ends but war remains stalemated.
1952
Jan 2 —  United Nations makes proposal on prisoner exchange embodying 
the principle of "voluntary repatriation."
Jan 3 —  Communists reject UN proposal in such language as to indicate 
the 18-month deadl ock over voluntary repatriation has been 
reached.
April 28 —  Admiral Joy presents UN final offer insisting on voluntary 
repatriation.
May 7 —  Communist POWs on Koje Island begin riots; General Mark Clark 
arrives in Tokyo to succeed Ridgway as Supreme Commander of UN 
forces.
May 22 —  Major General William Harrison relieves Admiral Joy as chief 
of UN delegation at Panmunjom.
Oct 8 —  United Nations adjourns armistice talks indefinitely until
communists accept its proposal on prisoner exchange or make a 
suitable counteroffer.
Nov b —  Dwight Eisenhower elected President of the United States.
Nov 17 —  India introduces compromise truce plan or United Nations.
Dec 2 —  President-elect Eisenhower begins three-day tour in Korea.
Dec 15 —  Peiping radio announces Communist China’s formal rejection of 
Indian compromise plan.
1953
Feb 2 —  President Eisenhower in first State of the Union message ends 
"neutralization" of Formosa Strait.
March 5 —  Premier Joseph Stalin of Russia dies.
i5o
March 28 —  Communists accept UN proposal to discuss exchange of sick
and wounded prisoners of war.
April 20 —  Exchange of sick and wounded prisoners —  "Operation Little
Switch" —  begun in Korea.
April 26 —  Truce talks resumed at Panmunjom.
May 7 —  Communists accept a UN proposal that prisoners unwilling to be
repatriated be kept in neutral custody in Korea rather than 
removed to a neutral nation.
May 25 —  New proposals for ending prisoner deadlock offered at Panmun­
jom, but South Korean observer boycotts meetings; beginning of 
South Korean President Rhee’s campaign to block the cease-fire 
is indicated.
June 8 —  Agreement reached on prisoner of war issue.
June 9 —  South Korean National Assembly unanimously rejects truce 
terms.
June ll| —  Communists launch heaviest offensive in two years at ROK 
troops in eastern sector.
June 18 —  On orders of President Rhee approximately 27,000 North
Korean prisoners are freed and returned to civilian life in 
South Korea.
June 20 —  Communists accuse UN Command of complicity in freeing of 
prisoners; suspend truce talks.
June 23 —  President Rhee reiterates opposition to truce terms.
July 11 —  Rhee announces he will no longer oppose truce terms.
July 13 —  Communists launch even larger offensive than June 12+ assault 
against ROK troops.
July 27 —  Cease-fire agreement signed, Korean War ends.
Aug 5 —  Exchange of prisoners —  "Operation Big Switch" —  begins at 
Panmunjom.
APPENDIX B 
MAPS
151
rrDNGYANO  
CHIMMA>^Oo
o S o o g c AvpNSAN
S o r iw o n
gCansong
9t /  H M 5E0
r-^K-urfv/Ka C
YELLOW SEA
V 'r'cy  x  h  unc Ko n
Kangnong
S OUL
O  ^
INCHON W o o jv
h^vngj
K o rv g ju
T o e jo
Kum ch tf
K u o  so
K yo n g ju
NoV 'Ory
U S A NKyrtsngju
M o k p
Y o n g d o k
MAP: 3
S C A L E :
p rcijiii---
r " >
r 1
A A A
L J
M A .
RUSSIA
A  i.ig.natn\ *._*• r ^  /^i p__^__
ssniirv:
Of' 
i-.unnnam
S ecCffof- 
~Japan
f w ;
W o r th  K o r e a n  a t t a c k  o n  S o u th  K o r e a  2 5  J u n e  1 9 5 0  
A r e a  c o n q u e re d  by N o r t h  K o re a  
by  1 4  S e p te m b e r .
U n ite d  N a t io n s  p e r im e t e r  1 4  S e p t e m b e r
U N . c o u n t e r  a t t a c k  beg u  n 1 8  S e p te m b e r
A r e a  r e c o n q u e r e d  by  2 6  S e p t e m b e r
U N. f r o n t  l in e  7  O c to b e r .
U .N . f r o n t  l in e  2 5 ,  N o v e m b e r
C h in e s e  t r o o p  c o n c e n t r a t io n s  In  
N o v e m b e r .
12S*
Sifeng
Kaiyuan H w e in a n  
° ^
TsingyLian
L iu h o5
130*
xY e n k l r ^ d ^ ong
T u t ^ ^
f l  C h o n g s o n g /O  £  f
H C u n g O  j  K y o n g h u ^ c
H o e ry o n g J  A o ji d o n g t
- \ J - D u  s u n g
S in p in
c
i fT u n g h w a
5 JPae ktu -san  
(P.003 c, 3
L in k ia n g
M u s a n  
0 S a j id o n g
gAiunnmo- Nana™,^Chon°[jin
P osyety"^ Peter the Great 
Bay
Chosan
ATj p '
.M u p y c n g -n i
O S ' " f 7 05-# O S ang-m  Puln g s a !y - /  KH,
san <i,274
^Chasong4^ ^ ^ ^  C^angpai
Ipyon^ dc^ L °Huchane 
I  H w a n je n  p r z r  j  ^ P K a s a n -
VfV L Ts ian  Ic M s n p c jm  j  d o n g  )  Tuun-
; Saimachi / \  /  K o s a n jip J v X j-N  ^  O  f\‘ V; R
v ,   ^ ' ' - ^ ^ j ^ - ^ o W i w o n  S T  J?
K w a n tie n  - ^ x  1 *N
° Rts-nJZi( v ^ i^ N p  P yok to rig
—  o C h a n g s o n g  i ,
-D  P anpyong-o  f  Y u d a m - n iQ ^ ,  | -v
Sakchu  don g  ^Chancjin\ C h a n g h u n g -n ip  |won
I H u ic h o n ,X  /lies. V jK o t o r i  j f
~J O l  / E  A  Puk<jhong \  9Ct
P akch in  I j A ^ ^ n g - s a n S  H o n g w o n  S i n p o Y ^ - u .
. . „ J— V T X X ^ Haml,un5o--^
o S o n c h o n  S  C y p d o n g  J  C h o n g p y o n g  o . - V " 'F^-donj No/ Of 0Acchang ° 9r' htir.^nam
-'O  I y  :l ^ ( i ic : . .  o
’’ on i  V on g hu ng ^*\
S'lcetw*' 1.0)
br>nq A
8,337 ^ K y o n p s o n g
Chuuronjang 
H y e s a n jin  \  ^  O da p jin
-P o n g d u -r i
^  M y o n g c h o n  
H a p s u
K apsan  ±Konidok-san 
\ A  / ls  1 (
KOREA
POLYCONIC PROJECTION 
SCALE OF MILES 
I 20 40 60 a
KILOMETRES
0 20 40 60 80
Capita ls  of  Countries ..
i ^ , nchan5 
foya n g -do
^  <P
- ,9° ^  / Z , ' '3 n -U y v -r - , ..„ '  « • - - /  '
° V » ’CS£ ^ Z C ^ n c h a n g - n ,
M u n c h o n  o  -J r  ..•r:a r'o 
O S o n g ch o n  /  f  y  , , ,
O Y a n g d o k y  ~7>V_ ~ &
Kjng dong X  Wonsan 0 S- A iu:
(  fA n b v o n  \ t
H v ,a c f,o p . *  
. ■ P ’ '
. r I .j 4,V-
K o re a
H a n c h o n w  LQls n  i 
^O^-hungsan 
H a n ijo n g -n i ,A  ^
-  1 X *71 /e > i r d /  '
V^^ vv'p'
- n ic .n
;k c k
'o n g c h o n
ing]OTKc\neso < Pycn^ ynn; .
C ^ » P K y " ^ 0 £ o n K § k s a n / SAnoSe y ^ g ^ O  . I .
C l K K t ^  ° H w ? n r . iu  1 \ . i 3 7 4 \ g  %  n . 2 s r . f , r e
S °  o  \ r j S a f ‘ <von x  ,,  -^."S i / y i  "
C n a p fc '’  w | gg ( i ,  A -x K u m s o n r ?  i i .  \/  C n ae ryo n gp ,1^ .  I O )J° _ S n  - F . )  i I * 3
C h a n t yon e . .O m '  L • ^ X t  P yonggang^ _ _ _ " .rX  I X  c \K o n fo r .S 
P  0  S rn c h c n  N e m c h o n j o m ' ^ C  o  T v . , -  } i
Sinwon-ni0  I , rv -1 .c y -^ S  /,*., °  Kum hw as/JttacAon v rf , c *,)»- v — . . . n d : ; n  s r .S a  o n  h > ; ^  j . . - *  1.1 ..• v j s— HaejU, vcF-' C r> A?.. >^ResJ
E A O F
",§y^ x 5 ’C iiunchon
<t o X aT / a n g
m jr . j in
o
K apyon
  - - . . . - .
'  . K a T ig l’1' " '  % . . ^ S o ^ ^ ' v p v — {V a n g p y o n g  JX oC O E S o ng  c
o.S EC ULT\ C h o n g s o y —
L i A n y a n g  \ - jO ‘ /  C V f . O c 
T o k c h o k - to, *=> C ? n -S a w o n 0  Ic h o n O  O w ;  I ’ VOnjU P y o n p c h a n g - 
V7A ^  o O s a n  vC hecnon^ For,
r i" ,<} K a n g h w a  
B a y
kundo
U llung-do 
(D ope ie t D t ^ ?
o s a n  X h e c h o n ^  C f f r . ^ o  l -> \  
£C hanghow on.niO< ^ r i ;■ U lcl.m
C TrZ&tyf / •
j i ^ n j e r '  1 ,v' ^  11--------- ---- '* <-7-i r3 ,iO
T a k e s h ira a ’ -
(Japan)
S tT fjepn^ ..
T a e r in T  0S r ija n « S
‘ ^ fl  j-v I I
H o r . iT o ^ p  C h o c h iw o n ^  p 
\ 'Kw angc lv -D o  Puyo
* ^  / > 0 ^ n y ^ £ 0  C h cna n  q , y  /  G i1
. iX  ^Y esan r / o  V .-jr^yong  o  /Clionrju! o (X’'P^ A->v^  AYorr
H a m c h a ^ - ^ G f e io n g  ^  '^ ' v i ! n  *v. ..  n *<ySCx\.'G‘-94’ mchangw A^nd'o j
9 ’V^ v ,  o U -s o n g  ^ V o n g d o k  .V I d T jC i I  ,C' y x C h c n *  x3H \  . ) . *j\L~t
X o . T c " °  T o  S o r.s a n C \ Ou. ,_ , „ .  C .io n g h a ] .v - ^
J A P A N
LO Kogunsnn-k
\ \
, r -  i i U 'W i i  Y.-.V ,* -n ■»
M n g g y ^ n g  K „ m s c ,n °  G  ' K -n P S h o n  tP  J '
i'.i LI! U O U1 >' j Lj ^  I'/,'d P 1''.V1 . . n
~  ix d fv -rp g p o  ri
^ . T - r f c r -
I ’igum -do ,
d Cl
la c liu k^r,n -do
tlong -do .
K l in s a i jT m o  °>v  ■■Jr/ ;, ; u ,u S o n t : ju Q WVdPrwan A  - . .M ir y r r
■ , c ! ' ^  o  K S h,n> ino ' i  T i R  ? K  A A -‘ T » « r
Sj-clo^ q  T?--ri A n u jO  i C h^ngdo^ 'A’san . • i •' E /
A n s c n -n ir ^ 'C h o n ^ u p ^  H a m y a iv v )( ^ C Ii3 n p n v o n i;( ‘j -M iry a n g  ’" ' v
K • - i;r:
?f *01\r10'T  T V X°,. -'•X v-;. " v-: ■••■:> sV ■ ? V Ch-,n';sun5: V ;'J, a-'dvX -VXXiipo c
Rrx]X^ c:v"J u s
P J S A N . , ^
V Chin*<lo, ^ r , kJV ,
x»- <Pt
^.Sohukaan-do O’ OSoan-kundo v S o .d(,
(P o r t  H a m ilto n )
42*
38*
c "
V’-*OnD Co. M(p!(-*ooO. N.J.
S t r a i t  
C lie iu  _^vK i‘ rTinYon8jy<j u 0 
(7 M o ^ u lp  i t ' j t t
*T  ( Q u f ' Ip a iL  I . )
<y v ry / ^ T 1’  t  - r 'U  j
XXiki N YavvataXTV J
* J 6 ^  V  p r X  K o V a \ f l 2k : , ts i
F u k u o l t a
1 ^  <> \ ° V  \r t  r <  I  I  U
H a m a d a
M asuda
H^ / ^ S ,
O Y a m a g u c h i t <T1 
°  T ok u yam  a /  QX
S l i im o n o s e K X y x v  h r x - v  “  3i»
:v < ^ ’ G V b e  N v ^
Ijoritfituilu 12b° Earit of Gre-enw ich Q
L K  Y U  S H  u ^  4 
c S  i  “ i ,  K m u i i ie  Ee})pu
°(lSaseb(kv t S\ nr
132*
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Acheson, Dean. Power and Diplomacy. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard Uni­
versity Press, 1998 •
________. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department.
Hew York: Signet, 1970.
Adams, Sherman. Firsthand Report. Hew York: Harper & Brothers,
1961.
Appleman, Roy E. US Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong,
Horth to the Yalu. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of
Military History, U.S. Army, I96I.
Bailey, Thomas A. A Diplomatic History of the American People. Hew 
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 19614.
________. Presidential Greatness. Hew York: Appleton-Century, 1966.
Berger, Carl. The Korea Knot: A Military Political History. Phila­
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968.
Blanchard, Carroll H., Jr. Korean War Bihliography and Maps of Korea. 
State University of Hew York at Albany, Korean Conflict Research 
Foundation, 1961;.
Bradbury, William C. Mass Behavior in Battle and Captivity: The Com­
munist Soldier in the Korean War. Edited by Samuel B. Meyers and
Albert D. Biderman. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1968.
Cagle, Malcolm W. and Manson, Frank A. The Sea War in Korea. Anna­
polis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1957*
Caridi, Ronald J. The Korean War and American Politics: The Republi­
can Party as a Case Study. Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl­
vania Press, 1968.
Carr, Edward H. The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939* Harper Torch- 
books. Hew York: Harper and Row, I96I4.
Clark, Mark W. From the Danube to the Yalu. Hew York: Harper and
Brothers, 195U-
155
156
Clausewitz, Karl von. War, Politics, and Power. Translated and edited 
with an introduction by Edward M. Collins. Gateway Edition. 
Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1965-
Collins, J. Lawton. War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of
Korea. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969*
Lille, John. Substitute for Victory. Garden City, Hew York: Louble-
day and Company, Inc., 195^ -*
Eisenhower, Dwight D. The White House Years, 1993-1996. Vol. I. Man­
date For Change. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company,
Inc., 1963•
Fehrenbach, T. R. The Fight for Korea: From the War of 1990 to the
Pueblo Incident. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 19^9•
________ . This Kind of War: Korea-A Study in Hnpreparedness. New
York: Pocket Books, Inc., I96I4..
Field, James A., Jr. History of United States Naval Operations in
Korea. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962.
Flynn, John T. While You Slept. New York: The Devin-Adair Company,
1951.
Futrell, Robert F. United States Air Force in Korea. New York:
Luell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1961.
Geer, Andrew. The New Breed: The Story of the U.S. Marines in Korea.
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952.
George, Alexander L. The Chinese Communist Army in Action. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1967*
Goodrich, Leland M. Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United
Nations. New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1955.
Gugeler, Russell A. Combat Action in Korea. Washington, D.C.: Office
of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1970.
Halle, Louis J. The Cold War as History. New York: Harper & Row,
1967.
Heinl, Robert D., Jr. Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign.
Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1968.
Hermes, Walter G. TJ.S . Army in the Korean War: Truce Tent and
Fighting Front. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military
History, U.S. Army, 1966.
/
Higgins, Trumbull. Korea and the Fall of Mac Arthur: A Precis in
Limited War. New York: Oxford University Press, I960.
157
Iklef Fred Charles. Every War Must End. New York: Columbia Univer­
sity Press, 1971*
________. How Nations Negotiate. New York: Harper & Row, 196I4..
Joy, C. Turner. How Communists Negotiate. New York: The MacMillan
Company, 1955*
Kissinger, Henry A. The Necessity for Choice: Prosnects of American 
Foreign Policy. Anchor Books. Garden City, New York: Boubleday 
and Company, Inc., 1962.
________. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1957*
________. A World Restored: CastLereagh, Mettemich, and the Problem
of Peace, lSl2-l622. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957-
Lall, Arthur. How Communist China Negotiates. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1968.
________. Modern Interna.tional Negotiation: Principles and Practice.
New York: Columbia University Press, i960.
Leckie, Robert. Conflict: The History of the Korean War, 1950-19.53.
New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1962.
MacArthur, Douglas A. Reminiscences. New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, I96I4..
Marshall, S.L.A. Pork Chou Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action,
Korea, Soring. 1953. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1956.
________. The River and the Gauntlet. New York: Time, Incorporated,
1953.
Montgomery of Alamein. A History of Warfare. Cleveland: World Pub­
lishing Company, 1968.
Morgenthau, Hans J. In Defense of the National Interest. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.
________. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.
5th edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.
Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Oxford History of the American People. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1965*
Oliver, Robert T. Verdict in Korea. State College, Pennsylvania:
Bald Eagle Press, 1952.
Osgood, Robert E. Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957-
1$8
Paige, Glenn D. The Korean Decision, June 2L-30* 1950. New York:
Free Press, 1968.
________. 1950’ Trumans Decision. New York: Chelsea House Pub­
lishers, 1970.
Rees, David. Korea: The Limited War. New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1961;.
Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean War. Garden City, New York: Double­
day and Company, Inc., 1967*
________. Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway. New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1956.
Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1966.
Spanier, John. .American Foreign Policy Since World War II. New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.
________. The Trumam-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War. New
York: W. W. Horton and Company, Inc., 1965*
Stone, Izidore F. The Hidden Story of the Korean War. New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1952.
Strang, Lord William. Britain in World Affairs: The Fluctuation in
Power and Influence from Henry VTI1 to Elisabeth II. Hew York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1961.
/
Strausz-Hupe, Robert; Dougherty, James E. ; Kintner, William R. ; and 
Cottrell, Alvin J. Protracted Conflict: A Challenging Study of
Communist Strategy. Harper Colophon Books. Hew York: Harper &
Row, 1963.
Thompson, Kenneth W. The Moral Issue in Statecraft. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1966.
Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War. Vol. 1. The Thomas Hobbes trans­
lation. Edited by David Grene with an Introduction by Bertrand de 
Jouvenel. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1959*
Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. Translated by Henry 
Reeve. New York: Arlard and Saunders, 1838.
Truman, Harry S. Memoirs. Vol. II. Years of Trial and Hope. Garden
City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956.
Vagts, Alfred. Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of
Foreign Relations. New York: King's Crown Press, 1956.
Vatcher, William H. , Jr. Panmun.jom: The Story of the Korean Military
Armistice Negotiations. Hew York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 195&
159
Yetter, Hal. Mutiny of Ko,je Island. Rutland, Vermont: Charles E.
Tuttle Company, 1S>6$.
Whiting, Alan S. China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the 
Korean War. Hew York: The MacMillan Co., i960.
Young, Kenneth T. Negotiating With the Chinese Communists: The United
States Experience, 1953-1997. hew York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1968.
PERIODICALS, SIGNED ARTICLES
Acheson, Dean. "The Truce Talks in Korea: A Pull Report to the United
Nations." Harper' s Magazine, January, 1953 , PP« 21-31.
£ ---- J- "World Documents: Tne Acheson Testimony." Current His­
tory, August, 1991, pp. 97-HU.
Baldwin, Hanson W. "China as a Military Power." Poreign Affairs, 
October, 1951, PP- 51-92.
Boatner, Haydon L. "The Lessons of Koje-do." Army Magazine, March,
1972, pp. 31+-3 7.
Bullitt, William C. "We Can Win the War in Korea." Reader1s Digest, 
March, 1953, pp. 29-3U.
Caridi, Ronald J. "The G.O.P. and the Korean War." Pacific Historical 
Review, Vol. 37, ho. 1+ (November, 1968), pp. lj.23—lpU-3-
Dean, Yera M. "Neither Munich nor Armageddon." Poreign Policy Bulle­
tin, Vol. 32, No. 20 (July 1, 1953), p. k-
Dulles, John Poster. "A Policy of Boldness." Life, May 19, 1952, 
pp. II4.6—II4.8 et seq.
 . "A Solemn Hour." Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 19, No. 21
(August 15, 1953), P* 81+3.
George, Alexander L. "American Policy-Making and the North Korean 
Agression." World Politics, Vol. 7, ho. 2 (January, 1955), PP« 
209-232.
Halperin, Morton H. "The Limiting Process in the Korean War." Politi­
cal Science Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 1 (March, 1963), pp. 13-39*
Joy, Turner C. "How We Lost Out in the Korean Peace Talks." ITS News 
and World Report, May 22, 1953, P« ^8.
Judd, Walter H. "The Mistakes That Led to Korea." Reader's Digest, 
November, 1950, PP* 5l“57*
160
Kahn, E. J., Jr. "Letter From Korea." New Yorker, July 7, 1951, P* Bk 
et seq.
Kern, Harry P. "An Opinion: Maybe Moscow Wasn't Surprised." Newsweek,
July 21+, 1950, p. 1I+.
Kirchwey, Freda. "Breaking the Circle." The Nation, November 2l+, 1951,
PP. 1+35-1+36.
Lattimore, Owen. "Korea: We Win A Round." The Nation, July 21, 1951,
p. kk-
Lawrence, David. "Civilian Stupidity." US News and World Report,
May 11, 1951, p. 132.
________. "Defeat?" US News and World Report, July 6, 1951, P* 58.
Lofgren, Charles A. "Mr. Truman's War: A Debate and Its Aftermath."
Review of Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (April, 1969), PP* 223-21+1.
McLellan, David S. "Dean Acheson and the Korean War." Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. I (March, 1988), pp. 16-39*
Malik, Jacob. "The Price of Peace." Vital Speeches of the Day, July
15, 1951, PP. 581-582.
Marshall, S.L.A. "Our Mistakes in Korea." The Atlantic Monthly,
September, 1953, PP* 1+8—1+9-
Miller, George. "Shall We Blow Them Up?" United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings, Vol. 79, No. 2 (February, 1953), PP* 150-155•
Modigliani, Andre. "Hawks and Doves, Isolationism and Political Dis­
trust: An Analysis of Public Opinion on Military Policy." The
American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 3 (September, 1972), 
pp. 960-978.
Mueller, John E. "Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and 
Vietnam." The American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 2 
(June, 1971),"pp. 358-375*
Murray, J. C. "The Korean Truce Talks: First Phase." United States
Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 79, No. 9 (September, 1953), 
pp. 980-989.
Oliver, Robert T. "Why War Came in Korea." Current History, September
1950, p p . 139-11+3.
Ruetten, Richard T. "General Douglas MacArthur's 'Reconnaissance in 
Force': The Rationalization of a Defeat in Korea." Pacific His­
torical Review, Vol. 3 6, No. 1 (February, 1967), pp. 79~93«
Shepley, James. "How Dulles Averted War." Life, January 16, 1956, 
pp. 70-72 et seq.
161
Sherrod, Robert. "The Inside Story of the Korean Truce." Saturday 
Evening Post, October 17, 1953» PP* 26-27 et seq.
Smith, Beverly. "Why We Went to War in Korea." Saturday Evening- Post,
November 10, 1951 > PP* 22-23 et seq.
Taft, Robert A. "The Korean Crisis." Vital Speeches of the Bay,
July 15, 1950, pp. 613-617.
Van Fleet, James A. "How We Can Win With What We Have." Life, May 18, 
1953, PP* 1^7-158 et seq.
________. "The Truth About Korea From a Man How Free to Speak." Life,
May 11, 1953> PP* 126-128 et sea.
Vatcher, William H., Jr. "Inside Story of Our Mistakes in Korea."
US Hews and World Renort, January 23» 1953j PP* 35-^0.
Warner, Albert L. "How the Korea Decision Was Made." Harper1 s Maga- 
zine, June, 1951? PP* 9^_10fc>.
PERIODICALS, UNSIGNED ARTICLES
"Admiral Joy Works for Cease-fire Under Difficulties." US Hews and 
World Report, August 214., 1951» P* 5-0*
"After the Deadline." Time, January 7> 1952, p. 15*
"Another Free Gift to Red Propaganda." Christian Century, January 16,
1952, p. 60.
"Atomize Foe if We Must." Newsweek, December 22, 1952? p. 19*
Christian Century. Editorial, August 22, 1951> P« 955*
"Climax in Korea." US Hews and World Report, May 9> 1952» p. 15*
"The Communists Accept." Hew Republic, July 9? 1951» P« 6 .
"The Course of Negotiations for a Cease-Fire in Korea." United Nations 
Bulletin, Vol. 11, Ho. J4 (August 15* 1951)» P« 1^ -9•
"Defeat." Time, December 11, 1950j P« 17*
"Do We Want a Truce?" Christian Century, November 28, 1951» P« 13 61+-
"The Education of a General." Time, July 7> 1952, pp. 22-25.
"Enemy in Korea Stronger Than Ever.” US Hews and World Report, March 
28, 1952, pp. 2i+—26.
"Foothold on Peace." The Nation, July 7 * 1951» P* h»
162
"Hard-Hitting U.N. Forces Wind Up War." Life, October 30, 1950,
pp. 21-21+.
"The High Cost of Mr. Rhee." Hew Republic, July 13, 1953> P* 7*
"How to Leal With Communists." US Hews and World Report, January 11,
1952, PP. 19-21.
"Johnson Tells About ’K Lay’." US Hews and World Report, June 22,
1951, pp. 21-22.
"Joy's Successor." Newsweek, June 2, 1952, p. 30*
"Koje Generals: Clark is Cleaning Up Mess. . ." US News and World
Report, May 23, 1952, p. 52 et seq.
"Korea: Formula for Endless War." US News and World Report,
November 23, 1951, PP* Il+-l5«
"Korean Fumble: Whose Fault?" US News and World Report, August 1+,
1950, PP. 18-19.
"The Korean War." Encyclopedia Brittamica, 1970, Vol. 1 3.
"Moscow’s Orders: Make Peace." US News and World Report, August 10,
1951, P. 22.
"Nixon Reappears on the Scene." Time, February 12, 1973j P* 9«
"No Whistles Blew." Time, July 9, 1951, p. 15-
"Paris Peace in Nine Chapters." Time, February 5, 1973, PP* 12-15-
"Peace But With Our Guard Up." Newsweek, July 95 195l» P« 17*
"Peace Terms." Time, June 11, 1951, P» 21.
"The Prisoners Speak." Time, May 5, 1952, pp. 30-31*
"Problems in Ending a War." US News and World Report, July 6, 1951, 
p. 16.
"Real Story of Returned Prisoners." US News and World Report, May 29,
1953, pp. 51+-63.
"The Reason." Time, April 28, 1952, p. 28.
"U.S., Russia in Peace Leal." US News and World Report, June 22, 1951,
pp. 13-15.
"Victory in Korea in 3 Months?" US Hews and World Report, July li+,
1950, PP. ll|-17.
163
"What Happened in Korea Mien Chinese Marched In." US Hews and World 
Report, February 13? 1953» PP* UO-1+2 et seq.
"Why Communists Don't Want Truce." US Hews and World Report, May 16,
1952, P. 2k.
"Why U.S. Decided to Halt in Korea." US Hews and World Report,
July 20, 1951, PP* 18-19.
"You Can't Win a War if Diplomats Interfere." US Hews and World 
Report, August 20, 195U? PP* 75~8l.
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
"Acts of Aggression in Korea." The Department of State Bulletin,
vol. 23, No. 575 (July 10, 1950), p p . U3-h6.
"Agreements Completed for Meeting to Discuss Truce in Korea." The 
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 25, Wo. 628 (July 9? 1951)> 
p. J+3.
"Exchanges of Messages. . ." The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 25, 
Ho. 628 (July 9, 195l), pp. U3-U5.
/Truman, Harry s/7. "Aims and Objectives in Resisting Aggression in 
Korea." The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23, Ho. 58i| 
(September 11, 1950)? PP« U07-U10.
£  J • "The Korean Situation: Its Significance to the People of
the United States." The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23,
No. 578 (July 31, 1950), pp'. 163-169.
£ ----- J -  "Statement by the President." The Department of State
Bulletin, Vol. 26, Ho. 628 (May 19, 1952), pp. 787-788.
"Use of Land and Waval Forces of the United States for Protection 
Purposes." The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23, Ho. 578 
(July 31, 1950), pp. 177-173.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Un-American Activities. Facts 
on Communism: The Communist Ideology, by Gerhart Hiemeyer.
House Document Ho. 336, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., i960.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed 
Services. Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings. 82nd 
Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.
"United States Policy in the Korean Crisis." The Department of State
Bulletin, Far Eastern Series 3U> Pubn. Ho. 3922, 1950*
161+
OTHER SOURCES 
Pacts on File, 1950-1953? 1969, 1973- 
The New York Times, 1950-1953, 1957*
Hazleton, William A. "North Korea and Sino-Soviet Competition." 
Unpublished Master's Thesis. The College of William and Mary,
1970.
Hermes, Walter G. "The US Army in the Korean War: The Last Two
Years, July 1951-July 1953•" Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown 
University, 1966.
Published in 1966 by the Office of the Chief of Military 
History, United States Army, in Washington, L.C., as US Army 
in the Korean War: Truce Tent and Lighting Front.
VITA
James Hugh Toner
James Hugh Toner was "born in Norwood, Massachusetts, on 
May llj., 191+6. He was graduated from Monson High School, Monson, 
Massachusetts, in 1961+ and received his "bachelor's degree, cum laude, 
in June, 1968, from Saint Anselm's College, Manchester, New Hampshire. 
A graduate of the U.S. Army Infantry Officer Candidate School, Port 
Benning, Georgia, he was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant of Infan­
try in August, 1969> and. served on active duty until March, 1972, when 
he was released to inactive reserve status with the rank of Captain, 
USAR. He "began his graduate studies as an assistant in the Department 
of Government at The College of William and Mary in Septemher, 1972,
and completed his thesis,"Power and Politics in the Korean War: A
/
Study in Negotiatory Naivete," the following summer. In September, 
1973 > he entered the doctoral program in the Department of Government 
and International Studies at the University of Notre Dame.
165
